



Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-197
Thursday
10 October 1991

Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-197

CONTENTS

10 October 1991

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

NOTICE TO READERS: The United States Government recognizes the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Arms Control & Disarmament

Lobov: U.S. 'Surprised' by Response to Cuts [TASS]	1
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on Bush Proposals [5 Oct]	1
PRAVDA Commentator Remarks on Arms Cut [8 Oct]	2
Gen Kobets Summarizes U.S. Military Talks [TASS]	3
CFE Treaty Implementation Issues Viewed [KRASNYA ZVEZDA 8 Oct]	4

Worldwide Issues

Foreign Minister Holds News Conference 9 Oct	6
Comments on U.S. Visit [TASS]	6
Remarks on Union's Role [INTERFAX]	7
Radio Rossii on Remarks	7
Further on Grachev 8 Oct Press Briefing [IZVESTIYA 10 Oct]	8
KGB Official Comments on Security Situation [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 5 Oct]	8
NATO General Comments on Talks in USSR [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Oct]	8
TASS Observer on G-7 Aid Opportunities	9
State Bank Chairman on IMF Membership [TASS]	9

United States & Canada

Gorbachev Talks With U.S. Secretary Madigan [TASS]	10
U.S. Diplomat Zoellick on Changes, Relations [IZVESTIYA 4 Oct]	10
Gates' Objectivity Questioned at Hearings [IZVESTIYA 3 Oct]	11

Northeast Asia

U.S. Air Actions in Korean War Recalled [Moscow International]	12
New Details on KAL Tragedy Appear [IZVESTIYA 4 Oct]	14

East Europe

Stand on Slovene, Croatian Independence Noted [TASS]	15
Honecker 'Could Stay' in Chile [TASS]	15

West Europe

Gorbachev Greets USSR-FRG Forum [TASS]	15
Germany Believes USSR 'Fully Solvent' [TASS]	16
Motives of KGB Defector Fomenko Examined [IZVESTIYA 5 Oct]	16
Italian Businessman on Market Possibilities [IZVESTIYA 10 Oct]	17
Finland Declares Zhirinovskiy 'No. 1 Enemy' [INTERFAX]	17
BBC To Broadcast on Radio Rossii [Moscow International]	17

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuban Fourth Party Congress Viewed [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 10 Oct]	18
--	----

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

INTERFAX Reports Draft of Union Treaty	19
Relations With Baltics Emphasize 'Cooperation'	19
Exchange of Notes 'Historic Event' [TASS]	19
Pankin, Saudargas on Ties [INTERFAX]	20
Soviet Forces 'Very Acute' Problem [Moscow TV]	20
Soviet-Latvian Negotiations [INTERFAX]	20
Shevardnadze on Foreign Political Association [INTERFAX]	21
New Parties Organize, State Goals	21
Party of Left-Wing Forces [TASS]	21
Labor Party [MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 22 Sep]	22
Constitutional Democrats Register [Radio Rossii]	22
Yakovlev Political Statements, Affiliations	22
Remarks at Research Foundation [PRAVDA 5 Oct]	22
Evolution Viewed [IZVESTIYA 5 Oct]	23
Role as Gorbachev Adviser [Bratislava PRAVDA 7 Oct]	25
Primakov 'Must Bring' Stability to KGB [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 3 Oct]	25
Changes in KGB Personnel Viewed [MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 22 Sep]	26
Government Communications Committee Chief Named [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Oct 91]	28
State Committee for State of Emergency Case	28
Grushko Hearing Postponed [IZVESTIYA 3 Oct]	28
Kryuchkov Attorney Protests [PRAVDA 7 Oct]	29
Update on Lukyanov, Yazov [IZVESTIYA 7 Oct]	30
Presidential Commission Created [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Oct 91]	31
TASS Carries Press Review for 10 October	32

Economic

Silayev 'Almost Certain' of Agreement Adoption [Moscow TV]	33
Deputy Minister Discusses Energy Structure [TASS]	34
Committee Seeks Easing of Energy Restrictions [INTERFAX]	34
Latest Union Customs Concept Outlined [IZVESTIYA 4 Oct]	34
57 Percent Stocking Up on Products [TRUD 5 Oct]	35
Drop in Meat, Milk, Egg Production Predicted [INTERFAX]	36
Crisis in Gold-Mining Sector Examined [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 2 Oct]	36
Foreign Companies To Aid Oil Exploitation [Moscow International]	37

Scientific

Cosmos-2163 Space Satellite Launched 9 Oct [TASS]	37
Mir Crew Conduct Experiments During Mission [TASS]	37
Conversion Entails Cuts in Nuclear Research [TASS]	38

Military

Results of Consultations on Military Reform	38
Center To Retain Nuclear Control [Moscow TV]	38
Most Republics Favor Joint Forces [INTERFAX]	39
Manilov Discusses Meeting [Moscow International]	39
Manilov on Baltic Withdrawal [TASS]	39
Meetings Completed [TASS]	40
Poll on Meaning of Disunification of Army [INTERFAX]	40
Amnesty for Armed Forces Deserters Detailed [IZVESTIYA 5 Oct]	40
Military Press To Be Reformed, Liberalized [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Oct]	41
Plan To Reform Military-Industrial Management [INTERFAX]	42

BALTIC COUNTRIES

Baltic Affairs

USSR Announces Lithuanian, Estonian Ties [BALTFAX]	43
Diplomatic Notes Exchanged [Moscow International]	43
Troop Withdrawal Hinges on New Stations [BALTFAX]	43
Baltic Council Adopts Documents on Cooperation [Vilnius International]	43

Estonia

Formal Diplomatic Ties Established With USSR [TASS]	44
Possible New KGB Agreement 'This Week' [BALTFAX]	44
Savisaar, Bakatin Discuss KGB Abolition [BALTFAX]	45
Agreement Suspends KGB Activities [TASS]	45
Protocol Signed [BALTFAX]	45
Agreement To Pay Military, KGB Pensions [Tallinn Radio]	45
Bank Takes Control of Ruble Transactions [BALTFAX]	46
Meri Answers Questions on Slovene Recognition [BALTFAX]	46
DM50 Million German Credit Accepted [Tallinn Radio]	46
Pechery Wants To Remain in RSFSR [Tallinn Radio]	46

Latvia

Godmanis Rejects Alma-Ata Based Treaty [TASS]	46
USSR Interior Troops Begin Withdrawal [Riga Radio]	47
USSR Defense Ministry to Release Buildings [TASS]	47
Jurkans Assesses RSFSR Relations [INTERFAX]	47
Parliament Adopts Draft Law on Citizenship [BALTFAX]	48
Dinevich: Russia Must Be Involved in Talks [BALTFAX]	48
Diplomatic Relations With Japan Restored [Tokyo KYODO]	48

Lithuania

Restoration of Relations With USSR Noted [Radio Vilnius]	49
Pankin, Saudargas Exchange Notes on Ties [TASS]	49
Landsbergis, Major Discuss Troop Withdrawal [BALTFAX]	49
Shevardnadze: Talks Will Be 'Difficult' [BALTFAX]	49
Law Bans Dual Citizenship [TASS]	49
5 Oct Border Incident Detailed [BALTFAX]	50

RSFSR

Supreme Soviet

Lobov 'Sharply Criticizes' Yavlinskiy Plan [Russian TV]	51
TASS Reports on Dispute	51

Federation Affairs

Yeltsin on Silayev Removal; Replies to Letter [Russian TV]	51
Yavlinskiy Views 'Disputes' Among Leaders [TASS]	52
Former Envoy Warns of 'Political Struggle' [TASS]	52
Article Examines 'Crisis' in Power Structures [IZVESTIYA 9 Oct]	52
Rutskoy on Chechen-Ingush Events; Reviews Trip [Russian TV]	54
Bessmertnykh Invited To Head Analysis Center [INTERFAX]	55
Russian Democratic Party Adopts Draft Program [Radio Rossii]	56
Magazine Accused of Hampering Coup Case [TASS]	56
KGB Official on Fight Against Crime [Russian TV]	56

Trade Ministry on Food Import Requirements [Radio Rossii]	56
Declining Food Production Threatens 'Famine' [PRAVDA 8 Oct]	56
Local Affairs	
Chechen-Ingush Situation 'Deteriorates Again'	57
Total Mobilization Declared [INTERFAX]	57
Railway Building Seized [INTERFAX]	58
Media	
Radio Rossii Official on Programming Changes	58
International Affairs	
Official Discusses Border, Territorial Problems [Russian TV]	58
Rally Protests Mainland Attitudes to Kurils [PRAVDA 8 Oct]	59
WESTERN REPUBLICS	
Belorussia	
Resolution To Create Armed Forces Adopted [IZVESTIYA 5 Oct]	60
Convertible Currency Introduction Delayed [INTERFAX]	60
Ukraine	
Kravchuk, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Meet [Kiev Radio]	60
Cabinet Discusses Creation of National Army [Kiev International]	61
Supreme Soviet Assesses Economic Issues [Kiev Radio]	61
Citizenship Law Adopted, Reviewed [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 10 Oct]	62
Communists Plan Presidential Election Strategy [Radio Rossii]	62
Chornovil Receives Presidential Support [Kiev Radio]	62
Moldova	
Snegur Seen as Presidential Front-Runner [INTERFAX]	62
CAUCASUS	
Georgia	
Gamsakhurdia Links Resignation, State Existence [Radio Rossii]	63
Events Termed 'Attempted Coup' [INTERFAX]	63
Supreme Council Vote [AFP]	63
Gugushvili Renews Accusations Against Moscow [AFP]	63
IZVESTIYA on Clashes, Prison Revolt [7 Oct]	64
Demonstrators Use Supreme Council Session [Moscow TV]	64
Artillery Fire Continues in South Ossetia [TASS]	65
Call For 'Military Approach' [Russian TV]	65
Armenia	
Coming Presidential Election Race Analyzed [TASS]	65
Fears of Bread Shortage Discounted [Yerevan Radio]	66
Defense Officials Assess NKAO Issue [Yerevan Radio]	66
Azerbaijan	
Supreme Soviet Views Draft Constitutional Law [Baku Radio]	67
Popular Front Assembly Meeting Reported [Baku Radio]	67

Nakhichevan Decries Armenian Presence at Talks [INTERFAX]	67
Aliyev Calls for Food, Fuel From Iran [Moscow TV]	68

Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast

Thwarting of Agreement Seen as 'Sabotage' [PRAVDA 5 Oct]	68
New Clashes Near Stepanakert Reported 9 Oct [Yerevan Radio]	68

CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Comments on USSR Succession [IZVESTIYA 8 Oct]	69
Activist on Trial for Insulting President [INTERFAX]	69
'Alash' Demands Leaders' Release From Prison [INTERFAX]	69
'Azat' Movement Holds First Congress [INTERFAX]	69
Regional Group To View Economic Questions [Moscow Radio]	70

Kryrgyzstan

Preparations Under Way To Issue Currency [INTERFAX]	70
---	----

Tajikistan

Calm Prevails as Presidential Contest Begins [IZVESTIYA 9 Oct]	70
Labor Collectives Form Strike Committees [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Oct]	70
Winter Bread Shortage Unlikely [TASS]	71

Turkmenia

Niyazov Discusses Security With Grachev [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Oct]	71
---	----

Arms Control & Disarmament

Lobov: U.S. 'Surprised' by Response to Cuts

LD0910153691 Moscow TASS in English 1511 GMT
9 Oct 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—Chief of the Soviet General Staff Army General Vladimir Lobov told TASS today that the recent proposal by President Bush to further cut U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals and President Mikhail Gorbachev's reply initiative coincided in many ways. He noted that there was also "an obvious proximity of positions" on tactical nuclear weapons.

"The two presidents' initiatives did not catch the Soviet Armed Forces unawares," Lobov stressed. "The dynamics and logic of disarmament," he said, "make us work with an eye for the future—the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, a deadline set by Mikhail Gorbachev several years ago. Nevertheless, it was difficult to expect some elements of the voiced proposals, including the complete destruction of nuclear mines, decommissioning and partial liquidation of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles."

According to Lobov, the Soviet side's reply initiative came as a "surprise" for the Americans. It envisages the removal of all nuclear weapons from the tactical air force. "Judging by everything, the United States did not expect this," Lobov noted. "Now the American side is studying this proposal," he said.

"The 'third zero', i.e. the complete liquidation of tactical weapons, is yet infeasible," Lobov noted. "But nuclear ammunition for the artillery and tactical missiles will be fully liquidated, and this is already a big step forward".

"The Soviet Union's attitude to the 1972 Anti-Missile Defence Treaty so far remains unchanged," Lobov said. The expressed Soviet readiness to discuss the American proposals related to non-nuclear anti-missile defence facilities, Lobov believes, will not bring about a hasty revision of the treaty.

"The Soviet Union's lag behind the United States in the development and creation of such systems is proportional to our technology's lag behind the American," the general believes. "In order to overtake the United States in this sphere, huge investments must be made in the Soviet economy and science. But the received effect must be efficiently used in civilian sectors," Lobov declared.

Speaking about the moratorium on nuclear tests, announced in the USSR once again, he stressed that the Soviet side "expects an adequate and constructive reaction from the United States".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on Bush Proposals

PM0910090991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Oct 91 First Edition p 2

["Own Information" report under the "Our Information" rubric: "What Is Being Destroyed and What Will Remain"]

[Text] At the request of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers, we are announcing some of the details of the quantitative aspect of the unilateral U.S. initiatives on tactical nuclear weapons and strategic offensive systems. These figures were provided by U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney and General C. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a Pentagon briefing.

Ground-Launched Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The United States is dismantling and destroying all nuclear shells and tactical missile warheads sited both abroad and on U.S. territory.

In total roughly 2,150 units of the following munitions will be subject to elimination: 850 warheads for two types of Lance missile (including the W-79 "enhanced radiation" warhead) and roughly 1,300 155mm (M-48) and 203.2mm (two types) artillery shells.

Navy Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear-tipped Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles (roughly 100 units) on surface ships and attack submarines are to be removed from the arsenal and put in a centralized store on U.S. territory. If necessary, they can be remounted on ships.

Nuclear aerial bombs for carrier-based aircraft (M-57 and M-61) stored on board aircraft-carrying ships, along with nuclear depth charges used from aircraft carriers and shore-based naval aircraft (P-3 Orion aircraft), will be placed in centralized stores on U.S. territory. Later roughly 50 percent of the approximately 400 aerial bombs in the Navy arsenals will be destroyed (outdated models).

Air Force Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Aircraft using both conventional and nuclear (M-57 and M-61) munitions will remain the basis of the U.S. tactical nuclear potential.

Air Force Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Strategic bombers equipped with nuclear bombs, cruise missiles, and SRAM missiles [short-range attack missiles] are to be removed from combat alert duty. Forty of the 280 B-52G, B-52H, and B-1B aircraft were permanently ready for takeoff with hundreds of munitions on board. Henceforth they are on 24-hour readiness and the nuclear munitions will be stored at depots.

The ground-launched ballistic missiles to be eliminated in accordance with the Strategic Arms Treaty (to be implemented within seven years) are already being

removed from combat alert duty and once the treaty has been ratified their destruction will be speeded up in comparison with the previously envisaged schedule. It is a question of the 450 single-warhead Minuteman-II missiles. Some 500 Minuteman-III ICBM's (1,500 warheads) and 50 Peacekeeper ICBM's (500 warheads) will remain in the U.S. arsenal.

Navy Strategic Nuclear Weapons

These arms systems are the foundation of the United States' nuclear might and are not covered by President Bush's initiative. Two-thirds of the missile-carrying submarine fleet will continue to be kept in permanent readiness for combat use—one-third actually on combat alert duty and one-third en route to patrol regions or heading back to base.

Strategic Nuclear Command of U.S. Armed Forces

In order to centralize control of the strategic nuclear weapons within the U.S. Air Force and Navy there is to be a joint strategic nuclear command stationed at Offutt Air Base, Nebraska.

PRAVDA Commentator Remarks on Arms Cut

PM0810135191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Oct 91
Single Edition p 4

[Yevgeniy Shashkov "Commentator's Opinion": "Measure Seven Times Before You Cut Once"]

[Text] As Washington presumed, the Kremlin's detailed response to G. Bush's disarmament initiative followed rapidly. M. Gorbachev's statement was published in full in our newspaper yesterday. As expected, Moscow's countermoves are wholly in line with the U.S. initiative but also have a number of proposals of their own. I shall note a few of them.

The Soviet president has proposed to the United States the scrapping on a reciprocal basis of naval tactical nuclear weapons as well as the removal of all nuclear munitions (aerial bombs and air-launched missiles) from tactical aviation combat units. They are to be kept at central storage bases. As for the numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces, Gorbachev declared his intention to cut them by 700,000 men.

It is not only servicemen who are considered superfluous here now but also strategic offensive nuclear weapons [boyezaryad]. A few months ago the Strategic Offensive Arms [START] Treaty stipulated that we shall retain no more than 6,000 of them. But now a new decision has been adopted: At the end of the 7-year period of reductions it is planned to cut them to 5,000. In addition, it has been proposed to Washington that, after ratification of the START Treaty, intensive talks begin on a further radical reduction of strategic offensive arms by approximately half.

I think that I should not inundate you with any more numerical computations. After all, apart from those

people whose profession it is to study disarmament problems, few in our country are interested in them. Over the past six years people have become sick and tired of the empty promises that if we "melt down" the guns and missiles it will mean butter on everyone's table in a year or two. The country is in such a situation today that talk of potential multibillion windfalls from the disarmament process simply cause an indignation which could give way to bitterness at any moment.

Indeed, people no longer believe that an arms reduction can turn into real gains today which will be reflected in the lives of the present generation. They have been "fed" too many fables about a radiant future. They are waiting with increasing impatience for real and not "mythical perestroika" internal reforms. But instead of that the powers that be are again becoming furiously active in the foreign sphere, that is, in those areas where, it seems to them, they can quickly improve their political rating, particularly in the disarmament sphere.

There is no denying it—we cannot manage without disarmament. What is more, it could be implemented even more radically than the Bush and Gorbachev initiatives propose. In my view, guaranteed security can be achieved even with 200-300 nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms on both sides.

The objections are due to something else—the oversimplified nature of the very approach to disarmament shown in some places: If we "melt down" all the nuclear weapons we shall begin to live like real people in a nuclear-free world. No, we will not! Meanwhile, our leading politicians do not have the courage to admit that as things stand today the nuclear-free world is a myth, a utopia. Among the members of the "nuclear club," in my opinion, we are the only ones who regard the attainment of a nuclear-free world as a practical task for foreign policy.

That was still possible in 1986 when we were striving for moral and ethical leadership in the world. But is it really justified in the present situation to claim that we are still continuing today the cause that began in Reykjavik? If you look around you will see that our country's place and role in the world have changed fundamentally. Paradoxical as it may seem, the Reykjavik initiatives were viewed as an intellectual breakthrough not so much because of their content. It was more to do with the fact that they were voiced by the leader of a totalitarian superpower. But our present initiative is not evidence of a breakthrough but confirmation of the collapse of a totalitarianism based on superarmament.

Our present activeness in the disarmament sphere is largely due to a concatenation of fatal circumstances to do with the disintegration of the Union and the impossibility in the future of monitoring tactical nuclear weapons in particular from a single center. Why should we not tell people that honestly? Has life really not taught us anything?

I think it would be no exaggeration to say that foreign policy recently, largely designed for outward effect, has become, alas, a contradictory factor in our life. And indeed, was it not the harshness and haste of that policy which promoted the destabilization of society which ultimately led to the attempted coup d'etat?

By conducting a course toward disarmament we tried to do something good not only for our own country but for the whole world, too. That was the theory. But in practice this was done in a forthright, bolshevik-style manner, the most powerful blows were dealt to the country's already ailing economy, and the futures of millions of ordinary people were ruined. No, not the leaders of the military-industrial complex, up until the August putsch they were among the president's immediate entourage.

Why did we not plainly tell the West even once that the very scale of our disarmament initiatives and their incredible cost to the Soviet economy presume an absolutely specific and, moreover, vast Western aid for the conversion of whole sectors of the country's already sick economy? But that is how it is because the reduction of the USSR's military potential made it necessary to directly link the accords achieved in the disarmament process, accords on the elimination of military systems, including the agreement on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and treaties on conventional arms and strategic offensive arms with multibillion agreements in the sphere of cooperation in conversion so as once and for all to transform the production of instruments of destruction into the production of instruments of creation. Why did we not insist that the West share its equipment and technological achievements in this area free of charge? After all, that would have been a real contribution to the cause of strengthening world peace.

Once more, unfortunately, there is not a single word about this in the president's reply to Bush's disarmament initiative. And that means that once again the COCOM restrictions will remain in force, as will the bans on the use of the output and services of Soviet enterprises by firms and organizations in the NATO countries' military industrial complex. As before a vast part of the external market in high-technology output—space services, telecommunications, and nuclear technologies—will remain inaccessible to our country's firms.

Apart from the fact that the lack of an adequate Western response is a most severe blow to the most advanced sectors of our country's industry, essentially leaving them without a future, this will be yet another serious problem not only for us but for the whole world, too. Thousands of Soviet physicists and engineers could be turned into an army of "hired hands." I would not be surprised if after some time the number of members of the "nuclear club" began to rise sharply because scientists bought up in the Union will be creating nuclear weapons.

Is there a way out of this situation? In my view, one will be found. But for that, clearly, we must rid ourselves of the illusion that problems, including those in disarmament, can be resolved only via the collective organs of the center. By all accounts, the START Treaty, which is designed to run seven years, will have to be seen through to the end by the states of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. But above all by Russia. Not only because 70 percent of the country's military-industrial complex and almost all its nuclear potential are located on Russian territory but also because Russia today remains the only great power in the military-political and economic sense in the entire vast Eurasian continent.

I should like to believe that, before attaching its signature to the documents on disarmament, the present Russian leadership will be able to convince the West that it is impossible to behave as though it is the Russians who, having given everything they had for the creation of the military potential in the past, should now shoulder the heavy burden of eliminating it.

Gen Kobets Summarizes U.S. Military Talks

LD0910135691 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2050 GMT 8 Oct 91

[By Tass correspondent Stanislav Lunev]

[Text] Washington, 8 Oct (Tass)— Army General Konstantin Kobets, Russian state adviser on defense and chairman of the Committee on Preparation and Implementation of Military Reform under the USSR State Council, today completed his visit to the U.S. capital. There he met with U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and General Colin Powell, head of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and took part in a Soviet-U.S. seminar on the topic of "Changes and Continuity in Soviet Military Policy" held by a Washington research organization, the Center for International Security, and the Soviet "Army and Society" association.

In an exclusive interview with TASS prior to his departure from Washington, Army General K. Kobets said that the U.S. defense secretary and the head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the military experts who took part in the work of the seminar, were highly interested in the intentions of the Soviet side concerning the implementation of comprehensive military reform in the USSR.

This is related to the fact, the Soviet military commander stressed, that the main aim of his trip to the United States was to exchange views with the U.S. side on matters of the forthcoming military reforms in the USSR—and the United States has considerable experience of such reform—above all in the conversion of military production, integrating the military industrial complex into the country's economy, and ensuring social guarantees for servicemen.

The U.S. side was informed of the fact that four main strategic areas stand out in military reform in the USSR.

The first of these relates to general political and military-political aspects, defining the place and role of a new union state in the world and European military strategic areas, and also defining a likely enemy. Whereas previously deployment of the main groupings of the USSR Armed Forces was made in accordance with the defense doctrine (lately the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency), now this principle no longer meets today's requirements. Therefore, constructing the military in the USSR should be carried out on the basis of the degree of permissible response to the actual risk of possible armed conflicts arising (according to common human concepts).

Consequently, Army General K. Kobets stressed, we need to change our military doctrine so that it meets today's demands. It could provisionally be called the military doctrine of preventing war. And if it is adopted, then it will significantly change the very shape of the USSR Armed Forces.

The second area of reform, the Soviet military commander continued, is economic. On the basis of the new military doctrine of preventing war, we should define what specifically the Soviet economy can provide toward organizing the armed defense of our state and, in turn, to clarify how it is possible to implement in practice the new military doctrine using the technical resources at our disposal.

And only the third area of military reform, Army General K. Kobets indicated, will relate to the implementation of direct changes in the USSR Armed Forces. The size of the Soviet Armed Forces needs to be defined, the question of what forms and types of troops they should possess should be answered, and parallel structures both in management activity and in the structural components should be removed. The center should be in charge of four spheres of activity: strategic intelligence, strategic warning systems, anti-air defense and space defense, and strategic nuclear forces with a unified management structure.

As for ground forces, their state affiliation could be defined gradually. In particular, in the first stage, ground forces situated on the territory of the republics should be regarded as an integral part of the USSR Armed Forces, which should operate according to a single military strategic plan that should be reflected in an appropriate agreement on the division of rights and powers of the center and republics. In the second stage, there could then be joint rather than unified armed forces within the framework of the ground forces, matters of which could be dealt with at a collegium of the Defense Ministry, based solely on the principle of unanimity, a collegium to which plenipotentiary military representatives of the republics should be delegated as full members.

The provision of social guarantees for servicemen could be named as the fourth strategic area of military reform, the Soviet military chief stressed. A package of relevant legislative normative acts should be drawn up in this

sphere which, as in the United States, could resolve all questions connected with the social protection of servicemen.

Army General K. Kobets noted that he will inform M.S. Gorbachev, President of the USSR, and the members of the USSR State Council of the specific plan of proposals elaborated by him in the sphere of implementing military reform.

CFE Treaty Implementation Issues Viewed

PM0910142591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Oct 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by V. Tatarnikov and I. Usachev, staffers of the Russian-American University: "Food for Thought: On the Question of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe"]

[Text] The crisis of the structures of legislative and executive power in the Soviet Union is hindering the solution of many vitally important problems. One should also add to them those arising in connection with the CFE Treaty.

This treaty was signed in Paris almost a year ago by the heads of the 22 states of NATO and the now-disbanded Warsaw Pact. By establishing a balance of forces from the Atlantic to the Urals at a substantially reduced level, it is designed to eliminate the threat of surprise attack or large-scale offensive operations by any state in Europe. Its implementation would help stabilize the situation on the continent, curb the arms race, and help the member states make the transition to defensive doctrines.

A characteristic of the treaty is that the deep arms reductions outlined in it should be implemented by the participants in precise sequence throughout the area of application and should adhere to a schedule to ensure the sides' security while observing equilibrium between them. In 1994 the collective level for each of the two groups of states must not exceed the following: tanks—20,000; armored personnel carriers—30,000; artillery—20,000 pieces; warplanes—6,800; strike helicopters—2,000; and armored bridgelayers—740. Levels of arms have also been established for each party to the treaty. For the USSR, they are:

- 13,150 tanks of which 2,650 at depots;
- 20,000 armored personnel carriers, of which 2,000 at depots;
- 13,175 units of artillery, of which 2,350 at depots;
- 5,150 warplanes;
- 1,500 strike helicopters;
- and 462 armored bridgelayers among regular troops.

In addition—and this is very significant—the full area of application of the treaty from the Atlantic to the Urals is divided into agreed regions where there may be a strictly limited number of armaments and military hardware.

Even a general acquaintance with the treaty's provisions shows the complexity of the measures that our country

will have to carry out to realize its requirements. After all, for the treaty to go into force it is necessary to reduce the total number of armaments to the level envisaged in it on the whole territory of the European USSR and consequently on the territories of the union republics situated there which have declared themselves to be sovereign states. A number of new factors arise in that connection.

The Soviet Union is the party to the treaty and bears full responsibility for the treaty's entry into force and implementation. But since the treaty was signed events have taken place in our country which cannot be ignored. For example, the Baltic states have acquired independence. The question is: Should their armed forces be counted in the USSR's level of armaments?

The next question is the creation of military formations—national guards and so forth—in the republics. If they are equipped with military hardware mentioned in the treaty but above the limits set for the USSR, that would constitute a violation of it. Who will bear the responsibility in that case?

There are fears in the world as to how successfully the Union will manage to pass through the transitional period. It is doubtful that the Western powers would ratify the treaty before the situation in our country becomes clear although it cannot be ruled out that some NATO countries will agree to ratification before us. In that case, we could be accused of creating obstacles to the strengthening of stability in Europe and the lowering of the level of military confrontation by not ratifying the treaty.

In brief, the time has come when solutions must be found. The renewed USSR Supreme Soviet, empowered to ratify international treaties and agreements, will soon resume its activity. Until then, however, it is not clear: Will it be capable of assuming the responsibility not only for the act of ratification but also for the concomitant consequences in regard to ensuring the prompt and complete fulfillment of commitments under the treaty across the entire area of its application in the USSR? The honest answer would seem to be no, it is not. In any event not until there is a firm commitment from the republics to observe the provisions of the treaty relating to their territories, especially in the Baltics, the Ukraine, the Transcaucasus, and Moldova.

Of course the republics themselves could adopt such commitments but for that they need to define their attitude toward the Union of states that is to replace the old structure of the Soviet Union and to find their place in it. And indeed, to give their own assessment of the treaty and formulate their own attitude toward it. However, time does not stand still, the treaty exists, and it must be implemented. The European states are already engaged on this. What about us?

In our view it would be reasonable right now to agree with the republics a procedure for implementing the CFE Treaty. It is difficult to talk seriously about its

fulfillment without the republics' commitment not to exceed the arms levels for the regions, especially on the flanks (in the Baltics, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). This also relates to the right to inspect Soviet Army formations and units in the republics and inspect their national formations.

From the viewpoint of the reliability of the defense of the future Union of sovereign states and the creation of guarantees of military-political stability within the confines of its space, it would be sensible to have unified armed forces. The advantages of such a decision are obvious, in terms of both ensuring the security of the sovereign republics and reducing the economic burden on the participants. However, the existence of unified Union armed forces does not exclude the possibility of the republics' creating their own military formations. There must be complete clarity here. It is one thing if a national guard represents a form of internal troops with the functions of safeguarding the security of republic institutions and maintaining order. Then, having clearly defined its status, it should be made distinct from the armed forces. It is another matter if a given republic creates—in the form of a national guard—a contingent or even a national army to protect its territory with arms limited by the treaty. In that event these contingents must be counted under the CFE Treaty and subject to control.

We believe that regardless of the character of the solution of the question of organizing the Union's Armed Forces there must be commitments from the sovereign republics on the implementation of the CFE Treaty. It would clearly be sensible for the republics to delegate to the USSR Supreme Soviet (or to another higher organ of the Union which may emerge at the end of the transitional period) the powers necessary to ratify the treaty as well as the powers necessary to ensure the monitoring of its fulfillment. It is possible, in our view, to institute a coordinating organ comprising representatives of the center and the republics whose territory falls within the area of application of the treaty. Such an organ, empowered to resolve questions which arise during the implementation of the treaty, could take part in talks to introduce amendments, clarifications, and additions to the treaty if such are required.

It seems to us that the republics' leadership should be giving thought now to the problems of implementing the treaty so as not to conflict with the interests of its participants and not place the enactment of the treaty in jeopardy. The republics could confirm commitments arising from the CFE Treaty and from other current agreements signed by the Soviet Union. It is obvious that the following agreements are not at variance with their interests: the commitments under the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Three Environments, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or the International Convention Banning Bacteriological Weapons. Similar steps by sovereign republics would help to create a favorable climate for the ratification and

implementation of the CFE Treaty and would demonstrate a responsible attitude to their duty and commitments as subjects of international relations.

Worldwide Issues

Foreign Minister Holds News Conference 9 Oct

Comments on U.S. Visit

LD0910194691 Moscow TASS in English
1429 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Nikishev and Vasily Titov]

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin today held a news conference at the ministry's press centre devoted to an analysis of his two-week trip to New York where he led a delegation to the United Nations General Assembly session.

According to Pankin, the trip was brimful of events, comprising about 60 individual and group meetings and conversations with top-ranking statesmen of U.N. member-countries. Of special importance were meetings with U.S. President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker, Pankin said.

One of the main tasks set to the delegation was to inform the world community about changes in the Soviet Union after the August democratic revolution. The topic was central both in his address to the session and in the all the conversations delegation members held.

"We sought to direct the outside world towards active cooperation with our country," he stressed.

The results of these contacts, according to Pankin, testify to the adequate assessment by the world community of the present moment and its significance not only for the fate of the USSR but for the future of the entire world. This conclusion is borne out by the success of numerous negotiations on economic cooperation.

The Mideast settlement featured prominently in the work of the delegation, Pankin noted. He said the convocation of a peace conference was in the focus. Headway was made in preparing the soil for the organization of the conference, especially during the meetings with James Baker and the foreign ministers of Israel and a number of Arab countries, Pankin said.

Serious attention was given to the situation in Afghanistan and around it. The Soviet delegation sought to highlight the problem of Soviet prisoners of war in Afghanistan and ways of securing their release. According to Pankin, the response on the part of the countries involved in the conflict, particularly Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, was "encouraging".

The minister noted the special significance of the meeting with a group of leaders of Afghan rebels from the Peshawar Seven.

Pankin said the situation in Yugoslavia came under scrutiny. The conflict in Yugoslavia was in the focus of a special meeting of the U.N. Security Council.

The Soviet Union, the minister said, co-authored the Security Council resolution on this matter. Proceeding from the principles on which the resolution was based the Soviet Union has since taken a number of steps aiming to end the conflict. The most important of these steps has been Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's address.

Pankin informed journalists about his visits to Sweden and Czechoslovakia en route to and from New York.

In Stockholm, Pankin said, he acted on express instructions from the Soviet president in discussing the expansion of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Sweden and other Scandinavian countries.

In Prague he initialled the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighbourliness and Cooperation, a move testifying to overcoming the political and psychological barrier that hampered the development of relations between the two countries lately. Experience acquired in Czechoslovakia will help prepare similar treaties with other East European countries, the minister said.

Pankin replied to numerous questions from correspondents.

A number of questions were about the Middle East settlement. In his reply Pankin said that the Soviet Union and the United States were acting together in this field as "eventual co-chairmen of the forthcoming conference, invited to act as such by the countries involved in the conflict or in its settlement".

During recent conversations in New York, he noted, "I felt an urgent call for the Soviet foreign minister to visit the Middle East ahead of the conference", Pankin said and added he was planning a trip to the Middle East in the second half of October to discuss a planned peace conference.

Pankin said he was scheduled to visit Israel, Jordan, and Syria, and probably Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

"We hope as before," he stressed, "that the conference will begin at the end of October".

The idea of the conference, according to Pankin, was not to set forth any preconditions.

The minister told the news conference about his meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levi in New York to discuss plans to restore full diplomatic relations with Israel.

"He agreed with our idea that this important action must take place on the eve of the peace conference," the Soviet foreign minister noted.

He rejected allegations about cooler relations between the Soviet Union and Arab countries.

Pankin expressed hope that the Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union would be substantial and constructive. "It may bring nearer by another step the solution of the package of problems that exist between us and Japan," he stressed.

Commenting on the Japanese Government's decision to extend aid to the Soviet Union, Pankin said, "this is a positive step and we welcome it. It is gladdening that the Japanese side announced that this step is by no means conditioned on, or tied to shifts in our positions on the territorial issue".

Pankin drew the attention of journalists to the fact that the recent statement of the Soviet president on nuclear disarmament was "a collective response of our country's" to President George Bush's initiative. The statement had been prepared with the participation of the leadership of republics, including Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

As regards relations with independent Baltic states, the minister stressed that "the Soviet Union has recognised the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and is honouring all its commitments."

According to Pankin, full-scale negotiations are forthcoming on the complex knot of military, economic, property and humanitarian issues.

Characterizing relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba, Pankin noted that during his meeting with the Cuban foreign minister in New York, "we confirmed once again our intention to transfer our relations with Cuba, as well as with other countries to a normal legal basis."

All Soviet proposals were prompted by this intention, he noted, and pointed out that the reaction to this approach was "normal".

The Soviet Foreign minister said that Soviet and Finnish Foreign Ministries were now considering the question about "how well the 1948 treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance matches today's realities".

The territorial question, he stressed, "was not raised and is beyond discussion."

Remarks on Union's Role

OW0910184791 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1723 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Report by Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev from "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Boris Pankin has made it clear today (October 9) that the final decisions on such issues as nuclear disarmament and the future of the Kuril Islands will be taken by the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union, not the foreign ministries of former Union republics. Speaking before journalists, he disagreed with the view that the proposals on the reduction of tactical and strategic armaments made by the Russian Foreign Ministry were more radical than the ideas put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in his reply to George Bush. According to Mr Pankin, Mr Gorbachev's ideas form a continuation of a process the outlines for which were drawn back in January 1986, when Mr Gorbachev proposed his concept for building a nuclear-free world by the year 2000.

As for the statements on the future of the Kuril Islands made by Ruslan Khasbulatov and some of his colleagues from the "Russian political establishment", Mr Pankin said that "the less a politician has to do with the actual mechanisms for making decisions the more radical their statements may be". Very shortly, said Mr Pankin (on October 13, according to DP ["Diplomatic Panorama"] sources), the Japanese foreign minister, Taro Nakayama, is expected to come to Moscow for a new, detailed discussion of the problem. No haste was necessary here.

As became clear from Mr Pankin's words, he is going to the Middle East in the middle of October in connection with the preparations for a regional peace conference planned for the end of this month. He is planning to visit Syria, Jordan, Israel and possibly Saudi Arabia and Egypt. He made it clear that it might be declared about the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel in the course of this visit.

Mr Pankin also said that he was going to see Yevgeniy Primakov, who had recently been appointed chief of Soviet external intelligence, in order to discuss the activity of KGB officers disguised as diplomats. The work of Soviet intelligence officers, Mr Pankin believes, cannot violate the "generally recognised requirements of international law". He did not, however, answer the question whether Mr Primakov had worked for Soviet intelligence when he was in the Middle East as a journalist in the past. Speaking of himself, Mr Pankin said he had never worked for the KGB.

Radio Rossii on Remarks

LD0910231991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 2200 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] Boris Pankin, head of the Union Foreign Ministry, has made it clear that the final decision on such issues as nuclear disarmament and the fate of the Kuril Islands will be made by the USSR Foreign Ministry and not by former Union republics. The USSR foreign minister told journalists he did not agree with the opinion that proposals on reducing tactical and strategic weapons put forward by Russia's foreign policy department go beyond Gorbachev's ideas set forth in his reply to Bush. We are talking about a process which started taking

shape in January 1986, when Gorbachev announced the concept of achieving a nuclear free world by the year 2000.

Further on Grachev 8 Oct Press Briefing

PM1010093191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2

[G. Charodeyev report: "State Council Will Meet 11 October"]

[Text] Andrey Grachev, aide to the USSR president and leader of his press service, has given a briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center.

He reported, in particular, that a session of the State Council will be held in Moscow Friday 11 October. It will be devoted to finalizing the agreement on an economic community in the Soviet Union. Questions of the conclusion of a food agreement among the republics are expected to be discussed. There will be an exchange of opinions on the organization of work on preparing a treaty on the union of sovereign states. The draft prepared by Presidents M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin has already been circulated to the republic leaders. In addition, this session will see the first discussion of a fundamental reorganization of the KGB. Proposals on this score were recently submitted to the State Council.

The leader of the president's press service devoted great attention to G. Bush's initiative in the sphere of reducing nuclear arms and to M. Gorbachev's reply to it. He emphasized that the road to the practical realization of unilateral but essentially parallel steps by the USSR and the United States in the sphere of reducing tactical nuclear weapons has been opened as a result of the statements made by the two countries' leaders. Unilateral reductions, Grachev said, will accelerate progress toward real nuclear disarmament.

KGB Official Comments on Security Situation

PM0910102991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 5 Oct 91 p 1

[V. Filin report: "We Don't Need NATO Alone"]

[Text] The international conference "Topical Problems of International Security," at which Vladimir Rubanov, now head of the KGB Analysis Directorate, spoke, ended recently.

"I was speaking as a private individual," Vladimir Arsenyevich said when asked to comment on the situation, "and from a scientist's standpoint. First and foremost I said that a fundamentally new concept of security is needed today for the Union of Sovereign States. Inside the country we need to reach agreement on the limits of the republics' individual and collective security and ensure legal, civilized control of all 'power' structures—the Army, KGB, and Ministry of Internal Affairs—and from the outside we need to prevent

nuclear weapons from being split up among the republics and spreading around the planet. They should be in one pair of hands—the legal successor to the Union, either a republic or a new Union representing the interests of all its members. Otherwise the world will not understand us. Rumors about the closed, secret nature of the conference are clearly exaggerated. It was a working meeting of scientists and specialists, nothing more."

When asked "Is it true that Russia intends to join NATO to ensure its security?" the apparatus of Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy said: "No." The idea of the advisability of creating joint armed forces, but under UN auspices, which may in principle also include the Union Army in some form has been voiced as a subject for discussion at the meeting between Rutskoy and the NATO delegation. In itself the North Atlantic alliance may not be necessary in the current conditions, but that is a question for future discussion. Along with the mechanisms for controlling all the processes.

NATO General Comments on Talks in USSR

PM0910083591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Oct 91 First Edition p 2

[TASS diplomatic correspondent S. Nikishov report: "General Kenny Explains NATO Policy in Nakhbino"]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Oct—"This is my first time in the Soviet capital, but my visit represents a continuation of the bloc leadership's course of developing contacts with the Soviet military," General Brian Kenny, NATO deputy supreme allied commander Europe, said.

He is taking part in an international conference on "Pressing Problems of International Security" organized by the Center for Studies of Problems of National Security and Strategic Stability and the Association of Independent Publications in the village of Nakhbino near Moscow.

During a conversation with journalists the general stressed that "developing contacts with the Soviet military is part of the new NATO strategy" formulated at the bloc summit meeting in July 1990 in London. Even before the attempted coup in the USSR, he indicated, "we in NATO were aiming to establish contacts with the Soviet military." The NATO military man has already met with the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and with representatives of other military structures. "I tried to explain to the Soviet military the special features of the new NATO strategy and listened to their thoughts on the emerging military reform in the USSR," Brian Kenny noted. He also plans talks at the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, the USSR Foreign Ministry, and the USSR KGB.

During the visit the general said he has formed the impression that the Soviet leadership, the military leadership included, "realizes the need for radical reform."

Voicing his opinion of U.S. President George Bush's recent initiative on cutting nuclear arms, the general pointed out that "from the military viewpoint this initiative to a considerable extent backs up NATO's position in reforming its strategy, particularly on the question of reliance on nuclear forces." According to him, this question was broached at meetings with the Soviet military and "by and large their reaction was positive."

Brian Kenny announced the existence of a program for developing contacts between the NATO and USSR military. In particular, after this November's routine NATO summit meeting in Rome a group of military men from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff will visit the bloc's headquarters.

TASS Observer on G-7 Aid Opportunities

*LD0910052391 Moscow TASS in English 2018 GMT
8 Oct 91*

[By TASS international observer Albert Balebanov]

[Text] Moscow October 8 TASS—A conference of the finance ministers and managers of the central banks of the world's seven leading industrial powers, closely followed by the annual session of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), will be held in the capital of Thailand from October 11-15.

One of the key items of their agenda will be aid to the Soviet Union. A Soviet delegation, led, according to unofficial sources, by economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, is expected to participate.

Judging by reports in the foreign press and statements by officials of the G7 governments. The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development there are chances for the Soviet Union to receive some international aid. The question now is on what terms such aid will be provided, on what scale, and whether it will be a lump-sum aid or a drawn-out operation. It is not ruled out that the Bangkok sessions may decide to put off payments of the Soviet debt, that will amount to between three and five billion dollars by the end of this year, according to Western estimates.

An analysis of positions occupied by the world's industrial leaders with regard to aid to the Soviet Union reveals differences of approaches on the part of Western Europe, the United States and Japan. The European Community member-countries are the only ones in the West who do not only speak about the need to extend large-scale Marshal-Plan-type assistance to the Soviet Union but also act in this direction. A few days ago, the Community decided to grant the USSR credits worth two billion European currency units to buy food.

Japan sticks to its guns in demanding the solution first of the problem of the northern territories. Because of this

Tokyo does not move to anything beside promising to display a new approach to difficulties in Soviet-Japanese relations.

As regards the United States, the essence of its position was best of all formulated by Defence Secretary Richard Cheney: He said in an interview with the LOS ANGELES TIMES a few days ago that desirable changes in Soviet military policy would be viewed by the United States as a prerequisite for American aid to Russia. True, later U.S. Secretary of Finance David Malford sought to distance himself from that stand, hinting at length at Washington's readiness to help solve Soviet economic problems. Nevertheless, Cheney's pronouncements left an unpleasant aftertaste.

One other thing is that Malford may be right in saying that foreign governments lack full and clear information on the actual situation in many spheres of the Soviet economy, including the balance of payments, debt as the actual needs of the Soviet Union for food supplies in the next six to twelve months.

The Soviet Government that kept secret for many years the bulk of statistics on the Soviet economy seems to be acting on the inertia even now, considerably assisted in this by the political confusion in the country.

This, together with the ambiguous position of some influential Western states, seeking to bank on the Soviet Union's temporary weakness, can lead to Soviet problems being pushed into the background during the annual session of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

If this happens, it may slow down the process of normalization in the USSR on which hopes are pinned by those who are interested in a stable and secure world.

State Bank Chairman on IMF Membership

*LD0910181391 Moscow TASS in English 1327 GMT
9 Oct 91*

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Markov]

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—The Soviet Union has joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as an associated member.

"The fact that the Soviet Union has been granted the status of an associated member of the IMF is undoubtedly a noteworthy event," Viktor Gerashchenko, chairman of the Soviet State Bank (Gosbank), told TASS in comment on the event.

"Although the Soviet Union filed an application for full member status, the IMF decided to grant the status of a special associated member so far."

"The point is that full membership bid presupposes a long procedure to determine the country's economic

potential and a series of expert examinations. The process takes not less than a year even for countries with accomplished market structures.

"The country's status of associated member enables the IMF to begin to give technical assistance to the Soviet Union already now that the USSR is in the process of transition to market relations," Gerashchenko said.

"The IMF is prepared to begin to give assistance immediately, primarily as regards a macroeconomic policy, financing programming, banking, and economic statistics.

"Besides, the IMF membership is a kind of guarantee for those who will want to invest in our economic projects," Gerashchenko said.

United States & Canada

Gorbachev Talks With U.S. Secretary Madigan

LD0910212391 Moscow TASS in English
2014 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on Wednesday met Edward Madigan, U.S. secretary of agriculture, to discuss foreign assistance to the Soviet Union during a transitional period.

Madigan arrived in Moscow at the instruction of U.S. President George Bush to study the situation and work out specific measures to provide the Soviet Union with food and medicines this winter. He will also help work out a joint programme to overhaul the Soviet food industry.

Madigan informed Gorbachev about the conclusions made by U.S. experts and their proposals.

They believe the existing plants and factories can cover the country's need in foodstuffs, if proper management techniques are used.

Gorbachev supported Madigan's proposal to send U.S. managers to Soviet enterprises.

The Soviet leader welcomed the idea to create a zone of example farming in St. Petersburg to teach Soviet farmers effective agricultural techniques.

The secretary and U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Bob Strauss on behalf of the U.S. President reiterated the U.S. Administration's position to provide the Soviet Union with urgent and effective food and medical aid.

Gorbachev and the U.S. guests discussed prospects for the development of the country's agriculture and its potential resources, taking into account its historical peculiarities, radical changes in the system of ownership and land reform.

Both sides agreed that cooperation in agriculture is a significant part of Soviet-U.S. relations and world politics, which is characterised by trust and mutual understanding between both countries and their leadership.

U.S. Diplomat Zoellick on Changes, Relations

92UF0042A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Oct 91
Union Edition pp 1, 5

[By correspondent A. Blinov: "Progress and Upheavals, in the Opinion of a Prominent American Diplomat, Are the Basic Features of the Present Situation in the USSR"]

[Text] R. Zoellick, undersecretary of state of the United States, testified on 2 October at hearings in the U.S. Congress House of Representatives Subcommittee for Europe and the Middle East. They were devoted to an assessment of the situation in the USSR and Soviet-American relations.

According to R. Zoellick, the failure of the August "counterrevolution of apparatchiks" of the USSR is a turning point in history. The victory of the democratic forces has afforded broad opportunities for genuine far-reaching reforms in the Soviet Union and the republics. At the same time, overall conditions within the country are marked by extraordinary difficulties. Reformer democrats occupy key positions, but are surrounded by myriad threats.

The old command economic system has fallen apart, but a market economy has not yet come to take its place. The traditional system of power has fallen apart, but the forces of the new pluralism just taking shape have yet to formulate new terms of cooperation that would make it possible to create and implement their program. The democrats have to secure a firmer base of support and do so in such a way as to prevent the discrediting of democracy and a revival of authoritarianism.

As the American diplomat observed, at the present time "power has shifted almost completely to the level of the republics of the Soviet Union." "Before August we were interested in how the center and the republics would share power. Now the question concerns the preservation of ties between the republics." The crisis of the legitimacy of power (its legality and plenipotentiary nature), which had arisen earlier, has persisted at the level of both the center and the republics. At the same time, however, attempts to resolve it on the path of a "restoration of order," specifically via a new Union treaty, have ended in failure.

"The present period is characterized by the fact that currently the republics are taking steps to establish the legitimacy of power. They have declared independence. They now have to determine its significance for their population and for relations between the republics."

In R. Zoellick's opinion, it is essential that the independent republics preserve ties among themselves; they need

the benefits of integrated and coordinated structures. Cooperation between the republics would help them avoid interethnic friction and the danger of civil war and ensure the joint preservation of security, including the centralized control of nuclear weapons, and make it possible to improve the prospects of successful economic reform.

"Continuation of a certain relationship is of importance for ensuring security and stability. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons it is critically important to maintain centralized control over them. The creation of large independent republic armies would not help in preserving the stability of Eurasia. Small states creating armed forces cannot successfully pursue economic reform."

R. Zoellick mentioned appreciable economic reasons for preserving a common policy of the republics. Specifically, the experience of the United States and West Europe has clearly demonstrated the advantages of a unified domestic market without trade barriers. Without agreement among the republics in respect of a common economic policy, it will be difficult to make progress in all-around market reform. Economic difficulties could intensify unless the republics agree to maintain open channels of trade and the approximately simultaneous implementation of reforms.

The agreement of the republics is required also in improving the monetary and tax systems and preserving currency stability. Without this, economic stabilization is impossible.

Thus "the establishment of a proper balance between the functioning of smaller independent political formations and a connection between them recognizing economic and political interdependence is becoming a critically important problem for the people of the Soviet Union."

Broaching the state of Soviet-American relations, the U.S. undersecretary of state observed that the United States is not a "detached observer" of events in the USSR. The direction in which they move is directly bound up with Americans' national interests. The United States realizes that the USSR has a considerable proportion of the global nuclear arsenal. Cataclysms in the center of Eurasia could create a threat to the United States' allies and economic partners.

As R. Zoellick noted, the U.S. Administration is guided in its USSR policy by the five principles stated by Secretary of State J. Baker on 4 September of this year on the eve of his visit to the Soviet Union. It is these principles, which are based on the provisions of the Helsinki Act, that are the "basis of the support and assistance" to the processes occurring in the USSR.

The undersecretary of state observed that the U.S. Administration realizes the "fluidity" factor and uncertainty of the situation in the USSR. In the light of this, Washington intends to extend its relations with the "society in transformation" at all levels.

A program of regular visits of staff of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to the republics to establish contacts has been mapped out. American consulates and "small diplomatic posts" will be opened in various republics. Support will be rendered to democratic forces, free trade unions, and the free press. American diplomacy considers it important to pay attention to all important groups of society, including such influential yet "mobile"—in terms of political sympathies—circles like the Army and the military-industrial complex.

Washington considers it essential to eliminate the remaining barriers in the sphere of contacts between citizens of the two countries, having abolished the restrictions on issuing visas and the prohibitions on travel to individual areas ("closed zones").

As the undersecretary of state observed, the United States is studying the possibility of providing the USSR with humanitarian food assistance. The Union and the republics will be helped to formulate an all-embracing plan of economic reforms. This plan must conform to international standards and include such important aspects as the establishment of property rights, privatization, producer competition, measures of macroeconomic stabilization, and the abolition of price control combined with a system of the particular provision of the populace with basic essentials.

According to R. Zoellick, the initiators of the reforms in the USSR should realize that, given the scale of the Soviet economy, even the receipt of large sums from Western governments cannot secure appreciable growth of production. This is attainable only if the USSR economy attracts an influx of private capital investments.

Gates' Objectivity Questioned at Hearings

92UF0042B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Oct 91
Union Edition p 4

[By correspondent A. Blinov: "In the Distorting Mirror of Intelligence"]

[Text] Washington—The arms race would not have been of such proportions and the Soviet-American confrontation in the 1980's in the so-called "Third World" would not have been so acute had intelligence analysts not contributed to it. This conclusion may be inferred from a number of speeches of retired and active CIA officers at hearings in the U.S. Senate.

The hearings, which are being held in the special Senate Intelligence Committee, are devoted to a matter of the Senate's prerogative: confirmation of a new CIA director. U.S. President G. Bush has appointed to this office Robert Gates, deputy national security adviser, who has in the past held executive positions in the CIA.

The hearings have shown that the main obstacle in the way of R. Gates' appointment as director of the CIA and thus head of the entire American intelligence community

has proven to be the candidate's past activity in the CIA itself. The senators wanted to hear the opinions of Gates' former colleagues. A number of them, including R. Inman, former deputy director of the CIA, has commended R. Gates' unique analytical and great organizational capabilities. "If the CIA will not 'dance with joy' at R. Gates' appearance in the office of director, it is only on account of fears of a serious reorganization," R. Inman declared. But not all in the CIA share this opinion.

"CIA employees really will not dance with joy but for entirely different reasons," another witness, Harold Ford, formerly a senior intelligence officer and now its nonsalaried historian, declared.

According to him, the CIA's authority suffered considerably because of W. Casey, Reagan's CIA director, and R. Gates, who was his subordinate, "politicized" the activity of American intelligence. Throughout the term of the Reagan administration practically, they inflated in every possible way critical judgments concerning the Soviet Union.

The medium for displaying a distorted picture of the truth was the "national intelligence estimates," the most important product of CIA analysts. The estimates were systematically slanted to demonstrate the "hostile activity" of the USSR. For example, such a paper asserting that the Soviet Union was creating "a threat to Iran" was compiled on R. Gates' instructions in 1985. The paper maintained that the USSR was preparing to take advantage of the weakening of Iran following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in the interests of its political and military penetration of this country. This finding contradicted information at the CIA's disposal concerning a reduction in Soviet military supplies to Iran and the departure from Iran of Soviet specialists. At the same time, however, it was beneficial to those who were preparing covert action pertaining to the sale of American weapons to Iran.

The CIA veteran noted also that R. Gates was among the high-level intelligence officers who underestimated the scale of the changes in the Soviet Union and the East European countries. At the same time he was considered an expert on the Soviet Union. "The CIA needs more scrupulous analytical minds," H. Ford said. "R. Gates should not be confirmed as CIA director."

Former CIA analyst Melvin Goodman, who spoke at these same hearings, accused the former leadership of American intelligence of supplying the country's leaders, in deference to political requirements, with incorrect information and, at times, simply disinformation. This was clearly manifested in the blown-up assessment of the Soviet Union's ties to international terrorism by the CIA as of 1981.

When, in 1981, there was an attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II in Rome, the CIA took steps to ascertain the real reason for the terrorist's actions. It turned up no connection between him and the Soviet Union. The CIA

formed the opinion that Agca had acted alone. But later, on R. Gates' instructions, a document was compiled that picked up on every conceivable argument in support of the fact that the USSR might have been mixed up in the assassination attempt. The authors of the paper were in possession of no corroborating facts. The paper was reported to the President and other leaders of the Administration.

The matter of the CIA having systematically overstated indicators of the state of the Soviet economy has been raised repeatedly in the course of the hearings. Soviet scientists and designers have been ascribed nonexistent achievements. All this so that the "Soviet threat" might appear more "graphic." Only thus could a number of the Pentagon's extremely costly programs have been justified.

Northeast Asia

U.S. Air Actions in Korean War Recalled

SK1010072891 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 2 Sep 91

["Memoirs" of (Georgiy Lobov), retired Air Force general]

[Text] Nowadays, historians in the USSR and other countries are paying greater attention to the 1950-53 Korean war. On more than one occasion, Radio Moscow has aired memoirs of the Soviet soldiers who collaborated with the DPRK. In this hour, we are going to read you the memoirs of (Georgiy Lobov), Soviet hero and retired Air Force general.

He was the commander of the 64th Air Defense Battle Division, which covered the airspace above the northeastern part of China and the DPRK during 1950-53.

He recalled the situation on the eve of the war. He says: Before the outbreak of the Korean war, I commanded one of five jet fighter divisions organized shortly after the Great Patriotic War. When a crisis erupted in an Azerbaijani region close to Iran, Stalin ordered all the jet fighter divisions to be deployed in the surrounding area of Moscow.

Each division began to organize a new division out of itself, leaving behind a regiment each. This is the way the Soviet Union organized jet fighter forces. My regiment was stationed in Yaroslavl and Kostroma region.

One day (Moskalenko), commander of the Moscow Military District, summoned me and ordered me to move my division to the Soviet Far East. Shortly afterward, the Korean war broke out.

We landed in an Air Force base called (Vostvichenka) in the Soviet Maritime Province. No sooner had we landed than I was received by Admiral (Nikolay Kuznetsov), commander of the Pacific Fleet. According to him, the 303d division placed under my command had just been

moved to the Soviet Far East not long ago. We had to teach the Marine and Air Force (?officers) stationed in the Far East how to fly a jet fighter. I knew well that all these activities were part of the measures for the Korean war.

Judging from some facts, it was clear that the Soviet Union was about to be drawn into a clash.

We were outraged by the fact that two U.S. F-85 fighter-bombers had bombed (Svayaretska) Airport when it was impossible for them to lose their bearings in broad daylight with the seashore clearly visible.

This Air Force base stood in a neighboring area of Vladivostok, one of the Soviet Union's major naval bases. The situation was becoming tense. We felt that we were about to be made to participate in the Korean war.

In October 1950, U.S. and South Korean armed forces drove as far as the borderline shared by the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union massed tank units, mechanized troop units, and Air Force units in the Soviet Maritime Province. These were regarded as a large number of forces.

At that time, the United States did not have jet fighters. U.S. troops were equipped mainly with large propeller planes called Fortresses. We had at our disposal Il-28 jet planes, the best of its kind at that time. They were light aircraft capable of carrying even a nuclear warhead. The Soviet Union, equipped with such weapons, was watching to see how the Korean war developed.

By the end of 1950, the U.S. Air Force gained mastery of the airspace above Korea. The North Korean Air Force pilots who flew only old aircraft were bound to lose their fights, although they bravely fought the enemy that outnumbered them by more than 10 times.

Air Force bases inside the territory of Korea were (?annihilated). Even the Chinese Air Force, which was being reequipped with jet aircraft at that time, was in no position to take part in air battle. So, Soviet fighter squadrons were sent to the Korea war at the request of the PRC Government in November 1950.

Later, they were integrated into a 64th Air Force Special Unit. None other than (Georgiy Lobov) was put in command of that very special unit.

We were only carrying out Air Defense tasks for the DPRK and the PRC, and our operational theater was limited. We were allowed to cover an area south of the (39th Parallel) on the peninsula, a line linking Pyongyang and Wonsan. We were also in charge of coast lines.

We were not supposed to appear in the airspace above the sea, including DPRK waters. The U.S. side craftily took advantage of such a situation. They engaged themselves in fights in the airspace above the shore. When they saw an unfavorable situation developing, they would go out over the sea and then come back to resume the fight.

Our aircraft were based in China. We were not supposed to cross the Chinese border according to a special UN decision. However, U.S. aircraft hindered our landings and takeoffs. Their fighters used to raid our Air Force airport.

We fought only U.S. armed forces in the air. We did not bomb the South Korean armed forces. Our force was in no sense small in number. In 1952 our force was composed of three air divisions, two artillery divisions, and one air technology division. About 26,000 personnel served in our force.

The same number of us saw the end of the Korean war. What was regrettable was that the servicemen had been changed completely. We had to spend a much of our time training inexperienced pilots. They did not have much choice. They had to familiarize themselves with flying conditions in Korea and new strategy and tactics. Our strategy was secret.

War and armed clashes kill not only soldiers but also civilians. The 1950-53 Korean war was no exception. Groups of U.S. bombers stationed in Japan not only tried to demoralize the North Korean Army, they also dropped enormous amounts of bombs in order to sabotage the rear.

Citizens and farmers in North Korea were the targets of their bombings. In particular, Sinuiju, a city along the Korea-China border, received an enormous amount of bombings.

I reached Sinuiju one day. On the previous night, Sinuiju had been massively bombed by 79 B-29 bombers. The city was still burning. Survivors were digging out the bodies of their relatives in the rubble of destroyed and burned houses. There was not a single military facility in that city. The B-29s did not touch an airstrip or the Amnok River ferry building.

The purpose of the bombing became clear. The United States [as heard] meant to wipe out the city's peaceful residents and refugees who had moved in from occupied areas.

I took part in the Soviet Great Patriotic War and this war, too. However, never before had I ever seen scenes as tragic as the one I saw in Sinuiju. I recalled the ruthless bombing in Dresden, Germany, by the allied army.

The U.S. Air Force was devoted to testing their new military operations and ultramodern weapons on the peaceful residents. Once we found in one of the (?B-26) bombers that we had shot down a plan to devastate the city. The plan even bore the code name "Strangler."

The United States attempted to wipe out bases producing rice, the Korean people's major staple, by destroying irrigation facilities built by the North Korean people.

I do not think that there would have been a Korean war if there had not been a (?cold war).

(Georgiy Lobov) commanded the 64th jet fighter squadron during the 1950-53 Korean war. This was a war that opened the Soviet-U.S. confrontation. One side was under the guidance of U.S. President Truman and the other was under the orders of Stalin.

(Georgiy Lobov) says: The moral aspect of the war never occurred to the two men. I think that the Korean war was meaningless. Although millions lost their lives and enormous amounts of funds were squandered, the balance of power has not been achieved and Korea has not been reunified. Also, the Korean war taught a lesson that no political issue can be settled by the use of military means.

New Details on KAL Tragedy Appear

92UF0045A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Oct 91 Union Edition p 8

[Follow-up commentary on the serial "The Mystery of Korean Boeing-747" by special correspondents S. Agafonov and A. Illesh: "Fishing Trawlers Deep-Freezing... Bodies?"]

[Text] Tokyo-Moscow—Our newspaper has devoted a lot of time and space to the investigation of the KAL-007 mystery. Over 30 reports have already been published. Many questions have been answered: We have succeeded in finding the crash site where 269 passengers perished, located witnesses, and questioned many military and civilian people connected with this major international scandal... Still, some things remain a mystery...

The persistent refusal on the part of our official agencies to share information they possess regarding the South Korean passenger airliner shot down in Soviet airspace eight years ago is hard to understand and explain. After all, such a position causes only misconceptions, false rumors, and irritation.

IZVESTIYA has been writing about it many times and has sent numerous requests for information regarding the Korean Boeing to competent organizations. Alas, all the editors received were formal replies in bureaucratic style and verbal recommendations not to disturb the past. (Our optimism did perk up, however, after a conversation with the new top leadership of the General Staff. We were promised help in the search for the "black boxes" that, in the opinion of experts, hold the main answers to the tragedy.)

Meanwhile, most fantastic suppositions in regard to the KAL-007 story continue to multiply and are distributed in millions of copies.

One such version appeared in Japan:

As a result of search operations undertaken by the Soviet side in the aquatic area of the airliner crash site, bodies and remains of the 269 passengers and crew members of

the Korean Boeing had been found. They were then loaded into the chambers of refrigerator ships and frozen.

This information was published in the Japanese mass media, and came from the tragedy victims' relatives returning from Sakhalin.

According to statements they made, during their stay on the island they met with a Soviet representative who had supervised the search operations at sea in the fall of 1983; he allegedly told the Japanese that human remains had been taken aboard a trawler. According to information received by the victims' relatives in Nevelsk (Sakhalin), about 50 fishing boats participated in the search operations. From there on, there are only questions: If this is true, this means that the Soviet side wanted to preserve the human remains—so where are they now?

A certain light on the more minute details of this fantastic version was shed by several publications in local—Far Eastern—newspapers, which started their own investigation of the KAL-007 tragedy after the publication of IZVESTIYA reports. One can state now without doubt that after the Boeing-747 was hit by the missiles, the force with which the plane hit the water was truly horrible. The divers who went to the bottom of the sea at the site of the jumbo jet crash did not find whole human bodies. It is hard to write about it, but we cannot keep silent, either. Some relatives of the passengers who perished in that crash keep hoping to this day. Alas, the experts confirm: There is no hope.

Still, various versions (all kinds of them, including one that has it that a number of passengers survived and are languishing to this day in secret camps in Siberia) explode like bombs on the pages of the world's largest publications. Why? Is it only because of the unrealistic but still flickering hopes of the relatives of the dead passengers? Or is the thirst for an explanation so sensational? The root of the problem is that at the time the Soviet leadership lied to the world community, announcing in the official version that the airliner had been on a spying mission and that it had been shot down "in accordance with all international rules." This lie was sufficiently awkward and could not deceive the entire world; it only deceived one-sixth of its dry land, which is where we actually live. Therefore, all subsequent official explanations coming from the Soviet side (even honest ones) are taken, to put it mildly, with a grain of salt.

That is why the relatives of the victims—the American, the Japanese, and the Korean associations—demand the bodies. That is why "versions" flare up. But there is no smoke without a fire. In the near future issues of our newspaper will report new details related to this old story....

East Europe

Stand on Slovene, Croatian Independence Noted

LD0910191991 Moscow TASS in English
1847 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By diplomatic correspondent Viktor Bezbrezhniy]

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—Maximum consideration and constructiveness is the stand of the Soviet Union as regards acts of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, sources at the Soviet Foreign Ministry told TASS.

Hasty actions can complicate the stabilisation process in Yugoslavia, CSCE efforts to normalise the situation and work of the Carrington mission.

At the same time, the Soviet Union calls for the support of Yugoslavian peoples' right to make their own choice with due account of interests of all the subjects of the present Yugoslavian federation.

These republics are on the way towards a complete separation from the federation. But this way will take a certain time, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's sources said.

It is still difficult to say what relations will remain between these republics and the rest of Yugoslavia, and in which form the country will exist.

Federal structures are practically not functioning, the supreme power body—the Presidium—has not gathered in full strength for a long time. The Yugoslavian Parliament has not gathered for a long time as well, and the term of its powers has expired.

So, it is not the matter of opposition between republics and the centre, but the opposition between republics themselves. The major spot of contradictions is between Serbia and Croatia.

Saying that the entrance into force of acts on independence of Slovenia and Croatia will complicate the general situation in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Foreign Ministry called attention to the actual impossibility of any negotiations under conditions of combat operations. Their termination is the first necessary condition for a dialogue.

Only then, one can count on a peaceful and agreement-based separation of Yugoslavian republics—since they raise the question of their separation from the federation—accompanied by the signing of corresponding agreements.

Honecker 'Could Stay' in Chile

LD0910165391 Moscow TASS in English
1520 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By correspondent Viktor Chistyakov]

[Text] Bonn October 9 TASS—The Honeckers believe they could stay for a considerable time in Chile where their daughter with her family resides, Margot Honecker, the wife of the former state and party leader of the former GDR, told a correspondent of the newspaper BILD in Santiago de Chile.

"Our Chilean friends will do their utmost so that my husband, now staying in Moscow, be permitted to live for some time with his family in Chile," Mrs. Honecker said. She answered in the affirmative the question whether she and her husband would like to return to Germany for permanent residence. "We have very many friends in Germany, not only enemies," she said.

She said Erich Honecker would not decide to emigrate if he were certain of getting in Germany the medical services he needs. And since the organs of German justice have issued an order for her husband's arrest, Mrs. Honecker believes he would not be guaranteed that medical service in a German prison.

Regarding her own health, Mrs. Honecker said she is in good health.

West Europe

Gorbachev Greets USSR-FRG Forum

LD1010102991 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1802 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] Moscow, 9 Oct (TASS)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev wished success for the participants in the second forum of representatives of the USSR and FRG public, which opened in Moscow today. The first forum was held in Bonn two years ago in accordance with a summit decision.

The USSR president expressed his confidence that the forum would provoke a wide response and be an important instrument in developing bilateral relations between united Germany and a Soviet Union undergoing renewal.

"Our great peoples, the history of whose relations covers several centuries, have embarked firmly upon the road of reconciliation, good-neighborliness, and partnership," says the message of greetings from Mikhail Gorbachev. "I believe that the great variety of ties of both states conceals a considerable and far from fully exploited potential, which your work will help to reveal and realize."

According to the Soviet president, the USSR has enormous tasks to deal with: the radical reorganization of society and its material base, the revival and renewal of its spiritual values, and full membership of the community of civilized states. Mikhail Gorbachev voiced the hope that the forum of representatives of the USSR and FRG public will contribute to dealing with these tasks.

Germany Believes USSR 'Fully Solvent'*LD0910170191 Moscow TASS in English
1049 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[By correspondent Aleksandr Semyonov]

[Text] Bonn October 9 TASS—"This subject is not yet ripe for discussion," TASS was told at the German Finance Ministry in reply to the question of whether the G-7 Bangkok meeting would postpone the payment of Soviet foreign debts or not.

According to Western estimates, the Soviet Union's foreign debt amounts to about 60 billion U.S. dollars. Germany is the USSR's main creditor. According to the newspaper "WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE", Germany's share of the debt equals to 22 billion. Ten billion were granted to the Soviet Union by large banks without any guarantees. Hence, Germany, as other Western states, for that matter, the newspaper says, "wants to be set at ease" concerning the Soviet Union's solvency. Member of the board of the leading FRG private "German Bank" Axel Lebanh says that his bank is in a better position than the rest, because it does business only with the USSR Vnesheconombank. "This Soviet bank," he told the magazine "DER SPIEGEL", "always pays on time."

The situation with other banks, including the second largest "Dresdner Bank," is different. The latter's Chairman Bernhard Walter is frankly alarmed by "talks about the revision of debts" now heard in the Soviet Union. He believes they are "unnecessary and harmful." Asked whether German banks would be compelled to write off the debts if the Soviet republics assumed responsibility for their finances early next year, another representative of German banking circles said: "At present we are doing everything to persuade Soviet politicians in the centre and on the periphery that the renovation they want should be promoted not by any strive for political power but with proper knowledge of economic affairs. This involves, primarily, the creation of a solid financial foundation by various means, including "timely payments and refusal to revise debts."

German business and government circles still believe the Soviet Union is absolutely solvent. Chairman of the Federal Association of German Industry Heinrich Weiss told the newspaper "DIE WELT" that the Soviet Union possesses huge amounts of valuable natural resources: petroleum, gas, coal and iron ore. It has highly skilled engineers and experts in the defence industry. It has everything necessary to promote the export of natural resources and industrial goods in order to "earn hard currency and guarantee the repayment of debts."

Speaking recently in Bavaria, German Finance Minister Theodor Waigel said that "in the long run the Soviet Union is fully solvent." Its present debts total is "considerably more favourable than in other central and eastern European states."

On the eve of the Bangkok meeting, the Western states, "DIE WELT" believes, are shaping a common approach to the problem of Soviet foreign debts. The Soviet Union must be interested in saving its reputation of a dependable debtor. It has everything necessary for this. Hence, the most it can now expect is one more credit to ease the consequences of its economic crisis, the newspaper says.

Motives of KGB Defector Fomenko Examined*PM0910091991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Oct 91 Union Edition p 6*

[By correspondent Ye. Bovkun: "Intelligence Officer Changes Bosses. KGB Officer Fomenko Fled to FRG After Failure of Moscow Putsch"]

[Text] Bonn—Fomenko, USSR deputy consul general in Munich, still features on the list of diplomatic missions that various establishments in Germany have at their disposal, although he no longer works there. The former diplomat, who, so informed local circles reported, wore the shoulder boards of a KGB officer, has "chosen freedom."

A few days ago he and his wife asked the Federal intelligence service for asylum, because its residence is quite close to Munich, at Pullach. Local newspapers have reported sparingly on this, making a well-founded guess that the flight was planned in advance and coordinated with the local special services.

The paucity of information is evidently accounted for by the sparing nature of the BND (the Federal intelligence service) itself, which has given the press only the most general information. It would have been strange if it had acted differently, but my German colleagues did not turn to the Soviet Consulate for explanations.

Therefore the people there were somewhat surprised at my telephone call. In reply to a question about the consulate staffers' attitude to this fact, however, they at once reported the following to me:

The flight of former Consulate General staffer Fomenko caused bewilderment and indignation in the collective, as there were no visible reasons for it. It is premature to speak now about what prompted Fomenko himself to commit such an act, which in the civilized world is usually qualified as treachery, because people at the consulate do not yet have sufficient information about this at their disposal. Attempts made to meet with Fomenko in order to learn the reasons that prompted him to leave have been fruitless. He and members of his family have stated in writing that they "refuse all contacts with representatives of the Consulate General."

The intelligence officer, or spy if you will, has changed bosses. They are now taking a testimony from him and, as world practice attests, will be doing so for a long time. There is nothing surprising in this; it is an almost classic

and, probably, ordinary case. The only circumstance that troubles my German colleagues is the timing of the flight.

Fomenko "chose freedom" quite recently, right after the failure of the Moscow putsch. From whom was he in a hurry to escape: the old or new chiefs of the KGB apparatus? And what did he fear?

There is also a more prosaic, mercantile kind of justification.

If this is so, then people will soon forget about Fomenko. But if he was guided by political motives, then we will hear about him again.

Italian Businessman on Market Possibilities

PM1010111191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2

[By R. Lynev: "Italian Business Wants To Open Up Soviet Market More Quickly"]

[Text] Between arriving in Moscow 7 October and flying out on the evening of 8 October, S. Pininfarina, president of the Italian Confederation of Industry, Confindustria, spent most of the time in intensive talks with A. Volskiy, president of the USSR Science and Industry Union. Between these talks and a meeting with USSR President M. Gorbachev, there remained one hour, part of which Volskiy and Pininfarina devoted to a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists.

It was stated there that this was not the first series of talks between the Italian and Soviet sides, but the continuation of lengthy work during which an agreement on cooperation between the two countries' major economic organizations was signed. Soviet-Italian economic relations themselves contain many vivid examples, both in the past and today. Mainly Italian big business and firms like FIAT, FATA, ENI, and Italstat, could gain access to the Soviet market. Now, however, with the Soviet economy's switch to market relations, broad prospects are opening up for small and medium enterprises, declared the president of Confindustria, which embraces 130,000 Italian firms producing a wide range of modern output. Here cooperation must take the path of setting up joint ventures, giving technical assistance, and formulating unified legal and technical norms.

While realizing that the transition to the market economy in the USSR will not be instantaneous, nevertheless we do not want to lose time and will endeavor to confirm the earnestness of our intentions with specific facts as soon as possible, Pininfarina declared.

In what spheres might this be manifested? Questions of providing major USSR cities with food and high-quality pharmaceutical preparations were discussed during the talks. The state of the Soviet defense industry and problems of conversion were also discussed. This was done at our request, Volskiy remarked, for it is the

defense industry that could produce the first one million unemployed unless measures are taken. What the defense industry can give the market as a result of conversion was shown at the recent Soviet exhibition in Bologna, which did not go unnoticed among Italian business circles. Several dozen protocols of intent were signed with enterprises participating in the exhibition.

Pininfarina's visit to the USSR marks a further step toward expanding economic cooperation between the two countries. This will be consolidated by the setting up of the Soviet-Italian Standing Committee and corresponding working commissions, which will include representatives of the republics. In addition, a Confindustria mission will open in the USSR, and one of the USSR Science and Industry Union will open in Italy. The purpose of these new formations is to help establish direct business contacts between Italian firms and companies and also to attract Italian investment in the Soviet economy. In conclusion Pininfarina expressed the wish "that the Soviet Union will overcome the present phase of uncertainty as soon as possible."

Finland Declares Zhirinovskiy 'No. 1 Enemy'

OW0910140591 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1200 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The recent visit to Finland by the leader of the USSR Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, stirred considerable alarm in Scandinavia. One of its results is that Finland declared Zhirinovskiy its "No. 1 enemy" after he promised that Finland "will be an integral part of Russia as it used to be before the coup of October 1917."

Upon his return to Moscow, Mr. Zhirinovskiy told Norwegian journalists that he would like the Russo-Norwegian border "to become longer after part of Finnish Lapland is incorporated into Norway."

BBC To Broadcast on Radio Rossii

LD0910172591 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1100 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] The British Broadcasting Corporation has said it signed a landmark deal on Wednesday to put World Service programs on Russian radio [Radio Rossii]. The agreement was signed in Moscow by the BBC's World Service managing director, John Tusa, and Oleg Potsov, Chairman of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company.

Two 30-minute current affairs programs from the BBC's Russian service will be broadcast each weekend on Radio Russia from early 1992. Programs will be beamed to Moscow by satellite and rebroadcast simultaneously nationwide. Radio Russia's network reaches nearly 70 percent of the population and spans 11 time zones. John Tusa noted it was the first deal of its kind to be

concluded between a Western broadcaster and a Russian radio station, adding that it marks a new high point for the BBC's strategy of winning air time for its programs on domestic radio frequencies.

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuban Fourth Party Congress Viewed

PM1010110791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 91 p 1

[By V. Kulikov: "Fourth Forum of Cuba's Communists Has Opened in Havana in Festive Atmosphere"]

[Text] Time is not always the best healer. The unexpected postponement of the date of the fourth party congress—initially it was planned for the first half of this year—has not justified itself. Malicious tongues in Havana are saying that they were expecting specific changes in Moscow and nearly got what they had been waiting for. Everything turned out differently, however, and now there is no getting away from it—they have to hold what the Cuban Communists' newspaper GRANMA recently called a "fighting congress." Translated from revolutionary rhetoric, that means the time has come for the party to prove in deeds its ability to lead the country without generous and selfless "fraternal aid."

To judge by Cuban officials, this is to be discussed for four days by the 1,800 delegates to the forum convened in Santiago-de-Cuba. Only the initiated, who do not include journalists, know the forum's precise agenda or the specific ideas and proposals submitted for discussion. There has been a surprising metamorphosis: At the start of the pre-congress campaign, broad declarations were made for the first time in the history of revolutionary Cuba to hold "a genuinely nationwide and absolutely open discussion" of party affairs and plans. As the congress approached the course of preparation, it became increasingly closed, until finally the organizers announced the forum to be an internal party measure.

The Communist Party of Cuba [PCC] is by no means a parliamentary or political party, even in the broad sense of the word, but an accurate copy of the omnipotent ("responsible for everything") state structure that our CPSU was in the years before perestroika. The leaders of the Cuban Communists are not idealists and understand very well this grave period of total crisis in the country and almost complete revolutionary solitude in the world arena. They realize every weight on the other pan of the scales could be fatal. One of these weights is undoubtedly glasnost.

Are the party's beliefs in the cohesiveness of the Cuban working class around the Communist Party and the ideals of socialism so correct? Who will protect them against the possibility that, in the heat of debates at the

congress, there may surface, for instance, a fact like the recent creation in Havana of the universal union of working people, the first independent trade union in Cuba in the past 30 years, which immediately demanded the implementation of economic reforms. Some delegates will unwittingly wonder whether the statement by a group of anonymous servicemen of the Revolutionary Armed Forces demanding the resignation of the present leadership and the transfer of power to a provisional government—a statement published in the Western press on the eve of the party forum—is really only a "dirty lie." What if some bold person recalls the dissemination of an appeal to the delegates of the "Cuban democratic accord" coalition of six dissident groups that suggests that the fifth article of the constitution concerning the communist party's leading role in society be repealed?

The question of power in the republic, or more precisely, of its thrust and forms, is not an idle one, and Cuban Communists of course realize this. If we judge by the "authorized information leak"—and this diplomatic ploy has been used frequently in Cuba recently—the island's party leadership is almost prepared to waive some of its principles and resolve at the congress the most keen and impartial discussions of the economy, as well as embark on personnel reshuffles on the political Olympus and even make corrections to state policy as a whole. Juan Escalona, chairman of the National Assembly of the People's Government, has stated.

Pedro Margolles, general director of the PRENSA LATINA agency, was also frank with journalists: "People want the renewal and reduction of the leadership." Here, however, he expressed himself against emergency measures. These and other statements mean many outcomes are possible regarding the question of the system of supreme power to be discussed at the congress. It looks as though the republic's party leadership does not rule out the possibility of Fidel Castro's resignation from the posts of first secretary of the PCC Central Committee and president of the republic's Council of Ministers while retaining the post of president of the Council of State.

If this option goes through, to judge by the same "authorized information leak," the vacancies may be taken by people who are fully prepared for it. The likeliest candidates are 49-year-old Carlos Aldana, the present party ideologist, and 39-year-old Carlos Lage, a member of the Council of State and candidate member of the PCC Central Committee Politburo.

The thrust of the hypothetical changes in the leadership was revealed by Fidel Castro himself. Readers were told by Jose de Cordoba, a correspondent of the U.S. newspaper THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, that the Cuban leader at a pre-congress meeting with foreign journalists had said literally the following: "For me power is a type of slavery and I feel myself to be a slave—that is my profession."

Political & Social

INTERFAX Reports Draft of Union Treaty

OW0910204191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2000 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Union of Sovereign States circulated by the USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to the leaders of the republics. [sentence as received]

The full text has been distributed as an express information issue, Oct 9.

The draft stipulates that each signatory republic is a sovereign state. The Union of Free Sovereign Republics (UFSR) is a united democratic state.

Its members set the priority of human rights as the basic principle of the union. All citizens are guaranteed a chance to study and use their mother tongue, free access to information, free worship, and other political, social, economic and personal rights and freedoms.

The states forming the Union establish independently their national, state, administrative and territorial systems, the power and government structures. They can delegate some of their powers to other signatory-states in the treaty if they form part of such states.

The Union of Free Sovereign Republics shall enter international relations as a sovereign state and subject of international law superceding the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The states in the Union are equal members of the world community with a right to direct diplomatic and consular ties, trade and other links with foreign countries compatible with the international obligations of the Union.

The membership in the Union is voluntary. States may enter it directly or within other states. They keep a right of free secession.

The members of the treaty commit themselves: never to resort to force or threat of force in their relations; make no claims on each other's territorial integrity; enter no agreements contrary to the aims of the Union or against any of its members.

The armed forces of the Union are not to be used within the country except in case of natural or ecological disasters.

To prevent or settle conflicts between the members of the treaty or any ethnic disputes the Union members are to set up special purpose troops on a parity basis.

To safeguard their common interests the members define spheres of common jurisdiction and conclude multi-lateral agreements on the economic Union; joint defence; state security; foreign policies; cooperation in

science and technology, also in education and culture; protection of human rights and ethnic minorities; on ecology; on energy, transport, communications and space exploration; on combating crime.

The signatories of the treaty provide for a free development and protection of all forms of property.

The states in the Union have their shares in the gold, diamond and foreign exchange reserve as per moment of concluding the treaty. Their share and participation in further accumulation and use of the treasures shall be defined by special agreements.

The legislative power is vested in the Supreme Soviet of the Union of FSR, of two chambers: the House of the Republics and the House of the Union. The former shall include 20 deputies from each republic directly entering the Union.

The head of the Union state is the UFSR president who is also commander in chief of its Armed Forces, represents the Union in relations with foreign countries, and controls the implementation of its international obligations.

The president is elected by the citizens of the Union in a universal, equal, and direct election by secret ballot for a term of 5 years, and no more than two terms running. The winner is a candidate gaining over half the votes cast throughout the Union and in the majority of its member-states.

The Union's vice-president runs together with the president.

The new treaty shall come into force when signed by the delegations of the member-states. The old Treaty on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics loses its force as of the same date.

Relations With Baltics Emphasize 'Cooperation'

Exchange of Notes 'Historic Event'

LD0910215891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1450 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 9 Oct—The exchange of notes on diplomatic relations between the USSR and Lithuania and the USSR and Estonia which took place today is an historic event, both for the sovereign Baltic republics and for the Soviet Union. This was stated today by Yuriy Deryabin, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, in an interview with a TASS correspondent.

The Soviet diplomat stressed that the establishment of full diplomatic relations serves as an additional basis for the resolution of all issues in a spirit of cooperation. Touching upon the role of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the process of legalizing diplomatic relations,

Yuriy Deryabin noted that the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs did a great deal to prepare the State Council resolution on recognizing the Baltic states. The Union Foreign Policy Department played a significant role regarding Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia joining the United Nations and the CSCE process.

Speaking about the upcoming tasks of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the "Baltic sphere," the deputy minister stated that the Union ministry is participating most actively in the talks between the Soviet Union and the Baltic states on economic, defense, and humanitarian problems. He also reported that taking into account the specific interests of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia, representatives of these republics are also included in the Union delegation for the talks.

In the words of Yuriy Deryabin, diplomatic cooperation with the Baltic states is to be carried out on the same principles and in the same forms as cooperation with other foreign states. In particular it is planned to hold joint consultations, as has already taken place during the CSCE international conference on the human dimension.

Pankin, Saudargas on Ties

OW0910184991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1723 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Report by Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev from "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The foreign ministers of Lithuania and the Soviet Union, Algirdas Saudargas and Boris Pankin, exchanged notes today (October 9) on the establishment of diplomatic relations on the level of ambassadors. During the ceremony Mr. Pankin said that this marked the end of one period in the relationship between Lithuania and the Soviet Union and the beginning of another one. He stressed the special role of the decision of the State Council on the recognition of the independence of the Baltic states, which provided a good basis for the establishment of diplomatic relations. He expressed the hope that relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union would develop in a spirit of good-neighbourliness and cooperation.

Mr. Saudargas emphasised that the step had been taken in a period of historic change, when the entire world was moving towards harmony and disarmament. He said that the peoples of Lithuania and the Soviet Union had traversed a difficult path and that citizens of both countries had defended democracy both in Vilnius and Moscow. This had been a considerable contribution not only to the cause of preserving democracy but also to the disarmament process the world over. The minister pointed out the fact that Lithuania had become a CSCE member during the Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension.

Soviet Forces 'Very Acute' Problem

LD0910175691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1300 GMT 9 Oct 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The problem of the presence of USSR Armed Forces on the territory of the three republics is very acute. Evidently, those who arrived in the Baltic over the last 50 years through military channels will not gain citizenship. The Baltic leaders demand that Soviet troops must withdraw by 1 December. However, the question of where they will be stationed cannot be answered in one blow. At the same time, the matter of using compulsory measures on those who refuse to serve in the new army is being discussed quite openly in each of the former Soviet Baltic states, though only last year one heard statements about freedom of choice and the right to alternative service. Much today also testifies to the nationalism which may be manifested regarding the nonindigenous population. There is cause for disquiet in the fact that certain circles in the ruling structures of the new states will insist on rigid conditions of naturalization—in other words, acquiring citizenship in the former Soviet Baltic states—and even on the departure of the Russian population. A restraining factor here should be the likely severance of diplomatic relations if the Baltic starts adopting undemocratic decisions, something which foreign diplomats have warned.

Soviet-Latvian Negotiations

OW0910184591 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1723 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Report by Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev from "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Very many issues in Latvian-Soviet relations should be solved with the participation of Russia, said Janis Dinevics, leader of the Popular Front of Latvia and head of the Latvian delegation at the Soviet-Latvian negotiations. In an exclusive interview granted to DP ["Diplomatic Panorama"], he emphasised that "Russia should play an important part in the course of the negotiations". Otherwise some of the issues would have to be dealt with a second time.

The Latvian delegation has already begun preliminary discussions with the Soviet delegation, which should not, in Mr. Dinevics' opinion, be confused with the forthcoming negotiations as such. The composition of neither delegation for the negotiations has yet been finally approved. The main purpose of the preliminary discussions, however, is to formulate the range of issues to be resolved.

According to Mr. Dinevics, some of the issues, above all technical ones, have been resolved during his recent meeting with the head of the Soviet delegation, Aleksandr Yakovlev. In particular, the sides decided to deal with all the issues with "maximum mutual respect".

Mr. Dinevics believes the delegations face a long spell of hard work, for "no issues involving division, especially division of property", can be resolved very quickly. The pace of the negotiations will above all depend on the principle they are based on. Two options are possible here. One of them is for the delegations to deal with only fundamental problems, in which case some kind of permanent body should be set up to implement the decisions taken.

The other option is, Mr. Dinevics believes, for the delegations to handle the whole job. This would take longer. But in any case even the fundamental issues cannot, in his opinion, be completely resolved in less than six months.

Mr. Dinevics hesitated to decide which option was preferable for Riga. Latvia would have to set up a permanent body dealing with these matters anyway. The problem will be discussed at a meeting of the Popular Front parliamentary group. "It's difficult to say what the decision will be," Mr Dinevics said.

Asked whether there could be any territorial disputes between Latvia and Russia, Mr. Dinevics said such problems do exist, but he believed they could be solved. Specifically he meant Pytalovo District in Pskov Region, which used to be part of Latvia as Abrena District. "Each side is willing to listen to the other's arguments," he said.

In Mr. Dinevics' view, Latvia can continue sending its representatives to meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers of Sovereign Republics (Russian abbreviation SMID) as observers, for this does not contradict the republic's status as an independent state. Such contacts and exchange of information exist throughout the civilised world. They facilitate mutual understanding and are a good means to test one's policy, said Mr Dinevics.

Shevardnadze on Foreign Political Association

OW0910170291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1500 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze has said the Soviet Foreign Political Association (FPA) he leads is determined to help ex-Soviet republics "gain access to the foreign political arena as smoothly as possible." Speaking at the FPA session in Moscow on Wednesday [9 October], he said the major difficulty today was that "the old Union is disintegrating, and its single foreign policy is about to vanish together with it."

Mr. Shevardnadze predicted that "lack of experience and culture", as well as the absence of distinct foreign political concepts might lead to miscalculations hampering the republics' progress toward international recognition. He said the FPA would be ready to help them out wherever possible.

The ex-foreign minister described the future of Soviet nuclear arsenals as one of the acutest problems and called for centralized control over them. He warned that the United States might reconsider its nuclear arms development program if such control were lost.

In Mr. Shevardnadze's view, the FPA "should be a permanent party to debates over the whole range of defence-related problems." He suggested holding the FPA founding conference in Moscow in the second half of December.

New Parties Organize, State Goals

Party of Left-Wing Forces

LD0910211191 Moscow TASS in English
1924 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Vinitskaya]

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—A group of members of the Soviet Communist Party, the activities of which have been suspended, has called on compatriots to work for the creation of the Russian Party of Left-Wing Forces of Socialist Orientation on the basis of progressive forces of the Soviet Communist Party.

The initiative group, consisting of ten communists, held a news conference in Moscow. Initiators of the party creation include People's Deputies of the USSR Anatoliy Denisov and Roy Medvedev, and People's Deputies of the Russian Federation Vitaliy Sevastyanov and Anatoliy Solovyev.

Speaking at the news conference, Medvedev described the suspension of the Soviet Communist Party's activities as "illegal and disgraceful".

He stressed that it is inadmissible to deny millions of people, believing in socialism, the opportunity to have their political party.

At the same time, the initiative group believes that the Soviet Communist Party as a political structure in its former shape, has exhausted itself, lost confidence and actually ceased to exist.

A recently published statement of the initiative group stressed that today there is a possibility to create a non-apparatchik strong party of like-minded persons, preserving political activity and being capable of actions in the name of civil concord, peaceful and constitutional escape of the country from chaos and disintegration, and profound renovation of all spheres of life.

Ideas, reflected in the draft new programme of the Soviet Communist Party, "socialism, democracy, progress", can become a foundation for the stand of the new Party.

The initiative group offered all, who share its stand, to create regional initiative groups and get ready for holding a republican constituent conference in the last ten days of October.

Labor Party

PM0810110191 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No. 38, 22 Sep 91 (Signed to Press
17 Sep 91) p 4

[Article by Vladimir Konstantinov under the "Facts and Details" rubric: "Party Life: No Respite From Defendants"]

[Text] An action group uniting several Moscow City Soviet deputies and representatives of the leadership of the Socialist Party and the Moscow Trade Union Federation has declared its intention to create a Labor Party in the very near future.

Just as proximity to the earth's pole disorients a compass needle, so the presence on the political horizon of a hybrid party like the CPSU has introduced very great terminological confusion into the characteristics of other political movements—which is what enabled Zhirinovskiy, for example, to pose as a liberal and a democrat and enabled Polozkov to appear as a left-wing figure. And only now is it possible to call things or, more accurately, political movements and parties by their proper names, positioning them on the political scale in accordance with their true values and aims. Obviously, the new party will end up on the left-hand side, the most extreme left-hand side, of this scale.

The new organization is seen by its creators as a party of a laborite type, defending the interests of hired laborers in the Supreme Soviet and in other institutions of state power. It is not hard to guess that it was precisely the obvious approach of legislative and presidential elections that prompted the Socialists, whose party cannot yet boast of mass appeal or broad support even on the part of hired workers, to seek a partnership with the trade unions—the most mass public movement in the country today. So the first statement by the action group may also be regarded as a draft election program.

In addition to the Socialists' traditional statements in defense of the working people, it contains quite original aspects. For example, Boris Kagarlitskiy, member of the Socialist Party Executive Committee, evaluated the situation which has been created in the country since the putsch as a victory for forces analogous with those that were headed in their time by the not unknown Mrs. Thatcher. They intend to counter the "wild" privatization which, in the opinion of the appeal's authors, has the country in its grip, with the principle of the working people's priority right to acquire ownership at their main place of work. The Labor Party's champions consider the powerful public sector the strike force of the economy, while recognizing, however, the right to the existence of private initiative too. The new party, the initiators declared, opposes the strengthening of executive power to the detriment of representative organs—which is what is happening in Moscow, for example. Generalizing all these ideas, it was concluded that the former USSR has

embarked on the "Third World" countries' path of development: A very close fusion of power and capital is approaching.

The situation is lent piquancy by the fact that the statement on the creation of the new party, which has declared itself an opposition party, was also signed by Moscow City Soviet Chairman Nikolay Gonchar. It seems that "smooth" relations between Moscow City Soviet and the city hall are not foreseen.

In assessing the new party's prospects, too great a significance should not be attached to the allergy to socialist ideas which has been observed in society since the putsch. Tomorrow, when measures to revive the economy, including unpopular ones, will inevitably start to be taken, unemployment will increase and living standards will fall, and the attitude of many people to these ideas and to the parties offering them will change.

Constitutional Democrats Register

LD10055791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian
1800 GMT 1 Oct 91

[Summary] The Constitutional Democrats Party has registered officially as a party. Mikhail Astafyev, chairman of its central committee, said during a news conference today that the main goals of the party will be a state system, priority of individual rights over the rights of a nation, and defense of national minorities. The party is against the disintegration of the Union.

Yakovlev Political Statements, Affiliations**Remarks at Research Foundation**

PM0910145991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Oct 91 Single Edition p 2

[Report by V. Nikiforova: "How To Get Bolshevism Out of Your System"]

[Text] A Sociopolitical Research Foundation has been established by decree of the country's president. It is housed in the building of the former CPSU Central Committee Institute of Contemporary Social Problems and has inherited its finances and facilities.

At the presentation of the foundation on 3 October, G. Shakhnazarov declared that the institution is designed to be a generator of sociopolitical research and to lend it a systems orientation.

The potential for this does exist, as well known statesmen and politicians and prominent political scientists have joined the foundation's council. They include S. Stankevich, D. Volkonogov, A. Kiva, O. Latsis, K. Lubenchenko, and V. Lukin. Yu. Krasin is general director of the foundation. A Political Forecasting Institute and centers for international relations and the study of international political experience are being set up within the foundation's framework.

The first political lectures have taken place, starting with a lecture entitled "On the Threshold of the 21st Century" by A.N. Yakovlev, the foundation's honorary chairman. In it the lecturer expounded his "personal thoughts on Marxism as the basis of socialist building and what stems from this for our society." "Marxism has brought us to the brink," he said, "to a loss of conscience and morality, and our salvation lies in restoring hierarchical values." Bolshevik communism has failed, but it is difficult to get it out of our system.

Yakovlev was positive in his attitude toward the statement by the action group to unite Russian left-wing forces of a socialist persuasion: "It is all right if rank-and-file communists form a party and are involved in political life." But as far as the CPSU leaders are concerned, he said, he finds it unpleasant and shameful that the partyocrats have so quickly become democrats and issued statements in PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. However, maybe this was a joke prior to the glass of wine promised participants in the lectures, like A. Yakovlev's joking complaint that since the collapse of the CPSU democrats have suffered because the enemy has disappeared. For his part N. Travkin, chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia, deemed it necessary to reprove the democrats in power: In a couple of days you nationalized CPSU property, installed yourselves in fine buildings, and set up all your administrative apparatuses, while the Democratic Party of Russia headquarters has been languishing in a basement!

After the lectures, Arab newspaper correspondent D. al-Mashtah asked to those around him in perplexity: "Is it now as dangerous to defend Marxism in your country as it used to be to criticize it?"

Evolution Viewed

PM0910154791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Oct 91 Union Edition p 7

[A. Ostalskiy article: "Confession of a Captive of Time. Aleksandr Yakovlev in Search of the Truth"]

[Text] This happened quite recently and before our eyes: On 15 August 1991 the Bureau Presidium of the Central Control Commission—the CPSU's chief control body—unexpectedly recommended that Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev be expelled from the party. In fact, his "disagreement" with the party leadership had recently been known to everyone, and yet nevertheless this came as a shock. The controllers did not even consult with the CPSU's leader, who was on vacation at Foros—which was utterly unusual and caused alarm. "It seems there's a 'mutiny on board the ship,'" many people thought.

Yakovlev long ago became a symbolic figure. His very presence in the political arena aroused the fury of reactionaries, as he personified changes that were so repulsive to them. In commencing the putsch they simply could not deny themselves the pleasure of displaying this loathing, even if this might have betrayed their plans to some extent. But few people at that time

guessed the true scale and aims of that mutiny, which was far from being only within the party.

It seems that at that time not even Aleksandr Nikolayevich himself had fully realized the meaning of his own prophetic sentence: "They probably think that power is already in their hands."

Yakovlev's book "Torment of Reading Genesis" [Muki prochteniya bytiya], which has just been published by the "Novosti" Publishing House, reads like a detective story (although, of course, of far greater benefit to the heart and soul), for it is, nevertheless, a question of one of the chief characters in a drama being created before our eyes (and in our lives).

The book includes speeches, articles, and interviews by Aleksandr Nikolayevich during quite a brief period—from the end of 1989 through August this year. But what a tremendous, exhausting path has been traveled during this time—no, not by one person but by our entire society, which has changed drastically. And this is what is striking—not only does the author not conceal the agonizing nature of this path, the errors, and the difficulties of the search but, seemingly, the opposite—he seeks to show all this in as accurate and as documented a way as possible.

How strikingly today's Yakovlev differs from yesterday's! As much as 18 months ago he gave this answer to a journalist's question about the possibility of a coup in our country: "I think not." (True, there is here already an element of doubt, of a second's hesitation, and of overcoming something within himself: not a simple and clear "No" but "I think..."). But in the summer of 1991 this doubt was becoming almost a certainty, a warning of the danger of Bolshevik revanchism. Yakovlev had already clearly discerned then that the reactionaries had "gotten a very wide smile on their faces..., a smile because they anticipated possible victory." "There is potential for a coup..." he warned. But, at the same time—"I am convinced that this will not end in victory for them." And in this last resolute assertion he also proved a prophet.

The book attests that as much as 18 months ago or even less than a year ago Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, a professional worker on the party apparatus, was entertaining considerable illusions about the possibility of reforming the CPSU, believing that the party, if freed from "the extreme reaction which still lives in the psychological field of permanent war against its own people," was capable of being a progressive force of help to perestroika. Alas, it has to be admitted that at that moment he, who for so long had been walking ahead and showing the way, found himself for a while at the back and lagged behind a multitude of communists who had been awakened from political hibernation with his help. After the Vilnius events few of them believed any longer in a future for the CPSU. And it was only just before the 19 August coup itself that Yakovlev "matured" sufficiently to take the most decisive step of consciously

leaving the party and declared that he was "disenchanted with Marxism as a guide for action."

But 18 months ago he was still defending not only Gorbachev and the party but also Marxism-Leninism from criticism. "Attempts, in the guise of renewal, to entirely do away with particular tenets of Marxism, Leninist concepts... Of course, this is unacceptable to the party even now"—this from a speech in June 1990. And just a little earlier—in February last year—he maintained that "by borrowing individual tenets of Leninism... Stalinism emasculated the chief thing—its essence, i.e. the method, development."

But by this fateful August Yakovlev was already looking differently on this "essence." "Lenin... transferred to our Russian soil the ideas of revolutionary violence, terrorism, disregard for a civilian society and the middle class... He translated Marxism into the language of Bolshevism."

How are such changes to be explained? Or was Shkiryatov, Stalin's party inquisitor, right when he accused Yakovlev, still quite a young Central Committee agent, of "unscrupulousness" because he was not purging Soviet higher educational institutions of "cosmopolitans"?

Aleksandr Nikolayevich himself answers such questions like this: "Do you know what a person is who does not change his views? He is someone who does not notice the movement of life." And, in another place and on another subject: "The slave in a person shrinks very slowly..."

And yet already in July 1990 he was saying: "You can understand how difficult it is to grasp the thought—and the human skull is a most impregnable fortress—the thought that a monopoly on the truth is fatal." And this was said at a party forum—at the CPSU congress! Were there many ears there that were capable of hearing?

Far earlier, during the period of "early perestroika," Politburo Member Yakovlev—also in some perfectly official, perfectly "party" speech—had started speaking about what he considered the chief thing for our society. And, in his view, this chief thing was not some "rallying" or "strengthening" of ranks nor even the really extremely necessary economic efficiency, but morality!

Even before Yakovlev found himself at the front of the stage of political life, rumors had spread about Moscow of a "strange," unprecedented department head, democratic, accessible, and not devoid of humor, who could call without ceremony on an ordinary agent and drink tea with him and who did not like highfalutin tittle-tattle and demagoguery. And even earlier I had read in Western newspapers about the "amazing" Soviet ambassador to Canada, who was "on friendly family terms" with Prime Minister Trudeau and was not afraid to speak frankly with the press...

And against this background it no longer seemed so surprising that M. Gorbachev, who has been to Canada,

chose Aleksandr Yakovlev (whom, incidentally, he had encountered before and whose "frondeur" reputation on the Central Committee he knew well) as one of his closest colleagues in the matter he had undertaken under the vaguely strange name of "perestroika."

And yet no one then could have assumed that a special role in history belonged to this man with a simple peasant face and characteristic way of pronouncing his "o's."

For it was precisely he who, as the all-powerful Central Committee secretary for ideology, "bore chief responsibility" for the fact that right at the start of perestroika democratically-minded people found themselves in the posts of chief editors of the leading newspapers and journals and that the press, for the first time in Soviet history, was freed from political censorship and was able, with his immutable support, to withstand the party's diktat increasingly boldly.

Yakovlev indignantly denied the fabrications of anonymous provocateurs, who ascribed to him a statement to the effect that Gorbachev "gives voice" to his [Yakovlev's] ideas. But few political experts doubt the reality of his tremendous influence over the "initiator of perestroika" particularly during the first, largely decisive years of the reforms. Many still remember the sense of grievance and the feeling of betrayal at the time when he was suddenly removed from ideology in 1988 and replaced by the superloyal V. Medvedev. The democratic press experienced many difficulties because of this at the time. But if someone wanted to "limit" glasnost, it was already too late. The train which Yakovlev had started had already left.

With what was it necessary to begin the reforms? Many people believed and still believe: with the economy. There is no denying that the reform of the economy should, of course, have been started far earlier and more decisively. But, for all that, the August events showed that, if we had not started with glasnost, whose architect Aleksandr Yakovlev is rightly considered, we too would most likely have ended up now like the Chinese—with Tiananmen... It was precisely political democratization and, above all, the freeing of the mass media and, thus, also of public thought, that destroyed in a matter of years the iron armor that had bound society for decades.

"Our soldiers must never again participate in the arrangement of social life in any country of the world"—this is how Aleksandr Yakovlev formulated one of his chief foreign policy principles. The time came in August this year when people tried to use Soviet soldiers to "arrange social life" in their own country. But they refused to do this. And it is undoubtedly to Aleksandr Nikolayevich's tremendous credit that this happened.

Role as Gorbachev Adviser

AU0910215391 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
7 Oct 91 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of President Gorbachev's Consultative Council, by Felix Alekseyev in Moscow; date not given: "I Can Still Be Useful...."]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

[Alekseyev] Last summer you left the CPSU Central Committee and this summer you left the presidential council. A few weeks later—in fact, just recently—you accepted Gorbachev's offer and became his adviser. You joined the president's Consultative Council along with Eduard Shevardnadze and other democratic politicians. How do you explain these changes?

[Yakovlev] Last year I thought about departing from the ruling structures. The reason? It was simply intolerable. It was impossible to work with people who, in my opinion, proceeded in their practical activity from absolutely contrary positions and convictions. However, at the same time, it seemed to me that President Gorbachev had got himself into a very difficult situation where everyone everywhere was shouting "Down with him!" From an ethical point of view, it was unacceptable to me to abandon him at a difficult time.

[Alekseyev] Nevertheless, despite this, you abandoned him this summer....

[Yakovlev] During the summer, when work on the Union treaty had come to an end and when Gorbachev had met with the "Seven" in London, it seemed to me that his position had improved and that he was beginning to cope with the situation better. Under these circumstances, I announced twice that I wanted to leave my post as senior adviser. My request was complied with in August following long discussions with the president. I began to fully devote myself to the Movement for Democratic Reform.

[Alekseyev] The movement was founded at the beginning of July, prior to your departure from the president. Why did you found it?

[Yakovlev] In the document in which we announced its establishment we cited the two main reasons that led toward this step. First, we wanted to prevent the rise of counterrevolutionary reactionary forces in the country. Second, we wanted to activate reform and to give it a second wind.

[Alekseyev] However, you did not succeed in preventing reactionary intentions....

[Yakovlev] There was not enough time. However, if I am to be sincere, I did not envisage that the counterrevolution would incline toward an overt coup attempt. It seemed to me that in September 1990 the right-wing had

decided in favor of creeping counterrevolutionary tactics. If they had continued with this they would have had, in my opinion, a greater chance of success.

[Alekseyev] You parted ways with Gorbachev, but you returned to him after the coup. What had changed?

[Yakovlev] Yes. As I have already explained, I parted ways with him at the beginning of August without any regrets. Naturally, the aforementioned coup changed a great deal in our political life. The country has changed. The reactionary conservative tendency in the upper echelons of power has narrowed down. However, this does not mean it has disappeared. Certain scope for this tendency remains, first and foremost, on account of our grave economic situation.

[Alekseyev] Obviously, your attitude toward whether it is necessary or unnecessary to immediately cooperate with the president has also changed?

[Yakovlev] Conditions are different after the coup. It is necessary to help the president and I want to do this within the bounds of my capabilities. I agreed to accept the post of adviser on condition that I would not be associated with the ruling structures and that I would not be involved with bureaucracy and paperwork. However, I will have a specific mission in fulfilling my tasks at home and abroad. I hope that I can still be useful in this regard.

Primakov 'Must Bring' Stability to KGB

PM0910123591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 3 Oct 91 p 3

[A. Vasilyev commentary under the rubric "Espionage News": "Now Let's Go Intelligence Gathering With Primakov"]

[Text] Lately Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov has "outsmarted" the oracles: Observers and experts marked him down for various state posts, especially for the job of USSR minister of foreign affairs. On 19 August a foreign diplomat called me at the editorial office to say that there are rumors in "diplomatic circles" that they are intending to appoint Ye.M. Primakov minister of foreign affairs... in the government of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. The diplomat was interested in hearing my opinion. I replied that Primakov will most likely decline, since his path is not the same as that of this "team." Which Yevgeniy Maksimovich demonstrated by his behavior at the time of the putsch. And now comes his new appointment—chief of Soviet foreign intelligence. And it is quite natural for different people to have different opinions about this.

Professional intelligence officers are grumbling because a nonprofessional has been put in charge of them. Primakov has never worked "in the field": He has never weeded out secret information, written encrypted messages, or recruited agents. But there is another viewpoint, and it too is shared by many intelligence staffers: A

politician rather than a professional is now needed to head this organization. The point is that the Soviet special services' main adversary continues to be the U.S. CIA and FBI, but now the main enemy is the incompetence and haste in the perestroika of the KGB's structure and activities, as well as in cadre questions. Primakov's task now is to protect the intelligence apparatus from the "sweeping" resolutions which are sometimes adopted in the Russian "White House" and the Kremlin. And here, of course, a politician is needed.

When Kryuchkov was promoted to KGB chairman from the post of chief of the First Main Directorate, they could not select a replacement for him for several months. This started to cause turmoil in intelligence. Its staffers joked among themselves: "The KGB wants to appoint its own man and the CIA wants to appoint one of its own." This episode shows for the umpteenth time how fragile and sensitive the intelligence mechanism is. Any changes in the leadership of the KGB or country or in the political situation are fraught with unpredictable consequences. An intelligence officer can obtain secrets and recruit agents only when he feels he can depend on his rear services. Intelligence can work effectively only given its internal stability—both psychological and cadre stability. This is precisely the stability that Primakov must bring to the organization under his command.

What else is important? It is important that intelligence officers' moral bearings do not shift, that they clearly understand for whom and against whom they are working. In the present conditions, when, for example, they are trying to make a traitor to the motherland like Gordiyevskiy out to be a profoundly moral man and virtually a fighter for perestroika, this task is not an easy one. According to this inverted logic, if the KGB chairman became a participant in the State Committee for the State of Emergency, while the CPSU is hiding the "people's money" somewhere, then the Soviet intelligence officer and CPSU member who have trodden the path of treachery are now good men. But it is just the logic of the absurd.

Here is the latest example of fact-juggling. At a news conference by six prisoners from Perm Camp No. 35 who were pardoned by decrees of Boris Yeltsin and Askar Akayev, the name of ex-KGB Lieutenant Colonel Boris Yuzhin was mentioned, who in October 1987 was convicted of betraying the motherland under the notorious Article 64, which was previously applied to dissidents too. In this context as well as alongside the pardoned men's names Yuzhin also looks "guilty without guilt," as it were. This is what his wife said in an interview with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "It seems to me that because my husband was secretary of the party organization of one of the TASS editorial offices, and consequently a very well-informed man, he was sent to Nizhniy Tagil so that he would vanish without trace."

Nadezhda Yuzhin's feelings can be understood, but the fact that her husband was a party secretary is not the issue here. He was indeed a well-informed man, because

he was a staffer at the KGB station in San Francisco and sold the secrets he knew to the U.S. special services for freely convertible currency. Yuzhin was actually "caught out" in Moscow. He lost his cigarette lighter at work, which a cleaner found and took to the building's janitor. It turned out that the lighter was fitted with... a camera. Some time later counterintelligence caught up with the lighter's owner too.

That is what he got Article 64 for. Under our laws, as a serviceman who had taken the oath he was liable to the supreme penalty—execution by firing squad. But because Yuzhin cooperated very actively with the investigation, he was given 15 years' imprisonment instead of the death penalty.

Now judge for yourselves: Can Yuzhin be put in the same category as dissidents, even if they were convicted under the very same article? And how would intelligence officers feel if Yuzhin were suddenly pardoned too?

Postscript

Yesterday Ye. M. Primakov held a news conference at which he, in particular, categorically came out against utilizing journalistic cover in intelligence work. Journalists, according to Primakov, must be absolutely independent of state structures. From Primakov's viewpoint, diplomatic posts are suitable for intelligence officers.

Changes in KGB Personnel Viewed

PM0910140191 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 38, 22 Sep 91 (Signed to Press 17 Sep 91) p 11

[Yevgeniya Albats "Observer's Commentary" under the "Appointments" rubric: "Lubyanka in Shock"]

[Text] Just as we predicted in the first issue of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI after the putsch, the removal of "Iron Feliks" from his pedestal proved to be for KGB staffers just the "flowers" placed on the victors' altar. They are gathering the first "berries" right now. I believe that this will be a very abundant harvest.

The Lubyanka is in shock, and not only because of the cadre purge on a scale which the KGB has not seen since the times of the Khrushchevian thaw but also because of the appointments which have already ensued—for different reasons, of course.

And so, the entire KGB Collegium, which includes the leaders of the most important subdepartments of this visible tip of the iceberg called the KGB's central apparatus, has tendered its resignation to Chairman Vadim Bakatin. The fate of some of them, such as Counterintelligence Chief Titov and KGB Deputy Chairman Lebedev, has already been decided—the department's Personnel Directorate will tackle their further job placement. The fate of the others is still in question. Lieutenant General Leonov, who headed the KGB Information Analysis Directorate and who is an odious figure

even among chekists, has retired on pension. It was Leonov who incautiously declared at the "Soyuz" congress that all KGB staffers are under the banners of "Soyuz." He has gone, leaving behind him absolutely empty safes and shelves in his office—and it was said of this directorate that it keeps its finger on the pulse of everything that happens in the KGB. Colonel Vladimir Rubanov, a well-known critic of Kryuchkov's committee, has been appointed leader of the Information Analysis Directorate; in the past, following one of his articles in the press, Rubanov was "asked" to leave the KGB, and he became Bakatin's assistant at the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The appointment of Konstantin Lubenchenko, a jurist by training and currently deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, as first deputy chairman of the KGB was to have been the sensation of the day. However, the sensation did not materialize: Lubenchenko refused, explaining his refusal by saying that the post of KGB deputy chairman presupposes shoulder boards and, as a result, the execution of military discipline and orders.

The majority of people with whom I have spoken regret the decision made by Lubenchenko. First, Lubenchenko is a jurist—which is very important, since the legal space in which the KGB operates to this day is absolutely virginal. Unless, of course, you count the Law on the KGB, which legitimated the department's lawlessness. There are still no laws that could protect us to some extent from the arbitrariness of power structures, whatever they may be—communists or democrats. True, according to information from well-informed sources, Vadim Bakatin is now preparing an order which will make public all the kinds of operational-technical measures which KGB staffers will be permitted to use and beyond which they have no right to go. This is the first time such a thing will have been done in the entire history of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, and the KGB.

But there is also another factor. Konstantin Lubenchenko has a reputation as an independent and "barely governable" person. And words about the need for the "personal devotion" of state officials to the Russian president, government, and legislature are increasingly frequently creeping into the vocabulary of the Russian leaders and Russian deputies addressed to various kinds of state officials. This way of formulating the question, especially if it is going to be applied to a structure like the KGB, does not elicit optimism.

However, the new authorities seem to be making the transition from words to deeds. I mean the appointment of Reserve Senior Lt. Yevgeniy Savostyanov, a geologist by training and until a few days ago assistant mayor of Moscow, as chief of the KGB Directorate for Moscow and Moscow Oblast.

This appointment has prompted grave doubts among qualified observers for at least two reasons. First, Savostyanov has never before worked at the KGB and, second, he does not have juridical training. It would be possible to overlook these arguments: What is bad about the fact that the Moscow KGB will be headed by someone not burdened by an organs mentality but endowed with certain common sense? Especially since such an experiment has proved perfectly successful in Czechoslovakia, for example. It turns out that the only difference is that the former state security structure there was totally disbanded and a new one is now being organized, for which professionals of the old school either are not needed at all or will be carefully picked out. But in our country these cadre changes are taking place under conditions when the same old KGB, endowed with totalitarian power, exists. It is in this that the geologist Savostyanov has to immerse himself. Incidentally, he has refused the rank of colonel. But even this is not everything. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has already written of the confrontation that exists within the KGB between professionals, in other words cadre staffers, and people who came from party organs. The fact that the new leader of the Moscow directorate is not a secretary of a CPSU rayon committee, let us say, but someone close to one of the leaders of the Movement for Democratic Reforms will, I am afraid, give chekists little inspiration. "These are dangerous games," this is how Col. Vladimir Rubanov, who can hardly be accused of liking the old KGB, assessed the Moscow authorities' decision. "This could, to say the least, split the collective and create confrontation. And it is hardly sensible to underrate the strength of the KGB." Let me add that the KGB's history attests that party comrades who have requalified as chekists began, as a rule, engaging precisely in politics in the organs, as it was in this that they felt themselves to be specialists. The old structure which has still not been destroyed, the lack of legal regulations which still do not exist, and the close coupling with party and state organs turned precisely this activity of the committee into activity personally dangerous to each of us.

The coming functional changes in the committee arouse no less interest than the cadre changes. The already known information about the elimination of the Fourth Department, which tackled church affairs in the "Z" Directorate (the Directorate for the Defense of the Soviet Constitutional System), will soon be complemented by other information: About the elimination of the "Z" Directorate altogether. Ideological counterintelligence is not yet provided for in the structure of the organs. It seems that the First Main Directorate—intelligence—which evidently forms an independent department something like the CIA, will attain independence from the KGB.

The Third Main Directorate—military counterintelligence—will most likely be entirely or mostly transferred to the Army.

Substantial changes are also coming in the Second Main Directorate (counterintelligence). It will evidently gather all the counterintelligence directorates under its roof. In this sense the approval of Major General Nikolay Sham, who until last week was deputy chief of the so-called Sixth Service—economic counterintelligence—as deputy chairman of the KGB does not seem accidental. Incidentally, a few months ago Sham himself became the object of a struggle between the "White House" and Kryuchkov. The Russians slated the general as leader of the republic KGB—which was categorically opposed by the chairman at that time.

There will probably also be a different status for the KGB Information Analysis Directorate, which used to supply the country's leadership with an analysis of what was happening in the state, based, according to Rubanov, on the answers that were at the end of the task book. It will evidently be transformed into the Center. However, let us not hurry events. It cannot be ruled out that the USSR KGB will not exist at all; an interrepublic coordinating council will be set up in its place, and the central apparatus will pass under Russia's jurisdiction. It is only important that politicians should not hurry events too. The victory cake is sweet, of course, but it quickly spoils. Like any other gastronomic product.

It is absolutely all the same to me, a committedly nonparty person, what the segment which will replace the Communist Party in the former oligarchic triad of the KGB, the military-industrial complex, and the CPSU will be called. It is important to me that the oligarchy itself should not exist. And this is only possible if the question of the "personal devotion" of state security organs and the military-industrial complex is excluded from the country's political vocabulary.

Government Communications Committee Chief Named

92US0037A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 39, Oct 91 p 1

[Commentary by Senior Editor A. Uglov: "Something Is Brewing Somewhere"]

[Text] We have learned from reliable sources that former Penza Oblast State Security Chief A.V. Starovoitov (who has nothing in common with G.V. Starovoitova, USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy) has been appointed to head the Committee for Government Communications under the USSR president. As a footnote, this committee has been established on the basis of several departments "extirpated" from the structure of the Union KGB.

There is talk in the circles close to President Yeltsin about establishing an analogous committee in the Russian Federation. Concerns are being voiced regarding the suspicious thoroughness and diligence with which Yeltsin's apparatchiks (almost all former professional communists) are pushing the draft toward signing. Judging by its contents, it envisages, among other things, the Union agency's control over information of state

significance for Russia. According to the draft, all code keys and other elements of protecting Russia's state secrets also are to stay in the same department rather than in its Russian equivalent. Allegedly, the draft has already been initialed by the chief of the Russian KGB, Ivanenko.

All of this permits one to conclude that quite possibly there is a new entity ripening in the bowels of the KGB—itsself in the process of being reformed now: a new analytical center autonomously conducting its own policy in the best Kryuchkov traditions.

State Committee for State of Emergency Case

Grushko Hearing Postponed

PM0410133591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Oct 91 Union Edition p 6

[Report on interview with V. Lebedev, chairman of the Russian Supreme Court, by Valeriy Rudnev; place and date not given: "State Committee for the State of Emergency Case: Judge Sends For Prosecutor To Check Whether the Arrest of One of the Accused Was Legal. But the Prosecutor Did Not Appear Before the Court..."]

[Text] The Russian Supreme Court office received an unusual complaint—from V. Grushko's defense counsel A. Kligman. The lawyer suggested that the arrest of the former deputy chairman of the USSR KGB was illegal. He asked for Grushko to be released from custody. And although it is a long time yet before the court examines the case, the court nonetheless decided to act on the complaint, asked the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Prosecutor's Office for the documents it would need for the check, and scheduled the hearing for 27 September, to be attended by the prosecutor, lawyer, and accused. The interested parties were notified.

However, no prosecutor turned up at the RSFSR Supreme Court at the appointed time. The examination of the case was aborted. The court postponed the hearing until some time in October (the date has not yet been announced), and Russian General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov was informed accordingly.

I asked V. Lebedev, chairman of the Russian Supreme Court, to comment on the situation.

[Rudnev]"Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich, it was, to be frank, a sensation when the prosecutor was summoned to appear before the court in order to check whether his decision to arrest had been legal. I believe it is the first time this has happened in Soviet judicial practice: Indeed, hitherto, a prosecutor has only been examined by another prosecutor."

[Lebedev]"It is normal practice for a rule-of-law state. Incidentally, we recognized it juridically a long time ago: Back in 1973 the USSR ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Here are some lines

from it: 'Anyone who loses his freedom as a result of having been arrested or taken into custody has the right to have his case heard in court, so that the court can forthwith make a ruling concerning the legality of his detention and order his release if the detention is illegal.' So it is not a revolution. The recently adopted Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms merely registered our commitment to the international community..."

[Rudnev]"So we had to endure the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] for the natural norms of the rule-of-law state to finally become a reality here?"

[Lebedev]"Certainly, the brutal ordeal of the August events will accelerate our movement toward a democratic society. As for the complaint about an illegal arrest in the SCSE case, that is OK. It must be OK! The lawyer made the complaint to our office without any preliminary talks or consultations. In any case, courts are now obliged to examine such complaints."

[Rudnev]"You are the supreme legal authority in Russia. Yet this is an ordinary complaint. What is it then—is it because of the special status of the SCSE case?"

[Lebedev]"Such complaints can indeed be examined by a people's judge in the place where the investigating body is situated. But, on the other hand, lawyer Klighman's complaint is the first of its kind. And we must set an example for Russian courts. The military call it—'do as I do.'"

[Rudnev]"Can you tell us, then, what happens after such a complaint is made?"

[Lebedev]"Such complaints have to be examined by a judge acting individually behind closed doors (we have to ensure that the preliminary hearing is secret). As for documents, you need at least those connected with the prosecutor's decision to arrest. And the parties, that is, the prosecutor, the lawyer, and the detainee, must be present."

[Rudnev]"And if the court decides that the prosecutor's decision was illegal?"

[Lebedev]"It releases the detainee immediately."

[Rudnev]"Perhaps that is why Russian prosecutors are afraid of going to the Supreme Court?"

[Lebedev]"Better ask the RSFSR general prosecutor about that..."

We called V. Stepankov:

"We are prepared to provide the court with the documents and, if need be, validate every arrest in the SCSE case," the Russian general prosecutor said. "But I am afraid that we and the court might make a mistake. They release a detainee in the courtroom, say, and we arrest him again outside the door. There are some other, equally delicate matters in what is a new procedure for our country. And we and the court must tackle them by

means of talks and consultations with academics and legislators, not in the way V. Lebedev proposes. After all, we are the same business.

Kryuchkov Attorney Protests

PM0710195091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Oct 91 Single Edition p 3

[I. Lenskiy report under the rubric "The SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] Case": "Attorney Complains"]

[Text] Yuriy Ivanov, attorney for former KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov, who is under investigation in the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] case, met with journalists at the Moscow Youth Institute.

The defense attorney reported that he was admitted to the defendant only on the 10th day of his detention, but he has already talked with him about 20 times. He categorically swept aside suggestions about mercenary motives for Kryuchkov's actions, stressing that the former KGB boss had been following his patriotic duty as he saw it. Although unable to go into the details of the investigation, the attorney stated that his client still does not admit the charge of betraying the motherland that has been brought against him.

In Ivanov's opinion, today we can speak in more or less definite terms about the imposition of a state of emergency in violation of procedure, which is not a criminally punishable offense. Although other actions which Kryuchkov had a hand in, namely the isolation of the president, the disconnection of government communications, and so forth, are liable to criminal prosecution, they should not be described as treason but a case of overstepping one's authority. Moreover, Ivanov stated, the present archaic interpretation of Article 64 of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Criminal Code, which implies "damage to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and state security of the USSR," could equally well be applied to the head of state.

Yu. Ivanov once again insisted that USSR President M. Gorbachev be given the status of an injured party rather than a witness. This changes a lot, since the injured party is a person with an interest in the outcome of the case. However, even with the present state of affairs, the attorney considers it juridically inadmissible that the prosecutor is reporting the progress of the inquiry to a witness.

Up to now the defense has had no chance to take part in the interrogation of other persons appearing as witnesses. For example KGB staffers whom the prosecutor's office and a parliamentary commission are dealing with. The trustworthiness of their testimony, which is sometimes given under direct or indirect threat of dismissal, is open to doubt.

It has become apparent that the "lists of people to be interned" which were plastered all over the newspapers turned out to be a piece of deception. However, it is known for certain that Kryuchkov had telephone conversations 19-20 August with B. Yeltsin, I. Silayev, and R. Khasbulatov, and in no way did he hamper the convening of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session.

Yu. Ivanov assessed former Prime Minister I. Silayev's demand that Kryuchkov should suffer the death penalty (OGONEK, No. 36) and a similar statement by Vice President Rutskoy about Yazov, made on television 21 August, to be a violation of the presumption of innocence and an attempt by Russia's top leaders to bring pressure to bear on the investigation and the court. RSFSR President B. Yeltsin anticipated the inquiry by naming Lukyanov as the ideologist of the putsch in his radio speech 7 September.

Summing up his remarks, Yu. Ivanov stated: "The investigation is proceeding in a nonobjective fashion; a multitude of difficulties and obstacles is being artificially created for the defense. Only an open court will be able to establish the truth not on the basis of rumors and conjectures, but on the basis of indisputable facts."

Update on Lukyanov, Yazov

PM0710212291 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Oct 91 Union Edition p 4

[Article by V. Rudnev: "The SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] Case: The Attorneys Petition for Rights, But the Prosecutor Is Still Right"]

[Text] Apparently, with the return of attorney Genrikh Padva from Paris, the defense of the accused Anatoliy Lukyanov is becoming more active. At least, the attorney intends once again to raise the question of releasing the former chairman of the country's Supreme Soviet from custody. The grounds—the continuing deterioration in his health. In this connection G. Padva described the recent mass media report that A. Lukyanov was being treated in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] hospital as a subtle ruse. In fact, the attorney explained, A. Lukyanov is not in a hospital ward at present, but in a cell in a detention center. (Before this issue was signed to press, it became known that Lukyanov has been hospitalized after all.)

True, G. Padva did not specify who was responsible for this ruse—the mass media or the investigative organs. Let us observe that the attorneys' previous attempts to obtain Lukyanov's release were unsuccessful: The prosecutor turned them down. We do not know what will be decided this time. But even if they release Lukyanov, the prosecutor will be right—after all, it is for him to decide...

However, the courts could also intervene in this simple game of "patience." At least, the Russian Supreme Court intends to examine attorney A. Kligman's complaint of unlawful arrest of V. Grushko (which we wrote about in

detail in issue No. 235), despite a degree of opposition on the part of the prosecutor's office. For the time being, let us observe that however the procedural dispute between the court and the investigators may develop, the prosecutor should nonetheless appear in court if he is summoned there. Because that shows respect for Russia's supreme judicial authority.

The attorneys are also continuing to insist on full access to the materials of the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] case. Limited access to the investigation documents restricts their ability to provide legal assistance to their clients. But here too, for the time being, right is on the prosecutor's side... Yevgeniy Lisov, leader of the investigation team and Russian deputy general prosecutor, is still citing Union legislative norms, which do not allow the attorneys access to the entire case at present. They are so entitled, in the prosecutor's opinion, only after the completion of the preliminary investigation—before the case is sent to court.

The attorneys are familiar with Union legislation, but cite Russian legislation, which states: From the moment that the defendant has access to the case, he is entitled to study all materials and transcribe the necessary information. In this specific situation we too can see no logic in the position of the Russian Prosecutor's Office, which apparently recognizes the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Declaration on State Sovereignty, but is still referring to Union norms.

And so it turns out that whoever has most rights, is right. And again, that is the prosecutor.

As, for instance, in the case of D. Yazov. He was arrested, as you know, 22 August. On the same day, when he was interrogated as a suspect, he (as was his right) asked for an attorney. On 30 August Yazov was charged under Article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, but without a defense attorney, which is categorically banned under current Russian law. Not until 3 September did the marshal's relatives conclude an agreement with attorney N. Pechenkin. The latter immediately filed a complaint to the Russian general prosecutor on the unlawful presentation of the charge against Yazov. The attorney received no reply. On 18 September, together with attorney L. Abeldyayev, who has joined the case, he wrote a second complaint, in which, in addition, they demand the release of the defendant on the grounds of gross violations of criminal procedure. Ye. Lisov's response: In view of the dangerous nature of the crime with which Yazov is charged, there are no grounds at present for releasing him from custody. Not a word about the violation of procedure.

It was not until 23 September, a month after the marshal's arrest, that the requirements of criminal procedure were finally met: The charge was presented to Yazov in the presence of his defense attorney.

And more about the marshal. A report has appeared in the mass media, citing investigative organs, to the effect that he is the only one of the SCSE to have admitted his

guilt. But according to attorney N. Pechenkin, Yazov did not actually admit his guilt either 22 or 30 August or 23 September.

In this context the attorneys' other petitions look trivial. For instance, the request to install television sets in the cells of those arrested in the SCSE case. The relatives of the accused are prepared to buy these televisions themselves. The administration of No. 4 Detention Center has not yet given permission, referring the decision to the Union Main Administration for Correctional Affairs. V. Gulyayev, chief of the Main Administration for Correctional Affairs, is personally not opposed to installing "windows on the world" in the cells of those under investigation, but refers the decision to the Russian general prosecutor. The latter thinks that radio channel one and the newspapers are quite enough to keep those under arrest informed about the country's life.

There is not much information about the life of the team investigating the SCSE case: Here too, it seems, there is secrecy... True, it is known that the investigations team is increasing in size, and there are now nearly 10 investigators per defendant. Some of the group have returned from Foros, where an investigative experiment was carried out, the nature of which is, however, not being made public. And another thing: A special section to oversee the investigation of the coup d'etat has been set up at the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office.

The work of the investigations team is following several principal avenues: the Cabinet of Ministers, the Supreme Soviet, the MVD, the KGB, the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Council, the Peasants Union, the Association of Industrialists. Lastly, the mass media. "The task: to uncover the main participants, and also accomplices. Those who wittingly or unwittingly were drawn into the conspiracy," Ye. Lisov comments. "But of course, proceedings will be taken only against those whose actions contain concrete criminal elements."

The team leaders have no particular problems at present. True, in Ye. Lisov's opinion some nuisance is being caused by the activity of the different commissions to investigate the SCSE—the state and deputies' commissions. Unverified information, or information which should not be made public, sometimes comes from these sources. For instance, new lists of persons whom the SCSE proposed to arrest have appeared in the press, attributed to the state commission to investigate the activity of the KGB. S. Stepashin, chairman of the state commission, confirmed: They are working on such a list. But he stated categorically that the state commission leadership did not give this information to the press. "Obviously the journalists themselves are active here," S. Stepashin observed.

Ye. Lisov believes that such activity on the part of journalists is damaging to the cause.

Let us note, for our part: The absence of information is even more damaging.

Incidentally, the list published in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY interested us not only because of its relationship to a possible SCSE action to intern people. It is very diverse: left, center, and right are all here. In a confidential conversation, a staffer on the state commission told us: The list was drawn up on the basis of reports based on the superficial observations and recollections of those KGB workers who carried out surveillance. We therefore have a unique opportunity (on the basis of this list) to judge the scope of KGB activity. They watched everyone, trusted no one...

Presidential Commission Created

92US0037B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 39, Oct 91 p 2

[Interview with T. Gdlyan, USSR people's deputy, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent P. Lukyanchenko, under the rubric "Point of View"; place and date not given: "What Awaits the Putschists?"]

[Text] Our correspondent P. Lukyanchenko discusses this topic with T. Gdlyan, former senior investigator on affairs of special importance under the USSR procurator general, and the people's deputy of the USSR and the Republic of Armenia.

[Gdlyan] It would be more natural for Gorbachev to stay completely out of the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] investigation: His constitutional rights have been violated, the investigation will figure it out, and the court will restore justice. Gorbachev, however, is creating his own presidential commission. This suggests the conclusion that the USSR president has a direct interest in this: His control over the investigation permits him to hold all the strings in his hands, to filter the information, and in the right moment to silence inconvenient witnesses.

[Lukyanchenko] What if this is only your speculation, and Gorbachev has created this commission for one single purpose: To avoid being a hostage to the conclusions of the same Union Procuracy that practically took an oath of loyalty to the SCSE on the first day of the coup?

[Gdlyan] Then explain to me why it was necessary to put a stool pigeon in the cell with one of the eight highest ranking putschists with the task of talking this putschist into hanging himself at all costs, since "there is no way to avoid the firing squad anyway"?

As a professional, I understand a few things about such matters. Mafia groups have an unbreakable rule: The best witness is a dead witness. For instance, in the corruption investigations I was involved in, some of the best informed bribe-takers were pushed into committing suicide before they were arrested. How did this happen?

For instance, we received the go-ahead to arrest Ergashev, the Uzbek Minister of Internal Affairs; we went there. On our arrival, we got an order from the CPSU Central Committee and the procuracy: "Hold the implementation." A week went by. During that time we registered two calls from the Central Committee to Ergashev: "Gdlyan has arrived with the arrest warrant; you have to make a courageous decision. We will take care of your family." On the night before the arrest, Ergashev gathered his loved ones, said goodbye, and at 1900 at the gate of his house he shot himself in the head. This is their method, which, by the way, has now worked beautifully on Pugo (who probably knew too much), Akhromeyev (I will never believe that a combat officer, moreover, a marshal, would hang himself...), and Kruchina, who "jumped" out the window (this one knew the secrets of the party's "black vaults," including the party's accounts in Swiss banks).

When the national legislature consented to instituting criminal proceedings against Lukyanov and to his arrest, and when Anatoliy Ivanovich continued to remain free for several days (he continued to stay in his Kremlin office), it was all immediately clear to me. Right then I said to the Supreme Soviet that it was an attempt to force Lukyanov to "make a courageous decision": No matter how much endurance he had, in this situation anybody could fall apart. Why was it done in regard to Lukyanov? Because, if he chose to he could tell things that are more frightening than any putsch.

[Lukyanchenko] But Lukyanov, unlike Pugo, Kruchina, and Akhromeyev, did not listen to the "solicitous voice;" neither, apparently, did other members of the SCSE. Will other actions be taken against them in the future?

[Gdlyan] In the investigative isolation block, some person "X" will pass a signal to one or other accused—or to all of them together—to hold on to the end, to keep silent, promising in return leniency in deciding their fate. People usually are gullible in this situation, and it is possible that the members of the SCSE will keep their mouths shut at the trial, relying on person "X" to the end. Then the Supreme Court will hand down... a death sentence, which will be carried out in a matter of days.

So Anatoliy Ivanovich, smart, cunning, and insidious as he is, did not understand what was happening in the USSR Supreme Soviet on that day when he was given the podium. Instead of telling everything, he decided to outsmart himself and left the last bullet in his own pocket. But person "X" can steal this bullet and fire it at Lukyanov.

[Lukyanchenko] Do you believe that all the accused will be shot?

[Gdlyan] Most of them.

[Lukyanchenko] In your opinion, they do not deserve it?

[Gdlyan] You see, they will be shot not for what they have done, but because they know too much. These, you would agree, are different things.

[Lukyanchenko] So what is the solution?

[Gdlyan] To tell everything honestly, as it was, at the trial. There will be a ruckus over it, and this will guarantee that the lives of many members of the SCSE will be spared.

TASS Carries Press Review for 10 October

LD1010081691 Moscow TASS in English
0805 GMT 10 Oct 91

["Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—"There has been no attempt on the life of the Soviet president," newspapers write today. They carry a TASS report saying that the rumours circulating in some Western countries about the alleged attempt on the life of President Gorbachev are absolutely groundless. This was reported to TASS by a spokesman for the president's staff.

PRAVDA carries an article by its correspondent entitled "Everything For Sale. Including the State Emergency Committee Case?" It deals with the sensational publication by the DER SPIEGEL magazine of the records of interrogation of three members of the State Emergency Committee—Dmitriy Yazov, Vladimir Kryuchkov and Valentin Pavlov. The question arises: By what channels could the magazine obtain the videorecord and how did the information leakage take place? The article includes fragments of interrogation records.

Casualties in Nagorno-Karabakh have amounted to 157 killed and 212 wounded Azerbaijanis and Armenians since the beginning of the year. Populated localities have been shelled 164 times, Igor Plavskiy, public prosecutor of Nagorno-Karabakh, told PRAVDA. He believes that peace may be established in the region only after representatives of all sections of the population, as well as officials taken upon themselves full responsibility for what is going on there.

The newspaper carries a letter to the editors, sent by the Japanese embassy in the USSR. It says that the victory of democratic forces in the USSR "created a good opportunity for discussing thoughtfully the problems of the northern territories, resolving it on the basis of principles of legality and justice and concluding a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty." Political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov also contributed to PRAVDA an article on this subject. He believes that it would be more expedient to leave the solution of the problem for the forthcoming generations. In his opinion, a free economic zone could be created on those islands. Everybody would profit from it and the international prestige of both countries would be enhanced.

PRAVDA correspondent Vladimir Belyakov writes in the newspaper about the world response to the August developments in the Soviet Union and their consequences for the Arab world. He believes that the problem of "upsetting the balance of forces" as a result of the developments in the USSR should not result in one-sided political orientation of Arab countries.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA carries an article, which contains statements of Soviet nuclear physicists about problems of the development of the nuclear science in conditions of conversion. They believe that the conversion, which is being implemented in the country, goes together with the reduction of allocations for research in the peaceful sphere. Specifically, the financing of all research institutions of the nuclear industry is reduced by 40 per cent, beginning with the fourth quarter of the current year. Scientists believe that at present there is no alternative to nuclear power engineering.

The newspaper publishes an article about territorial claims of some Soviet republics. It stresses the need for the Russian Government to hold all kinds of talks on Russia's relationship with the newly emerging states on the basis of national interests of all peoples of the single and indivisible country. Vladimir Yudin writes in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA about the "Barbarossa" novel by Valentin Pikul. The newspaper carries an interview with Anatoliy Soldatov, an agronomist from Saratov, which deals with the forecasting of grain crops on the basis of latest scientific finds and a due account for climatic characteristics of individual regions.

Newspapers report the resignation of Yevgeniy Saburov, Russian deputy prime minister and minister of economy.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an interview with Nikolay Ryzhkov. The former Soviet prime minister shares his ideas and recollections about the restructuring of Soviet economy and the steps taken by the Soviet leadership during the past several years. "When we started perestroika, we wished to find ways to improve our living standards within the framework of the socialist system. Later the banner of perestroika was taken up by different people. The banner looked the same, everybody was talking only about perestroika, but the meaning became different," he said.

Nikolay Karagodin, an economist working for the institute of world economy and international relations, writes in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA about the economic reform problem. He believes that if correcting inflation is suppressed, this will corner the national economy. "Without the inflation deficit financing the state will be unable to mobilise the enormous resources needed for supporting the restructuring of the national economy and the softening of negative social consequences of the introduction of the market-based system," Karagodin writes.

The newspaper writes about Boris Pankin's meeting with journalists at the Soviet Foreign Ministry press centre.

"The statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry confirms the feelings in this country in favour of radical nuclear disarmament measures," the Soviet foreign minister stressed.

Newspapers carry Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's report at the latest joint session of the two chambers of the Russian parliament. He said that by January 1, 1992 the USSR gold reserve would be 240 tonnes.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries an interview with Brigade General Daniel Gazeau, who visited the USSR as head of a delegation of the information and public relations service of the French Armed Forces. The general told about the way to maintain relations with the press, used in France.

TRUD carries a statement issued by the Movement for Democratic Reforms on the attitude to ways to overcome the current political and economic crisis. The newspaper also publishes an interview with Yuriy Karpukhin, senior teacher of the Interior Ministry Academy, which deals with the crime situation and methods to improve it.

"Some five million people are living in the part of the Russian territory affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe," RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA writes in the article, which urges to pool the efforts of trade unions in helping the Chernobyl victims.

International sections of newspapers highlight the situation in Yugoslavia, the Middle East, Romania, Latin America and other hotbeds of tension.

Economic

Silayev 'Almost Certain' of Agreement Adoption

LD0910214691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Interview with Ivan Silayev, chairman of the Committee for the Operational Management of the National Economy, by correspondent V. Stepanyuk; place and date not given; from the "TV Inform" newscast—recorded]

[Text] It seems that during the coming year we will also have to eat according to the same scanty food allowance as this year—that is, if the level of our economy can be maintained.

This was the subject of discussion today at the latest meeting of the USSR Committee for the Operational Management of the National Economy. Our correspondent spoke with Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, its chairman.

[Stepanyuk] Ivan Stepanovich, judging from the fact that you have been discussing here today the food agreement between republics, do you think that this document should finally be signed at the State Council on Friday?

[Silayev] I think that it has been worked upon in sufficient depth. The work on this document went on for over a month. An interim report was made on this at the second sitting of the State Council. It is the result of joint work, which on the one hand has taken into consideration the real situation regarding our own harvest and on the other the aggregate requirements of each republic for importing foodstuffs. I hope, and I am almost certain, that our document has been so well prepared that it can be adopted.

It is very important that we have reached agreement basing our calculations on the traditionally existing per capita requirements of each republic for various foodstuffs. They have an extremely broad spread. In the Central Asian republics there is one demand, say, for bread and meat, while the central areas have a different one, and the northern areas yet another. However, our approach to calculating requirements has been based on the actual per capita requirements in 1991.

Deputy Minister Discusses Energy Structure

LD0910183391 Moscow TASS in English 1340 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By correspondent Tatyana Akkuratova]

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—"Regarding a common economic space of sovereign republics, one should not lose sight of the fact that a common power grid has been existing for decades," said Anatoliy Baranovskiy, USSR deputy minister of power engineering and electrification, asked by TASS about the near future of this industry.

He said that the Soviet power industry consists of over a thousand of thermal, nuclear and other power stations, 5 million electric transmission lines, 5,000 enterprises of construction industry and repair shops. It is not so easy to sever these ties. They will remain strong also in a period of transition.

Baranovskiy believes that power engineering is one of the few industries which more or less copes with its tasks in conditions of the economic crisis, supplying light and heat to clients. The industry is affected no less than metallurgy or mining by obsolete equipment, the failure of related agencies to meet the schedule of supply and other problems, but it is coping with problems. The existing resources are being tapped.

"As is known, we have been taking pride in the joint power grid of the USSR. How will it be functioning in conditions when the republics are breaking away," TASS asked the deputy minister.

"Under the Russian president's decree all energy facilities in the Republic's territory are under Russia's jurisdiction. Managerial structures, specifically, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, are now being shaped in Russia. The

Russian State Power Corporation will discharge functions of production and will act as a lobby, whatever negative connotations this term may have," Baranovskiy said.

"The corporation will include the Russian Federation's entire power complex—power stations, transmission lines, building and assembly organisations, the building industry, science, Electrobank, Energoprogress Association and other structures. The corporation's chief purpose will be to protect the interests of its founders. A similar structure existing in the United States unites private companies which account for the generation of 80 per cent of electricity," he said.

Committee Seeks Easing of Energy Restrictions

OW0910170991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Committee for the Operational Management of the National Economy requested on Wednesday [9 October] that President Gorbachev amend his draft decree restricting the consumption of energy during this autumn and winter because of a slump in the extraction of fuel.

The draft stipulates that public services, the agro-industrial complex and transport will be supplied with fuel and energy in the fourth quarter of this year in no lesser volumes than one year ago. The rest of the consumers will receive by 30 less gasoline [as received], by 20 less diesel fuel, by 10 less furnace fuel and by 15 less electricity than they did in the same period of 1990.

If the decree is passed, the republics should regard it as a recommendation.

Latest Union Customs Concept Outlined

PM0810141191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Oct 91 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Nikolay Yermakov, chairman of the USSR Customs Committee, by I. Andreyev; place and date not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "New Concept of Customs Work. Is It the Last..."]

[Text] Recently the USSR Customs Committee, which still retains the name of the disintegrating Union in its title, submitted to the Committee for the Operational Management of the USSR National Economy a new concept of customs work in the interstate formation which will replace the collapsed empire.

The August putsch dealt the most powerful blow to the customs service, which has only just acquired forms acceptable to cooperation among sovereign republics, Customs Committee Chairman Nikolay Yermakov said. A few days before the attempted coup, on 14-15 August, we held a conference of representatives of the republics. To be more precise: not customs chiefs but high-ranking

officials responsible for foreign economic ties—ministers and deputy ministers. The leaders of those very spheres which were to have joined the Customs Tariff Council. They even came to us from those republics which do not intend signing the Union treaty. And everyone, absolutely everyone, realized: Politics is politics but the economy and long-standing economic ties cannot be dismembered or disrupted painlessly. And because the customs service is a concentrated expression of the economy, we intended to begin the new life from there. As the Kazakh representative put it then, customs is the hoop that binds all the republics....

[Andreyev] So, were the many months of work to create the Customs Tariff Council wasted? What would have awaited your department had the coup succeeded?

[Yermakov] The course that the country has taken toward market relations is not the department's business. In the normal course of things we are an instrument of those relations. Had reaction won we would have been expected to be an instrument that severs market ties and institutes the former monopoly of a few departments over foreign economic activity. Fortunately it did not come to that but, I repeat, the coordinated customs policy has been dealt a most powerful blow. Primarily in the sense that the republics, their eyes wide open, sent their representatives to us but are now adopting unilateral acts. Politics is unfortunately prevailing over economic expediency again.

[Andreyev] Who is the author of the new concept submitted to the Committee for Operational Management of the National Economy?

[Yermakov] It is a collective authorship. Each day we have telephone discussions with leaders of republic foreign economic departments. We meet with them if other business brings them to Moscow. We consult with the permanent representatives of the republics. We brought together the leaders of customs services. The draft concept included the ideas of all the interested republics. As for the Baltics, we are preparing with our colleagues from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia a draft agreement which will be adopted at intergovernmental level. We must also uphold and defend the interests of Russia, Belorussia, and the other republics. We hope to meet with representatives of all the other republics as soon as the Operational Management Committee approves the concept.

It is based on the idea of an economic union uniting the republics. Those not wishing to join it may conclude a customs union which in essence, briefly put, constitutes a single customs territory and a single foreign customs tariff. Goods may circulate freely within that union without attracting customs duties.

And finally a republic which wants to remain even more aloof may create a free-trade zone. By preserving their own customs territories, tariff, customs legislation, and customs service, republics are not imposing customs duties on goods within these zones and are not subject to export-import quotas.

Whatever form the economic association takes, it is worth creating a customs council authorized to make the final decision on all customs questions. It must be binding on all participants in the association. The council will comprise representatives of sovereign states—at the level of deputy prime ministers "responsible" for market structures. It is headed by the economic association's top official. Each state has one vote. Decisions are adopted by consensus although there should also be a reserve mechanism, for example, voting according to a certain procedure.

Next. Each republic will have a national customs service. In fact some already do but we are proposing transferring their sometimes self-managing activity to a civilized legal basis. But because there is an acute shortage of skilled cadres in places, the work of the national services could be coordinated by the Interrepublic Customs Committee created on the basis of a radically transformed USSR Customs Committee. Furthermore, I stress, all the republics' proposals are being adopted on the structure of the customs service and the demarcation of functions between the economic association and its individual members.

I could give you a long, detailed, and specific discussion on the demarcation of functions, which would not be very interesting to IZVESTIYA's readers. Nikolay Aleksandrovich went on. I shall merely say that a model is being proposed which fully corresponds to the current trend toward decentralizing the management of complex, ramified systems. The center retains the right to exercise only the functions which the national customs services delegate to it. For example, it offers an association in international treaties. It records the customs statistics of foreign economic activity which reflects the movement of the goods of any republic and through any republic. It trains skilled cadres.

One last point. The distribution of customs revenues is a sensitive and unresolved question in world practice. We have submitted our proposals which, we think, take into account the interests of the republics first and foremost. However, we stressed that it is necessary to find the kind of formula which would suit everyone, would be as fair as possible, and would be as close as possible to economically validated criteria.

Furthermore, the whole concept of customs work that we are discussing is subject to the demands of justice....

[Andreyev] Right after my conversation with the Customs Committee chairman there was an interrepublic conference on foreign economic questions. Its participants generally approved the concept presented in this publication.

57 Percent Stocking Up on Products

92P50011A Moscow TRUD in Russian
5 Oct 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Stock Up If You Can"]

[Text] Over half the country's population is stocking up on products for future use. At least that is what 57 percent of the 3,004 residents surveyed by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) said. Thirty-seven percent are not stocking up. Of those who are not stocking up on products, 47 percent are not doing so because there is simply nothing to stock—the products are not for sale; 29 percent do not have the means to do so, 15 percent have nowhere to store supplies, and only 19 percent are not buying for future use because they do not consider it necessary.

Drop in Meat, Milk, Egg Production Predicted

OW1010030191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2200 GMT 9 Oct 91

[From "Soviet Business report"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Soviet Agriculture and Food Ministry experts predict a continued drop in the production of meat, milk and eggs in the USSR.

Over the 9 months of 1991, the state (the overwhelming majority of Soviet population buy foodstuffs through the state-run distribution system) has purchased less food from domestic farmers than during the same period last year, including:

meat	a 12 percent drop (1,716,000 tons)
milk	a 13 percent drop (7,423,000 tons)
eggs	an 8 percent drop (3228 mn.pcs. [million pieces])

Experts predict that the cattle population will drop by 4 percent over 1991, and the swine population, by 8 percent.

By mid-September, the country had 13 percent less fodder in storage places than at the same time last year. Large livestock- and fowl-breeding businesses that produce 4.4mn. tons of meat and 47 bn. [billion] eggs (in 1991 the USSR produced 19.9 mn. tons of meat and 82 bn. eggs) are facing an acute shortage of fodder.

To meet its needs for mixed fodder, the country requires to buy 13 to 14 mn. tons of shredded soya beans and 34 mn. tons of grain fodder at the very minimum.

The falling efficiency of livestock breeding is also connected with the acute shortage of animal medications as the Soviet industry only meets 20 to 30 percent of the needs, and next to nothing is imported because of a shortage of hard currency.

Crisis in Gold-Mining Sector Examined

924A0035A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 2 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by mining engineer Pavel Lunyashin: "A Beggarly Share of the Gold in the Sack"]

[Text] Yakutiya—Last Saturday Grigoriy Yavlinskiy made a sensational statement: The USSR's gold reserves total only 240 tons. Have our supplies of the precious metal dried up? No, it is something else. The state gold-mining sector is threatened by crisis, in particular because the gold-prospecting artels are collapsing.

The destruction of the gold-mining industry in the Far North, which started with the departure of the best qualified experts from the state gold-mining enterprises, threatens to become a real crisis for the sector because of liquidation of many of the gold- and tin-recovery artels. Stifled by the burden of heavy taxes, an unsettled existence, and the drudgery of the work, prospecting is losing its attractiveness.

The main reason, of course, is the low level of wages. It always used to be corrected through administrative methods, even though at all stages of the administrative command system it was loudly stated in the press that the prospector earned according to what he found. For example, the wage ceiling for one working day (11 hours) in the artels of the Kularzoloto Combine was 40 rubles [R] to R45 until last year, that is, R4 an hour. At the same time, wages at the state mining enterprises were R5 to R6 an hour. If we take into account the fact that the people on the sick lists at the artels were paid R10 a day (it is now R20), then the people in the artels were underpaid a minimum of 20 percent to 30 percent for their labor.

Notwithstanding, the people in the artels finished up better off. They did not pay the 13-percent wage tax or the 1-percent trade union tax. While not receiving the additional payments made for working in the North, a new man could earn as much as a veteran who had spent many years in the North. All of this to a large extent insured a constant inflow of fresh manpower. Even just three or four years ago the R8,000 to R10,000 received in a season meant a great deal. Today, alas!...

Last year the cost of a work day rose to R70, and in some artels to R100. It was proposed that wages would be the same in 1991. The hourly rate for the prospector rose to R9. At the state enterprises, following the rate increase it was at the same level. However, the difference here was quite substantial: Wages at state enterprises were guaranteed regardless of final annual results, but an artel may "go bankrupt," and then the prospector must look to his own interests, as they say.

There is also no comparison between everyday conditions. On most sectors the prospectors must spend the long working season separated from their families. During these months they work 12 hours a day without a break. One can only guess what this does to people on the moral and physical planes.

These and other factors are leading to a situation in which workers are reluctant to switch from the state method to the prospecting method, and this has already become the unfortunate practice at the Kularzoloto Combine. It was the intention of the administration that

workers from the Sollur quarry, which has now been closed down, should go to fill the ranks of the Yuzhnaya artel, which has been allocated a sector. However, only very few people have transferred to the artel, and without them basic production cannot continue. And the leading experts prefer to resign and leave. As a result the combine has lost a million rubles in making compensation payments and has been recovering 40 percent less gold from the Sollur quarry. Similar problems are also arising in Magadan Oblast, where the many sectors are being transferred from the state method of recovery to the prospecting method.

The prospectors are also not in a good position with respect to the struggle against the apparatus. Strikes in the artels: Have you ever heard of such a thing? However, a wave of strikes did spread through the Severovostokzoloto Association this spring. The prospectors refused to sign agreements setting forth the conditions proposed by the enterprise administration.

Many artel chairmen are seriously thinking of disbanding their collectives. Alarm also reigns in the offices of the Main Diamond and Gold Administration [Glavalmazoloto], where they are perfectly well aware that if radical changes are not made with respect to the people in the North the gold-mining sector will collapse. It will be very difficult to find prospectors because they no longer have confidence or belief in the possibility of change. The more so since young people are reluctant to join the artels. And those who do often lose their spirit and courage within about three months. Then they ask for settlement of their accounts, and they leave, because many of them are both morally and physically unfit to work in the complex climatic and moral-and-psychological conditions.

What kind of wage is required today to attract skilled experts into the prospecting artels? In hyperinflation, this is difficult to predict. In any event, a guaranteed wage of R2,000 a month failed to lure bulldozer drivers to work for the Yuzhnaya artel.

Now it is possible to estimate how much a Soviet worker receives in terms of foreign currency. For his drudgery a prospector receives about 30 cents an hour. This is 20 times less than the wages of an American worker. But if the state would guarantee payment of half of these 30 cents in hard currency the flight of people from the artels could be halted.

The living standard of all people in the North, including the prospectors, continues to fall sharply. But there are still many people who like to work and can work, and who have the highest skills. But with each passing month they become fewer in number. Could it be that this autumn will be the last in the history of the Soviet prospectors?

Foreign Companies To Aid Oil Exploitation

LD1010031991 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 0900 GMT 8 Oct 91

[Text] The Soviet Union is expanding cooperation with foreign companies to reclaim new oil fields. The American Amoco Company and five other firms will take part in jointly tapping a highly rich field on the shelf of the Caspian Sea. At least \$1 billion will be spent on the project. The Chevron Corporation, as it has been announced in Moscow, will take part in setting up a joint company in order to develop the Tengiz oil fields in Kazakhstan. Oil fields along the Volga River will be reclaimed by the Global Natural Resources Company with the participation of a Soviet firm. The Soviet Union has agreed to cooperate with the West in developing its natural resources because of a fall in oil output in Siberia.

Scientific

Cosmos-2163 Space Satellite Launched 9 Oct

LD1010092391 Moscow TASS in English
0914 GMT 10 Oct 91

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—The Cosmos-2163 space satellite was launched in the Soviet Union on Wednesday [9 October].

The satellite was put on the orbit with the following parameters:

- initial rotation period—89.3 minutes,
- maximum distance from the earth's surface (apogee)—331 kilometers,
- minimum distance from the earth's surface (perigee)—174 kilometers,
- orbital inclination—64.8 degrees.

In addition to scientific equipment for exploring space, the satellite carries a radio system for exact measurement of orbital elements and a radio telemetric system for transmitting data on the work of instruments and scientific equipment to the earth.

Mir Crew Conduct Experiments During Mission

LD0810191691 Moscow TASS in English
1628 GMT 8 Oct 91

[By TASS special correspondent Yuri Konorov from the Mission Control Center]

[Text] Moscow October 8 TASS—The Soviet-Austrian crew has almost completed its fifth day on board the Mir orbiting station.

Austrian cosmonaut Franz Viehboeck today conducted the "son" and "audomir" medical experiments, as well as other research in accordance with his scientific program.

The research aims to study the influence of zero gravity, human isolation, and other space factors on various functional changes in the human body.

Toktar Aubakirov filmed the territory of his republic, Kazakhstan, alongside other research. The films will enable a detailed analysis of the Kazakh agricultural resources and will help to estimate the state of soils.

Unfortunately, a TV bridge with Kazakhstan, which has been scheduled for this morning, was not held. The Kazakh cosmonaut was to exchange opinions with agricultural experts on the work he is doing.

All the data obtained has been transmitted to the Mission Control Centre, from where it will be delivered to Kazakh specialists.

Conversion Entails Cuts in Nuclear Research

*LD0910184591 Moscow TASS in English
1345 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[By correspondent Rashid Akhmetov]

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—The Western press writes with alarm about the fate of Soviet nuclear scientists in light of the ongoing conversion of the Soviet defence industry. It notes that dozens of thousands of physicists, engineers, technicians and highly skilled workers are now employed in the Soviet nuclear science and industry. Most of them will be left without jobs. They must not be allowed to become a source of "mercenaries" for the Iranian, Iraqi, Pakistani or any other market.

Foreign atomic scientists believe that close cooperation should be established between the Western states, the USSR and the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to make proper use of these specialists.

Moscow nuclear physicists have told TASS about their views on the problem.

Executive Secretary of the USSR Nuclear Society A. Gagarinsky believes that the conversion now under way in the country leads to the curtailment of research, linked with the development of new nuclear weapons. This process can only be welcomed. But if the state reduces defence spendings, it is by duty bound to make efficient use of the powerful scientific potential, accumulated in the military sphere, in order to promote the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

However, the conversion, conducted by top Soviet echelons, boils down chiefly to the cutting of allocations for civilian research. Here is the latest news. All atomic industry research institutes have been notified that allocations to them will be cut by 40 per cent beginning with the fourth quarter of this year. This will result in the curtailment of laboratory work and will lead to the loss of gifted scientists and specialists, to the growth of unemployment among scientists and engineers.

In these conditions the USSR Nuclear Society and research institutes were compelled to ask the world community for orders to the Soviet nuclear science in order to save the nuclear technology potential, accumulated over several past decades. By the way, Soviet scientists have much to offer to the West. Our nuclear ship propelling plants, nuclear power and heating stations, as well as technological processes for processing and enriching uranium, besides many other inventions, are ranked among the world's best.

According to academician V. Subbotin, scientific director of the Physics and Power Institute, Soviet nuclear engineering has no alternative. No scientific, technological, economic and social progress of our society is possible without its further development.

Secondly, our science has achieved a level, when it is about to produce absolutely safe nuclear plants. But this will be possible only if our scientific potential is saved. If we lose it, the country will never pull itself out of the energy crisis.

Thirdly, the conversion in the military-research complex must, to my mind, be accompanied by an expansion of peaceful research, its proper financing and centralised provision with all the necessary supplies. Instead of this approach, accepted in all the civilised world, our authorities are systematically cutting allocations.

If this continues, the most highly skilled specialists will leave the defence industry. Of course, they will not augment the Iranian or any other market of "mercenaries." The prestige of Soviet nuclear physicists is sufficiently high throughout the world. The best Western laboratories and research centres will be glad to employ them. But what will the country do afterwards? It will have to restore the scientific potential with huge financial losses and will lag behind world technology for many years to come.

To prevent this, we must not stake on immediate benefits in carrying out the conversion of our Defence Ministry. We must be guided in this effort by common sense and sound state approach to the problem in hand.

Military

Results of Consultations on Military Reform

Center To Retain Nuclear Control

*LD0910224491 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Text] The USSR Defense Ministry has announced that those attending a consultative meeting on military reform have confirmed the decision that all forms of weapons of mass destruction must be under the control of the center. Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian republics declared themselves in favor of retaining a unified armed forces. The representatives of

Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova expressed special positions and reservations. The Ukraine did not attend the meeting.

Most Republics Favor Joint Forces

OW0910210391 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2000 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A majority at the second consultative meeting of the sovereign republics on the defence reform have confirmed their wish to participate in a single defence system, a single defence space and joint armed forces. That was announced at a briefing by the head of the information department of the USSR Defence Ministry Valeriy Manilov. The two-day meeting which has closed in Moscow included representatives of the former Union republics except the Ukraine and the Baltic states.

Manilov said that the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian republics are for keeping joint armed forces.

The delegation of Azerbaijan agreed subject to the joint armed forces guaranteeing its sovereignty and defence of its borders.

Armenia warned against haste in disbanding joint defence stressing that the participants should wait for the political decisions on the structures of the new Union.

Moldova confirmed its aim of setting up its own armed forces.

The meeting approved the idea of a permanent consultative council of ministers or chairman of defence committees under the USSR Defence Ministry. The council could start working right after its formation was accepted by the USSR State Council.

Manilov Discusses Meeting

LD0910232191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2010 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Announcer-read report on a consultative meeting of republic representatives at the USSR Ministry of Defense in Moscow on 9 October, including recorded remarks by Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov, Defense Ministry press secretary—Manilov speaks in Russian with superimposed English translation]

[Text] [Announcer] The meeting of the authorized representatives of the Union republics to reform radically the Soviet Armed Forces is being held at the Defense Ministry in Moscow. Details from the Defense Ministry press secretary, Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov:

[Manilov] The work on the concept of the military reform is at its height. Its aim is to preserve a single leadership over the country's armed forces with the observance of sovereign rights of the republics that used to be part of the Soviet Union.

[Announcer] Nevertheless, some republics, primarily the Ukraine, are taking steps to create their own armed forces. Does it alarm the Soviet military leadership? General Manilov again:

[Manilov] I think it somewhat premature to say that some republics are creating their own armed forces. So far there have only been made statements. But there is a coordinated decision to solve these problems jointly. I think that with all the variety of views on the future of the armed forces, there is general belief that a single defense space and a certain role of the center should be preserved.

[Announcer] And what arguments are advanced in the upper echelons of power in favor of the single armed forces? General Manilov again:

[Manilov] Well, there are historical premises for that. Say, the nations populating the territory that used to be the Soviet Union have defended their independence from the external enemies from time immemorial. Economically the upkeep of the Army is so expensive that none of the republics, not even the Russian Republic, is able to shoulder the burden. For example, to build a submarine we need to involve over 2,000 production enterprises. Take then our frontiers. They are the longest in the world, and it's difficult to defend them because of the unevenly populated territory of the country.

[Announcer] General Valeriy Manilov then commented on how the country's nuclear potential will be controlled:

[Manilov] The nuclear problems are the core of the military reform. The control system must be comprehensive and embrace all of its elements. If one element goes out of control there are no guarantees against non-sanctioned use. According to foreign experts coming to the Soviet Union, the reliability of our control over nuclear arms surpasses everything that's being used for the purpose in the West.

[Announcer] General Valeriy Manilov then analyzed the possibility of 100 percent guarantee for the non-use of the nuclear weapons if they are checked by the center:

[Manilov] Politically, only their full elimination could exclude the accidental use of these weapons. They must be removed from all arsenals of the nuclear powers, and their further spread to new owners must be prevented, so we can fully guarantee security only if we achieve a reliable control over them and reduce them at the same time.

Manilov on Baltic Withdrawal

LD0910230291 Moscow TASS in English
2237 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—Chief of Soviet Defence Ministry information service Valeriy Manilov on Wednesday [9 October] told a briefing the Baltic

Council's demand for a full withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by December 1, 1991 is "unrealistic and sounds like an ultimatum. Therefore, it does not fit human, civilised relations between the states".

The briefing was devoted to the results of inter-republican consultations at the Soviet Defence Ministry on Tuesday [8 October] on preparations and implementation of radical military reform.

The consultations were attended by representatives of all Soviet republics, except the Ukraine and the Baltic states.

The majority of them stressed the need for a single defence space and single armed forces.

He said the Soviet Defence Ministry will base its relations with the Baltic states on the recognition of their independence.

He said most likely preference will be given to inter-state agreements based on international norms, adding that a large-scale withdrawal of troops from the Baltic states will begin not earlier than 1994.

Meetings Completed

LD0910214291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1811 GMT 8 Oct 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 8 Oct (TASS)—"Individual delegations of the sovereign republics displayed their own approaches to questions of bringing the armed forces up to strength, to the principles of financing them, to deliveries of arms and materiel, and to cadre training. However, as a whole, the majority of the delegations agree that the armed forces should be united," Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, chief of the affairs directorate of the USSR Defense Ministry, said on completing the routine consultative meeting of representatives of sovereign republics on problems of military organizational development, which took place in the USSR Defense Ministry today.

It continued the exchange of opinions on topical questions of elaborating the concept of military reform and of transforming the armed forces.

"We observed a business-like, constructive approach to solving all questions, both on the part of the Defense Ministry leadership and the sovereign republics," the general noted.

In his words, the question of what the armed forces ought to be like was discussed, and the principles of military organizational development, the formation of the military budget, the administration of the armed forces, and other more local questions were discussed.

At the same time, he expressed regret at the fact that representatives of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia had

not participated in the meeting and that the Ukrainian delegation had not come to the meeting for a number of reasons.

Poll on Meaning of Disunification of Army

OW1010081991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0720 GMT 10 Oct 91

[From the "Viewpoint" feature: "What May the Split in the Army Lead To?"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the "DATA" news agency, an opinion poll taken by the National Public Opinion Studies Center in September among 2,075 people throughout the country showed that 47% welcome the split of the Army and consider it to be a democratic tendency.

19% said the split undermines the defensive capability of the country.

14% think the split may lead to civil war.

1 in 5 found it difficult to answer.

Margin of error—3%.

Most Respondents Believe CPSU and KGB Leaders Will Join Democratic Movements

29% of respondents in the same poll believe the leadership of the CPSU and the KGB will eventually "join the democratic movements."

Asked what the leaders of the KGB and the CPSU are likely to do in the future, 15% said that they "will go underground to conspire a new coup."

12% believe the KGB and the CPSU will switch to democratic reforms.

9% predict their disappearance from the political arena.

8% said they these bodies will try to openly resist to the changes [sentence as received].

27% did not answer.

Amnesty for Armed Forces Deserters Detailed

PM1010090991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Oct 91 Union Edition p 8

[Interview with Russian People's Deputy A.A. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR president's Committee for the Affairs of Servicemen and Members of Their Families, by correspondent V. Litovkin; date, place not given; first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction: "Amnesty Awaits Deserters"]

[Text] The draft USSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On an Amnesty for Servicemen Who Evaded Military Service" has been drawn up.

What are the essence and purport of the document that has been submitted? Our correspondent talks with Russian People's Deputy A. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR president's committee for the affairs of servicemen and members of their families.

"First of all," Anatoliy Alekseyevich said, "I wish to point out that the draft came into being after numerous

appeals from servicemen and their family members to our committee and at the suggestion of the all-Union Council of Servicemen's Parents and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet chairman's commission to verify the causes of service personnel's death and traumatism in peacetime.

"Guided by the principles of humanism and by concern for our servicemen's future, we proposed an amnesty for all servicemen who evaded military service and also for military reservists drafted to attend training stints or musters, if they committed crimes provided for in Articles 9, 10, 11, and 13 of the USSR Law 'On Criminal Liability for Military Crimes.'

"And if this resolution is adopted by the country's Supreme Soviet—and we are confident of this—then all investigatory cases against deserters and their cases which have not been examined by courts before this resolution comes into force will be dropped, and the convictions of those who will be freed from punishment on the basis of this amnesty will also be expunged."

[Litovkin] To which specific crimes will the amnesty extend? How many deserters are there in the country?

[Alekseyev] The amnesty extends to absences without leave from a unit for more than 24 hours but not more than 72 hours, or for less than 24 but repeated within the space of three months. To abandonment of a unit or place of service for more than 72 hours but not more than one month. To desertion, i.e. evasion of military service, and to similar actions, but with the occasioning of some harm to oneself (i.e. self-mutilation) or by means of feigning illness, forging documents, or refusing to fulfill the obligations of military service.

Nobody knows the exact number of deserters. Not even at the Ministry of Defense and the Main Military Prosecutor's Office. Certain commanders carefully conceal facts of the evasion of military service. But, according to our estimates, there are approximately 5,000 such people.

In speaking of them, I must make a reservation: The amnesty will not apply to those persons who during the period of evasion of military service have committed graver crimes than those I named.

[Litovkin] Who has the right to decide on an amnesty?

[Alekseyev] Internal affairs organs, chiefs of corrective labor establishments and special commandant's offices, commanders of disciplinary battalions and military units, and chiefs of military establishments. But every decision has to be approved by a prosecutor.

[Litovkin] What is the "technology" of the amnesty?

[Alekseyev] It is very simple. A serviceman who has left his unit must report for further military service to the nearest organs of military management—reception offices of the Ministry of Defense, military districts, and fleets, military commissariats, commandant's offices,

and military units—not later than one month after our resolution comes into force.

We—the all-Union Council of Servicemen's Parents and our committee—guarantee that no one will be sent back to the unit where he was taunted or mocked, while those who serve at least a further six months irreproachably will have the time they spent evading military service counted toward the length of that service.

[Litovkin] One more, in my view, very important question. Among the deserters, apart from those who left their unit because of bullying, humiliation, and beatings, there are quite a few who simply wish to roam about the country or who "miss" their girl friend, mother, friends... How can you distinguish between someone who has really suffered and an ordinary wimp or slug-gard?

[Alekseyev] This is a serious problem. There is a rule in jurisprudence: Any doubt is resolved in favor of the suspect. There are not that many soldiers "running" about the country for no obvious reason—approximately 10 percent of the number I named. It is better for someone to be granted an undeserved amnesty than for even one person who has suffered beatings, mockery, and taunts and who left his unit because of this to remain throughout his life sordidly branded a deserter or convict.

[Litovkin] When can the resolution be expected?

[Alekseyev] I believe, at the very next, fall session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Military Press To Be Reformed, Liberalized

PM0910125591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Oct 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by TASS correspondent R. Zadunayskiy: "Military Press To Acquire New Face"]

[Text] What fate awaits the military press? This question troubles all Army and Navy journalists as well as their readers. Despite the rumors, there are no grounds for anxiety: No one is going to "break up" the military press, radio, and television. On the contrary, they will be given creative freedom, Captain Third Rank Mikhail Nenashev, leader of the working group to prepare proposals on the structure and functions of the news service in the USSR Armed Forces, said in an interview with your TASS correspondent. This group works within the USSR Ministry of Defense commission to abolish military-political organs.

M. Nenashev noted that it is necessary to reform the structure of the Army and Navy mass media in order to implement the "Law on the Press" in full here. First of all we will have to substantially change relations between the editorial offices of military newspapers, journals, and radio and television stations and the military command at all levels. Thus the journalistic labor collectives and

other organizations and institutions that choose to do so will now become founders, together with the Ministry of Defense and the military councils of districts, fleets, and categories and branches of the Armed Forces. And the founders must clearly state in the contract the journalists' rights, which will protect the latter from certain generals' desire to "issue orders to the press." It is proposed to gradually go over to staffing military publications' editorial offices with "civilian" journalists. But this does not mean that officer journalists will cease to be trained, although the fate of the Lvov Higher Military-Political School, where journalists for the Armed Forces are trained, is not yet clear. It is quite possible that they will be trained at the USSR Ministry of Defense Academy of the Humanities, which was created out of the disbanded V.I. Lenin Military-Political Academy. As for existing journalists, those who have served their term of service will be transferred to the reserve while the performance of other creative personnel will be reappraised and those in whom the commissions or Officers Assemblies express a lack of trust will also quit the field of military journalism.

Over a two-year transitional period, M. Nenashev said, the military mass media should acquire a new face, switch to economic accountability, and begin to pay their way, that is, become commercialized. This, together with relative legal independence, will allow them to gain material independence as well. In this respect the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] newspapers SHCHIT I MECH [Shield and Sword], SITU-ATSIYA [Situation], and others are setting a good example. They are in great demand in the news market, are capable of competing with very popular publications, and are building their relations with their founder in such a way that even Pugo could not impose his will on them.

The military press' structure is planned as follows in the transitional period: The USSR Ministry of Defense will publish and finance official USSR Armed Forces publications, including central ones like VEDOMOSTI MINISTERSTVA OBORONY SSSR [USSR Ministry of

Defense Gazette], as well as the regional command news bulletins and military unit publications. Mass military publications such as the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (it will perhaps become the all-Union platform for servicemen), the journals SOVETSKIY VOIN and MORSKOY SBORNIK, and military district and fleet newspapers will go over to the principle of cofoundation.

There will also be publications issued by various associations, public organizations, and movements in the news marketplace. As far as military radio and television structures are concerned, it is proposed that a unified system of television broadcasting for the USSR Armed Forces be created. It is also planned to create a military press agency on principles of cofoundation. The USSR Ministry of Defense Information Directorate will coordinate the USSR Armed Forces mass media's activities, and the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center, the press centers of military districts, fleets, and groups of forces, and press officers in the formations will assist it in this.

Plan To Reform Military-Industrial Management

*OW0910140491 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1200 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A working group of experts led by the COMNE [Committee for Operational Management of the National Economy] members Nikolai Mikhailov and Viktor Protasov is to submit to the Soviet government by the end of this week a package of suggestions on how to reform the country's military-industrial complex management. The group involves representatives of 12 ex-Soviet republics, Defense Ministry officials, and specialists of the leading munitions-manufacturing associations.

Mr. Mikhailov told IF [INTERFAX] that the national defense complex should begin moving towards market relations, and its efficiency and the rates of conversion should substantially increase without, however, damaging the country's defense capability.

Baltic Affairs

USSR Announces Lithuanian, Estonian Ties

OW0910160291 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1450 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The USSR and Lithuania established diplomatic relations on October 9.

Soviet foreign minister Boris Pankin and his Lithuanian counterpart Algirdas Saudargas exchanged notes in Moscow on establishing diplomatic relations on the level of embassies.

During the ceremony Boris Pankin said that the exchange of documents concludes a phase in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, and, on the other hand, lays foundations for continuing traditional cooperation between them in the new circumstances.

The establishment of diplomatic ties stemming from the State Council's decision to recognize the independence of Baltic states paves the way for negotiating processes, said B. Pankin.

The problems emerging in the process of the talks "cannot be resolved overnight, but all conditions are being created for overcoming the difficulties", the Soviet foreign minister pointed out.

Today will also see in Moscow the ceremony of exchanging notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Estonia.

When asked by BF's [BALTFAX] correspondent about the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the USSR and Latvia, B. Pankin said that "everything is ready for it, and this is just a matter of time".

Lithuania's foreign minister Algirdas Saudargas also made a statement at the ceremony of exchanging diplomatic notes. "This step", he said, "is taking place at a time of historical changes, when the entire world is on its way to concord and disarmament". The people of Lithuania and the Soviet Union, he said, have covered "a tortuous road, and our citizens stood together for democracy both in Vilnius and in Moscow". According to him, this "made a contribution not only to the efforts to save democracy, but also to the process of disarmament in the world at large".

The Lithuanian government, A. Saudargas stressed, welcomed the concrete steps in the area of disarmament taken by the U.S. and the reciprocal initiatives of the Soviet leadership.

The same day a similar exchange of notes took place between Boris Pankin and the Estonian foreign minister Lennart Meri.

This ceremony, said the USSR foreign minister, puts relations between the USSR and Estonia in new conditions.

"The people of Estonia", said Lennart Meri, "looked forward to this moment for the past 50 years". According to L. Meri, Estonia intends to play an active role in the North of Europe and serve as "a bridge between West and East".

Diplomatic Notes Exchanged

LD0910141491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1300 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] In Moscow today the Soviet Union exchanged notes with Lithuania and Estonia on establishing diplomatic relations with them. As for Latvia, the third Baltic state which, as the two other republics, earlier belonged to the Soviet Union, notes with it will be exchanged later. This is because of the delay in preparing the documents.

A spokesman of the USSR Foreign Ministry told a Radio Moscow correspondent that the diplomatic functions of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will be performed temporarily by their permanent missions in Moscow. The question of opening diplomatic missions of the Soviet Union in the Baltic countries will be discussed later.

Troop Withdrawal Hinges on New Stations

OW0910211791 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2000 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Valeriy Manilov, head of the USSR Defense Ministry's Information Department, told a news briefing in Moscow that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltics will begin only after places of their new stationing are prepared. In his words, Soviet troops will remain on the territory of the Baltics at least until the end of 1994.

Mr. Manilov suggested that by that time the USSR may take a decision on paying compensation for the Soviet troops' stationing in the Baltics to their governments.

Baltic Council Adopts Documents on Cooperation

LD0910041391 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International
Service in Lithuanian 2230 GMT 6 Oct 91

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Five documents were adopted at the meeting of the Baltic Council. The text of the statement concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops has not been made public. And now we'll read the other four documents adopted at the Council of the Baltic States yesterday:

Resolution on the Joint Meeting of the Delegations of the Supreme Councils of the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania:

Proceeding from the Declaration on Cooperation and Concord of Opinion among the Republics of Estonia,

Latvia, and Lithuania of 12th May 1990, the delegated representatives from the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania at the 5th October 1991 meeting in Vilnius agreed to convene a joint meeting of the delegations of the Supreme Councils of the Baltic States on the 8th-9th November 1991 in Tallinn to jointly work out the principles of service in the parliamentary cooperation in the situation of independence with the aim of creating guarantees for the security of the Baltic states. The delegations of each state will be comprised of 15 deputies. Representatives of the delegations will meet on the 26th October 1991 in Tallinn to discuss the agenda and procedures of the meeting.

Communique of the Council of the Baltic States:

Pursuant to the Treaty on Concord and Cooperation between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which entered into force on 3d November 1934, endeavoring to ensure that the Baltic states be timely and objectively informed about the steps taken in the foreign policy of other states, the Council of the Baltic States has authorized the ministers of foreign affairs of the Baltic states before a Secretariat of the Council of the Baltic States is nominated to form a permanent working group for systematic exchange of information, working out a coordinated position on foreign policy and for the preparation of meetings within the framework of the Baltic states. Noting the necessity of the speedy implementation of the decisions of the Baltic states concerning the formation of the Secretariat of the council, it has been resolved to charge the above mentioned working group with the task of the preparation of the regulations of the Secretariat of the council of the Baltic states.

Statement of the Council of the Baltic States:

The council of the Baltic states welcomes the new initiative of the President of the United States of America, George Bush, to reduce the amount of nuclear weapons and consequently international confrontation. The council of the Baltic states calls on all the states which have nuclear weapons to support this initiative and reminds that the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Latvia have acceded to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the Republic of Estonia is prepared to do so in the immediate future and that the council of the Baltic states has repeatedly expressed itself on its resolute stand not to allow the presence of nuclear weapons on the territories of the Baltic states.

Resolution on a Collective Security System of the Baltic States:

The council of the Baltic states, taking into consideration that in 1934, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania concluded a treaty on concord and cooperation, restored their state independence in 1990-91 and in September 1991 became members of the United Nations Organization, being concerned with peace and stability in the eastern region of the Baltic coast, deemed it expedient to take an active part in the structures of the CSCE as well as

coordinate the security of the Baltic states providing a basis for and ensuring cooperation between the state structures in the event of danger. Therefore the council of the Baltic states came to a decision to form a joint group which would prepare an appropriate concept for regional cooperation. All the four documents adopted yesterday by the council of the Baltic states were signed by chairmen of the Supreme Councils of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Estonia

Formal Diplomatic Ties Established With USSR

LD0910204391 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1815 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 9 Oct (TASS)—[passage omitted] Today Boris Pankin and Lennart Meri, head of Estonian diplomacy, exchanged notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Estonia at embassy level. [passage omitted]

According to Boris Pankin, the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the third Baltic state, Latvia, is now a "purely technical" matter.

Speaking at the ceremony for the exchange of notes with the Lithuanian Republic, the Soviet Minister noted the important nature of this step in creating a favorable political and psychological background for the forthcoming talks between the states. These talks are expected to be very complicated. In particular, there will be disputes over the question of deadlines for the withdrawal of USSR Armed Forces units stationed on the territory of the Baltic republics. The leaders of these republics have adopted a tough stance on this, and are demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops by as early as 1 December of this year.

Possible New KGB Agreement 'This Week'

OW0810154891 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1430 GMT 8 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonia's prime minister Edgar Savisaar and the chairman of the USSR KGB Vadim Bakatin might sign a new agreement as early as this week, the government's adviser on military affairs Matti Pedak [spelling as received] told the newspaper "RAHVA HAAL".

On September 4 Savisaar and Bakatin signed a protocol on suspending KGB activity in Estonia.

According to Pedak, Estonia hopes to receive within 2 months all the files connected with legal actions launched against Estonian citizens from KGB archives located in the USSR. There are some 9000 such files kept

beyond Estonia. 7000 of them are in the KGB archives in Ulianovsk. Besides, an agreement was reached in principle with the KGB on transferring arms and special equipment belonging to the KGB to Estonia.

120 former members of the Estonian KGB have already said that they are leaving Estonia, and 140 said they will retire.

Savisaar, Bakatin Discuss KGB Abolition

*OW0910140891 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1200 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Soviet KGB Chairman Vadim Bakatin is having a meeting with Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar in Moscow today.

They are trying to clarify certain specific points for an agreement on the abolition of the Estonian KGB to be signed by the Estonian government and the Soviet KGB, such as the transfer of property and archives and the future of Estonian KGB staff.

Agreement Suspends KGB Activities

*LD1010095491 Moscow TASS in English 0910 GMT
10 Oct 91*

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS—Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar, Soviet KGB chief Vadim Bakatin and Estonian KGB head Rein Sillar on Wednesday signed a protocol on measures connected with suspending the activities of the Estonian KGB.

The document envisages forming a commission to make an inventory of property, technical facilities and arms on Estonian territory owned by the Soviet and Estonian KGB.

The sides are planning to create a special trilateral commission for transferring the Estonian KGB's archives to Estonian state bodies.

The protocol reads that the Soviet KGB agrees to transfer documents on the "activities of its secret agents, including information about assistance by citizens to Estonian KGB bodies".

The move followed the need to prevent "the use of the Estonian KGB's secret agent network to the detriment of the Estonian Republic". In accordance with the protocol, the documents will be transferred to the Estonian Republic "after it ensures sufficient legal guarantees and secrecy of their content and security for people mentioned in them".

Practical measures connected with the suspension of the Estonian KGB's activities shall be carried out in two months.

Bakatin said he was sure that "this is not the end of cooperation, and after corresponding legislative acts are

passed in Estonia, concerning the activities of security services in the republic, it will be possible to discuss new forms for such cooperation", which, Bakatin believes, "is inevitable".

Protocol Signed

*OW0910195391 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1730 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] As BF [BALTFAX] learned from the USSR KGB Center of Public Relations, at a meeting in Moscow October 9 Chairman of the USSR KGB Vadim Bakatin and Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar signed a protocol "On the implementation of the decision to stop activities of the Estonian KGB". This is already the third protocol on the liquidation of the Estonian KGB branch signed by Bakatin and Savisaar. The first one was issued on September 4. Currently, the KGB's activities are suspended on the Estonian territory.

The latest protocol envisages the creation within a few days of a joint Soviet-Estonian commission which will consider all questions concerning the practical liquidation of the Estonian KGB and determine its stages. By December 1 a final act on mutual commitments of the Estonian government, the USSR KGB and the Estonian KGB should be ready for the signing.

The protocol also says that part of the USSR KGB's archives will be transferred to Estonia by November 25.

During a meeting which lasted more than 3 hours Bakatin and Savisaar also discussed the fate of former Estonian KGB servicemen. The protocol says that by November 1 the joint commission should work out proposals concerning legal and social protection, pensions and other guarantees of employees and pensioners of the Estonian KGB for the signing of corresponding interstate agreements. It was decided that pensions will be provided by the Soviet Union.

A spokesman for the USSR KGB Center of Public Relations said that at the meeting Bakatin and Savisaar spoke in favor of cooperation between the USSR KGB and the Estonian Security Service yet to be set up.

Agreement To Pay Military, KGB Pensions

*LD1010061591 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1500 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Text] According to what Estonian Social Care Minister Siiri Oviir said to ETA, an agreement has been reached with corresponding USSR departments with respect to the USSR paying the pensions to USSR Armed Forces and KGB pensioners who live in Estonia. According to Siiri Oviir, there are about 10,000 USSR Ministry of Defense pensioners in Estonia and about 1,000 KGB pensioners. Pension benefits earmarked for war veterans will also be paid for by the USSR. The same will also

apply with respect to USSR personal pensioners. Estonian personal pensions will be abolished from 1992.

Defense Ministry enterprises located in Estonia as well as the railways will be transferring their social tax into the Estonian budget and that is how pensions for their workers will be financed.

Bank Takes Control of Ruble Transactions

*OW0910211691 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2000 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Bank of Estonia and the USSR State Bank have reached an agreement under which the former will take over the republican branch of the State Bank and will control all rouble transactions in the republic until January 1, 1992. This was told to a "BALTFAX" correspondent by Mr. Siim Kallas [spelling as received], president of the Bank of Estonia (the republic's central bank), on Wednesday in Tallinn.

Mr. Kallas also said that preparations for the introduction of Estonia's national currency—the krona—will be completed by mid-1992. He emphasized that the Estonian krona "should be a convertible currency" from the outset. Its convertibility will be supported by the gold reserves of the Bank of Estonia and loans which Estonia expects to receive from international financial organizations and Western countries.

Meri Answers Questions on Slovene Recognition

*OW0810181791 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1715 GMT 8 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In the absence of Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar during a weekly meeting of the Estonian parliament with the government Tuesday [8 October], Foreign Minister Lennart Meri answered questions of the deputies. The meeting focused on the recognition of Slovenia's independence by Estonia.

Estonia recognized the independence of Slovenia on September 25 when a document on "suspension of decisions about Slovenia's independence" adopted by the Slovenian leadership was in effect.

Shortly a scandal broke out: the Estonian press sharply criticized the Estonian Foreign Ministry and the government for "recognizing the independence of a country which does not consider itself to be independent."

Asked to comment on that, as the Estonian radio put it, "unprecedented event in world's history", Mr. Meri said that "the decision was made proceeding from Estonia's state interests."

Mr. Meri also said that "after a conversation with a foreign minister of one of the West European countries"

it was decided not to publicize the recognition of Slovenia's independence by Estonia, because it could aggravate the situation in Yugoslavia.

As a BF's [BALTFAX] correspondent reports, Meri's answers were received by the parliament without enthusiasm. Asked by one deputy if he fears to lose his post after taking such an "unprecedented" decision, Mr. Meri said no.

DM50 Million German Credit Accepted

*LD0910060591 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1500 GMT 7 Oct 91*

[Excerpt] The Estonian Government has decided in principle today to accept a foreign credit to the value of 50 million German marks [DM] from Germany. According to Harri Ounapuu, minister of agriculture, the conditions for the credit are favorable because Germany wants to support the agricultural machinery industry located on the territory of the former GDR. Estonia hopes to acquire spare parts for the agricultural machinery which originally came from the former GDR as well as to purchase new technology with the help of the credit. The credit is being administered by Tartu Commercial Bank in the person of Bruno Saul. [Passage omitted]

Pechery Wants To Remain in RSFSR

*LD0710163691 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 0700 GMT 7 Oct 91*

[Summary] Twice within the past week PECHERSKAYA PRAVDA has published an appeal from the Pechery rayon soviet to start collecting signatures from 12 to 14 October to retain the ancient Russian Pechery area within Russia, warning the people that they would become second-class citizens if they rejoined Estonia.

Latvia

Godmanis Rejects Alma-Ata Based Treaty

*LD0910152491 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT
9 Oct 91*

[By correspondent Valeriy Zaitsev]

[Text] Riga October 9 TASS—"Latvia does not intend to sign a new treaty on an economic union", republican Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis has told a news conference here upon his return from Alma-Ata.

"Although Latvia's aim is to win the status of an EC associated member, it is very important for the republic to continue to maintain its economic relations with the East, because the Latvian and union economies are closely bound together, and this interconnection cannot be broken off through political decisions," Godmanis said.

Still he regards as more preferable the conclusion of bilateral treaties with each republic separately.

"But if economic cooperation in the East assumes the form of an economic union, it would be advisable for the Baltics as a whole to join a new economic community and conclude a special treaty", the Latvian premier said.

USSR Interior Troops Begin Withdrawal

LD0910101491 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 0500 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] Withdrawal of the USSR interior troops from Latvia started yesterday. Internal Affairs Minister Alois Stated in an interview to a BNS correspondent that armed forces' unit No. 54-59, the so-called Riga militia regiment, which in the course of the past year was engaged in guarding Communist Party properties, began to withdraw. Armed forces' unit No. 74-58, which was engaged in guarding places of imprisonment and escorting imprisoned persons, would be withdrawn gradually.

As Vaznis reported, a gradual withdrawal of the armed forces' units is necessary so young men to be called up into the compulsory state service for guarding places of imprisonment can be suitably trained. It is planned to accomplish this training within two months. As Vaznis announced, to guard the places of imprisonment in Latvia, approximately 1,800 men, including officers and additional service soldiers, are required. He emphasized that after an agreement with the USSR minister of internal affairs, Colonel General Barannikov, all USSR interior troops will have left Latvia by the end of this year.

USSR Defense Ministry to Release Buildings

LD0910200291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1822 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow, 9 Oct—The USSR Defense Ministry is ready immediately to hand over two buildings to the Latvian Government which the department has been occupying in Riga. This information was given to a TASS correspondent today by Janis Peters, Latvia's permanent representative in Moscow.

According to Peters, he had a meeting this afternoon with USSR Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov and Colonel General Vladimir Semenov, commander in chief of USSR land forces. They agreed to release the buildings of the former German Embassy in Latvia and Riga's Lettish Society, which have been occupied by the military department since 1940. The permanent representative of the Republic of Latvia said that the German Embassy will probably be accommodated anew in one of the buildings, especially since prior to Latvia's incorporation into the USSR it had been the property of that

state. The second building which housed the House of Officers will be used by the troupe of the Riga Theater of Opera and Ballet.

Answering a question from the TASS correspondent on the dates for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Latvia, Peters stated that the exchange of the relevant notes is scheduled to take place on 15 October. "We wanted first to establish diplomatic relations with Russia. After all it was the first to recognize Latvia's independence on 24 August, and the Soviet Union did so only 11 days later", he recalled.

Jurkans Assesses RSFSR Relations

OW0910011291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2015 GMT 8 Oct 91

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" program; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On 4th October foreign ministers from Russia and Latvia, Andrejs Kozirev and Janis Jurkans signed a protocol of diplomatic relations at an ambassadorial level. This statement, to quote the chairman of the committee for human rights in the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, finally "buried" the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which had caused the Baltic republic's loss of state independence. The Latvian Foreign Minister gave "DP" [Diplomatic Panorama] an exclusive interview.

Relation with Russia

In the words of J. Jurkans, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the nations of Latvia and Russia is an event of historical significance. He stressed that Russia in particular due to its decision of 24th August had "opened doors" for a diplomatic declaration of Latvian independence.

J. Jurkans also emphasised that this act had strengthened stability in Latvia through Russia's belief in the republic's advance along the road of democracy.

The Latvian minister voiced the hope that establishing diplomatic relations with Russia would have a stabilising effect and "would pacify those, who believe that Latvia is only for Latvians".

J. Jurkans believes that this will help Latvian business directors work in Russia and set up mutually beneficial ties. In other words, he summarised by saying that setting right Russo-Latvian relations was very important. To have as friendly a state as Russia in the East was very valuable, J. Jurkans said. This is in some respects a move of political defence for the young Latvian State.

Latvia's foreign-policy priorities

To quote J. Jurkans, Latvia's foreign policy serves above all to attain its inner political goals. The most important thing now is to strengthen democracy and to put the Latvian economy on a solid footing. "We shall become

independent only when we have an independent economy," said the minister. Hence Latvia's interest in broadening mutually-advantageous contacts with the East, with the former republics of the Soviet Union, and also to get integrated with the European economic and political structures.

A come-back to Europe, said Mr. Jurkans, will help the Baltic states catch up with the West and at the same time serve as a laboratory for Russia and for other republics of the former union which will move along the road of free trade and market. As a link between East and West Latvia may help not only stabilize the situation but also to promote the democratic processes in Russia. "Our success and possibly future largely depend on democratic progress in the East, in Russia and in the former or future Soviet Union," the Latvian foreign minister stressed.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states

According to J. Jurkans, the acceleration of Soviet troop withdrawal from Baltic State territory (which is planned to begin in the year 1994) "is highly essential". He stressed in particular that the presence of Soviet troops in the Baltics "was a politically destabilising factor".

At the same time, added the minister, we understand the problems that the Soviet Army has and will take them into account. The withdrawal of troops has now become a problem of economic technicality rather than a political question. "Its solution should evidently be complex," concluded Latvia's Minister for Foreign affairs J. Jurkans.

Parliament Adopts Draft Law on Citizenship

*OW0910212091 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2000 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Latvian parliament has adopted by majority of votes a draft law on Latvian citizenship prepared by Deputy Janis Lagedins [spelling as received].

Under the draft law, those who had been Latvian citizens before 1940 regain this status now. Those who came to the republic after its annexation by the USSR (about 35 percent of the Latvian population) will be granted Latvian citizenship only if they meet the following demands: minimum 16 years spent in the republic, the knowledge of the spoken Latvian language, the oath of allegiance to the republic and giving other citizenships up.

The draft law indicates the categories of people who have no chance to get Latvian citizenship. Among them those who settled in Latvia after 1940 and opposed the restoration of Latvia's independence, demobilized military servicemen of the "foreign army," as well as alcoholics, drug addicts and criminals.

The main provisions of the draft law are expected to be submitted to a referendum.

A BF's [BALTFAX] correspondent says a law on Latvian citizenship will be based on the adopted draft.

Dinevich: Russia Must Be Involved in Talks

*OW0910211891 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2000 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A large number of issues involved in relations between Latvia and the Soviet Union should be resolved in consultation with Russia, said Mr. Janis Dinevich, head of Latvia's delegation appointed to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union. In an interview to BALTFAX, he said that "Russia's representation on the Soviet delegation at talks with Latvia should be fairly substantial". This, in his opinion, would eliminate the necessity of obtaining a separate approval by Russia of issues already agreed upon by the delegations.

Preliminary consultations with the Soviet delegation are already under way. These consultations, however, should not be seen as anything like the future negotiations, Mr. Dinevich said. Both Latvia and the USSR have yet to appoint their delegations to these negotiations. As for the consultations, their main objective is to draw up a list of outstanding questions.

According to Mr. Dinevich, a number of questions, primarily those relating to the procedure to be used, were agreed upon at his recent meeting with the head of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Aleksandr Yakovlev. In particular, both parties determined that all questions would be addressed "with the maximum of tact".

Mr. Dinevich believes that the talks will take long because many problems related to dividing something, particularly property, cannot be resolved quickly. This will take at least six months, he stressed.

Asked whether there is the danger of territorial disputes arising between Latvia and Russia, Mr. Dinevich replied that there are indeed such problems, but, in his view, they could be settled. He clarified that what is at issue is the Pytalovsky District within Russia's Pskov Region, which used to belong to Latvia under the name of Abrena. "Both parties have shown understanding with respect to this problem", he went on.

Diplomatic Relations With Japan Restored

*OW0910011191 Tokyo KYODO in English
2303 GMT 8 Oct 91*

[Text] Moscow, Oct. 8 KYODO—Japan and the break-away Soviet Republic of Latvia reopened diplomatic relations at a ceremony in the Latvian capital of Riga Tuesday, Japanese officials said.

Muneo Suzuki, Japan's parliamentary vice foreign minister, participated in the ceremony and later met with Latvian leaders to discuss ways to strengthen bilateral political and economic relations.

On Monday, Suzuki attended a ceremony in Vilnius marking the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and Lithuania after a 51-year break.

Lithuania

Restoration of Relations With USSR Noted

LD0910184991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Report by Lithuanian news agency ELTA special correspondent from Moscow]

[Text] This afternoon Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Minister Algirdas Saudargas and USSR Foreign Affairs Minister Boris Pankin signed and exchanged notes on the restoration of diplomatic relations.

This act took place at the USSR Foreign Ministry, in one of its most beautiful halls, where the official USSR interstate documents are usually signed.

The ceremony was attended by Egidijus Bickauskas, the permanent representative of the Lithuanian Government in Moscow, heads of the Protocol and Second European Departments of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and press representatives.

Boris Pankin and Algirdas Saudargas delivered speeches. Then, the ministers devoted 30 minutes to an unofficial conversation.

On the same day, diplomatic relations between the Republic of Estonia and the Soviet Union were restored.

Pankin, Saudargas Exchange Notes on Ties

LD0910151191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1438 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow, 9 Oct (TASS)—The Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic have agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the level of embassies. The exchange of the relevant notes took place in Moscow today between USSR Foreign Minister Boris Pankin and Lithuanian Diplomatic Chief Algirdas Saudargas.

Landsbergis, Major Discuss Troop Withdrawal

OW0910135191 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1200 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] During his meeting with the British Prime Minister, John Major, in Blackpool yesterday, the head of the

Lithuanian Parliament, Vitautas Landsbergis, said the main problem for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories. Their further presence, Mr Landsbergis believes, is fraught with the danger of a new coup d'etat being attempted. He emphasised that the Council of Baltic States could insist that all Soviet troops be withdrawn from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by December 1, 1991.

Mr. Major assured Mr Landsbergis that Great Britain supports the Baltic states on this issue.

He also spoke in favour of a bilateral trade agreement to be signed by Britain and Lithuania.

It was decided to set up a joint commission to deal with the issue of the Lithuanian gold stored in British banks since 1940.

As already reported by BF [BALTFAX], Mr. Landsbergis has come to Britain on an invitation from the Conservative Party.

Shevardnadze: Talks Will Be 'Difficult'

OW0910211991 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2000 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In an interview to a "BALTFAX" correspondent, the head of the Soviet delegation at Soviet-Lithuanian talks, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, said that in his view Soviet-Lithuanian talks will be very difficult, and therefore he had no idea how long they would take. He said that both the Soviet and the Lithuanian sides will have to address and resolve "many questions requiring time, patience and restraint," although, he added, there is every intention to conclude these negotiations fairly quickly.

"I have set myself the aim to conduct these talks in such a way that we could stay friends: Russia, Belorussia and other republics, on the one hand, and the Lithuanians on the other hand," Mr. Shevardnadze emphasized.

Law Bans Dual Citizenship

LD0510040191 Moscow TASS in English
0832 GMT 4 Oct 91

[By correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius October 4 TASS—About 40 per cent of Lithuania's residents have yet to decide whether they will remain citizens of Lithuania or the Soviet Union.

Under the republican law, by November 3, all residents enjoying a civic right, including the indigenous population, must receive temporary certificates of Lithuanian citizenship or send written applications.

The law prohibits dual citizenship in the republic.

People who do not apply for a certificate will automatically become "citizens of a foreign state or people without citizenship," Virgilyus Chepaitis, head of the Lithuanian parliamentary commission for human rights and nationalities, said in a televised address on Thursday.

He called on all republican officials to intensify work in this direction.

5 Oct Border Incident Detailed

*OW0910195291 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1730 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A BF's [BALTFAX] correspondent provided the details of an incident on the Latvian-Lithuanian border October 5 when an officer of the Lithuanian Joniskis customs post Gintaras Petronis was seriously wounded.

According to the latest report from the Latvian Interior Ministry, on Saturday at 20:10 in the republic's Dobeles region 30 meters away from the Joniskis post a Latvian militiaman Valdis Ulans noticed a stranger carrying a can in his hands (as BF reported earlier, the man crossed the border in order to get some water from a well). Ulans asked the stranger to show his documents. But the man hit Ulans's leg with the can and rushed toward the Lithuanian side of the border. At first Ulans shot in the air, but when he saw that the man did not intend to stop, Ulans shot him.

The stranger was identified as Gintaras Petronis, who worked as a stoker at a customs post, resident of the Lithuanian town of Zhagare, born in 1966. Petronis was wounded in the back and the bullet hit his liver. He was taken to a hospital in the grave condition.

The Dobeles Prosecutor's Office has instituted legal proceedings against Ulans on charges of exceeding his authorities.

Supreme Soviet

Lobov 'Sharply Criticizes' Yavlinskiy Plan

LD0910194491 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Report by correspondent L. Ioffe on the Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 9 October, including recorded remarks at the session by Oleg Lobov, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] At the Supreme Soviet session today, Russian deputies examined the draft treaty on economic community submitted by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's group. The sitting was opened by Yevgeniy Saburov, deputy prime minister, who explained his resignation by the reluctance of colleagues in the cabinet to back the treaty. Yavlinskiy, however, correctly foretold the death of all nascent post-totalitarian democracies for purely economic reasons if they fail to sign the treaty, while taking into account its transitional nature. Production has fallen by 17 percent, and a mere 3 percent separates it from paralysis. In Yavlinskiy's view, a catastrophe can be averted only by economic community.

Oleg Lobov, first deputy prime minister, argued with Yavlinskiy. Having reassured deputies by saying there is no split within the government, and that differences merely boost progress, Lobov sharply criticized the draft, maintaining that it infringes upon Russia's rights. Why? The possibilities for Union industrial monsters to survive are being preserved, and finances are being distributed in an unjust manner for Russia, which is being plundered economically. The center of gravity, Lobov believes, should be moved onto bilateral interrepublican treaties, in accordance with their interests.

[Begin Lobov recording] It seems to me, speaking here, Yavlinskiy proceeds from a crazy idea which has held him in thrall from the very beginning. I have been observing this. It concerns attempts to preserve the Union, a single space, a single market. Is it not high time for us, Russia, to create a banking system of our own, price formation and property of our own, and so forth and so on? [end recording]

TASS Reports on Dispute

LD0910212191 Moscow TASS in English
2034 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By parliamentary correspondents Tamara Zamyatina and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—A joint meeting of chambers of the Russian parliament witnessed today incompatible points of view on the treaty on economic community. The document initialed in Alma-Ata has become the major item on the session agenda.

Grigory Yavlinskiy, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Management of the National Economy,

told the assembly that the production recession has reached 17 per cent, and that 20 per cent recession will lead to the complete paralysis of the economy.

In this connection, Yavlinskiy called on the Russian Supreme Soviet to approve the treaty on economic community.

He reproached the Russian parliament with the fact that within one year deputies changed twice their approach to the preservation of the Union.

First, they spoke of the primacy of economic relations between the republics. Now they speak of the need to conclude a political treaty. "If we continue to give the politics the priority over the economy, we will be buried under debris of the disintegrating state by next spring," Yavlinskiy said.

Nevertheless, deputies expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that the Russian Supreme Soviet was not presented the draft treaty and Yevgeniy Saburov, who was not entitled to sign the document, went to Alma-Ata.

Saburov had to explain his actions. In his words, he received oral permission from the Russian president to represent the interests of Russia in Alma-Ata. Saburov went to Sochi, showed Boris Yeltsin the major part of the treaty and was "given the blessing" for conducting the negotiations.

The Russian president, however, insisted on a tough banking system and the removal of customs barriers between the republics.

Still, the Russian Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers do not seem to be satisfied with Saburov's explanations.

In contrast to Yavlinskiy and Saburov, Oleg Lobov, the first deputy chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers, spoke of the unacceptability for Russia of the Treaty on Economic Community in its present form. In his opinion, the signing of this document would lead to the infringement of the economic and political sovereignty of Russia.

Finally, deputies decided to form a group to prepare the draft resolution of the Russian Supreme Soviet on economic treaty.

Federation Affairs

Yeltsin on Silayev Removal; Replies to Letter

LD0910220391 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Excerpt] Silayev's removal has not done anything to help cohesion. Incidentally, Yeltsin today replied to his former prime minister's letter, which was the reason for the conflict. Yeltsin described the USSR Committee for the Management of the National Economy as an unconstitutional structure, and its decisions as mere decisions

of recommendation. Yeltsin believes that Silayev's proposal to suspend the validity of a number of Russian acts is an infringement on the sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR].

However, Silayev himself today told the RIA [Russian Information Agency] that Yeltsin's letter is more an emotional than businesslike approach. According to Silayev, the RSFSR president was today disposed to suspend the order of 31 August regarding the work of nuclear power stations and the administration of Russian power engineering. Silayev intends to settle his differences with Yeltsin following the latter's return from leave. [passage omitted]

Yavlinskiy Views 'Disputes' Among Leaders

LD0910151791 Moscow TASS in English 1450 GMT 9 Oct 91

[By parliamentary correspondents Tamara Zamyatina and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow October 9 TASS—Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, member of the Political Consultative Council at the Soviet president [as received], expressed concern over differences among Russian leaders.

At the request of TASS he commented on the statement of the British newspaper TIMES that in the absence of President Boris Yeltsin there are disputes among Russian leaders threatening to paralyse the Russian Government and create insurmountable obstacles to economic reforms and Western aid.

Yavlinsky said the situation in the Russian Government does not warrant positive feelings and affects the destiny of the interrepublican economic agreement. Regrettably, in the present conditions the process of signing the treaty on economic community is not irreversible, he said.

Former Envoy Warns of 'Political Struggle'

LD0910203991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1900 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] Moscow, 9 Oct (TASS)—There is no organized opposition in Boris Yeltsin's apparat, thinks Yuriy Petrov, the Soviet Union's former ambassador to Cuba, who took up the post of Russian president's head of administration on 19 August, the first day of the attempted coup.

Petrov, 55, who many of the media claim occupied the post thanks to his personal friendship with the Russian president, declared in an interview published in today's IZVESTIYA that "there is a tense situation in the president's apparat," but it is caused "by the normal establishment of the institution of presidential rule."

However, in the observer's opinion, there is now an aggravation of the political struggle in the corridors of Russian power. Examples of this are provided, specifically, by Ivan Silayev's recent resignation from the post

of Russian prime minister and today's relinquishment by Yevgeniy Saburov of his duties as vice premier.

Nevertheless, Petrov, who has held only nomenklatura posts since the 1960's, including the post of first secretary of Sverdlovsk Oblast's CPSU Committee, claims that there is in the apparat of the Russian president no struggle that can be seen as a struggle for influence over the president. In his view, it is an ordinary formation of new power structures. "There are no behind-the-scenes intrigues within the activities of the apparat, and every leader has the right to choose a team that suits him," he considers.

The Russian leadership's main power structures consist of the president, vice president, state advisers, the State Council, the Security Council, the Federation Council, and the Cabinet of Ministers. Each of these structures operates independently, helping the Russian president with the adoption of decisions, while the apparat, according to Petrov, assists the interaction between them.

The task of the president's head of administration, Petrov said, is to organize the activities of the apparat, which must work for all structures of power.

Article Examines 'Crisis' in Power Structures

PM1010084891 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 91 Union Edition p 1

[Article by I. Demchenko: "Will Russia Sign the Treaty on the Economic Community? Ministers Make Contradictory Statements, Parliament and President Remain Silent"]

[Text] One wonders whether the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Council of Ministers will adopt a resolution disassociating itself from the 5 October television remarks by Minister of Justice N. Fedorov regarding Russia's position on the treaty on the economic community.

As you know, after the end of the Alma-Ata talks the RSFSR Government adopted a resolution saying that it had "not authorized anyone to conduct talks or consultations with representatives of sovereign states." This renders invalid the signature of RSFSR Minister of Economics Ye. Saburov on the treaty on the economic community, which he initialed in Kazakhstan along with 11 republic heads of government.

Speaking on television 5 October to clarify this matter, Justice Minister N. Fedorov took it upon himself to express the will of the RSFSR people, which he also had certainly not been authorized to do. N. Fedorov's initiative appears all the more surprising in that neither parliament nor the RSFSR president, who, unlike the minister, was elected in a nationwide ballot, has hitherto expressed a view on the treaty.

Apparently history is repeating itself as farce: Once again, when a president—this time the Russian president—is on vacation and for some reason is silent, government members appear on the TV screens making political statements that are careless in form and dangerously ignorant in content. It is quite obvious that expressions like "the people of the republic do not want to live under the twofold oppression of administrative structures" are not dictated by concern for the people. Because the people, of course, cannot in any way be oppressed by the Banking Union, the single arbitration system, or the executive-administrative Interrepublic Economic Committee which is wholly subordinate to the council of heads of governments of the states belonging to the community—and that is a full list of the future central "administrative structures."

However, immediately after signing the treaty the Russian Government loses the right unilaterally to take actions that have irreversible consequences for the entire community—such as last year's panic increase in purchase prices for agricultural products, which made the RSFSR Council of Ministers directly responsible for today's terrible inflation. And this restraining factor could, of course, oppress members of the republic government who have already become accustomed to operating totally uncontrolled.

It follows from the RSFSR justice minister's statement that under the ordinary oppression of their very own Council of Ministers the Russian people will live in joy and happiness. But, incidentally, it must not be forgotten that the center whose actions had devastating consequences of such might that they totally neutralized the consequences of mistakes at republic level, no longer exists. And while the RSFSR parliament, having put all its efforts into the struggle against the center, has not yet had the opportunity to devote sufficient attention to the actions of its own government, interesting revelations now lie in store for it, such as the deception of the peasants over the "Harvest-90" checks, the resolution with the remarkable title "On Resettling Citizens to the Jewish Autonomous Oblast," the decisions on setting up monopolist enterprise structures in Russia endowed with unprecedented and unlawful privileges of a kind that suggest a special interest in the issuing of these documents, and much more besides.

Painful as it is to recognize this fact, people must realize: The consequences of N. Fedorov's statement to the effect that Russia will not be racing other republics to sign the treaty on the economic community cannot be totally repudiated. Whatever position is now adopted by the president, who formerly was apparently an active supporter of the treaty and fitted in very well with its consolidating policy, or by parliament, which for some incomprehensible reason is ignoring this event, it has already gone down in history forever as a terrible paradox that revolutionary, democratic, great Russia, at a critical moment for the fatherland, hesitated and was slow to extend its hand to other republics. And it does

not matter what prompted this: a combination of circumstances, the desire to secure certain advantages by bargaining, or the inner convictions of those whom the people of Russia have in reality entrusted with representing their interests and expressing their will.

The time has come when it is no longer possible to conceal the profound political crisis that has gripped the power structures of the biggest republic and has intensified particularly since the August putsch. It transpires that it was only their opposition to a common enemy—the center—that was making them work more or less harmoniously and efficiently. Today all the institutions of power that make up the sovereign democratic state have lost their common language and embarked on an internecine confrontation like the builders of the ancient Tower of Babel.

The RSFSR president's apparatus is fighting the State Council for influence on the top man. Parliament opposes the president. The government, not satisfied with its role of executive power, is actively trying to compete with parliament for the right to make policy. At the same time, inside the government itself, what one minister called a "serious discussion" is taking place, one result of which, it is now emerging, was to literally squeeze I. Silayev out of the post of Russian premier. Palace intrigues, which in all times and at all levels of power have been the merciless instrument of the replacement of cadres, have, in the hands of what it is now customary to call "our young democracy," become an uncontrollable weapon striking out to right and left.

But youth is not our democracy's only shortcoming. It is uneducated, too. Top state officials sometimes act like adolescents who are not ashamed to call each other names in public and to demonstrate all the "charms" of a transitional age—unconstructiveness, incompetence, arrogance, irresponsibility, and envy. With truly bolshevik ease, they ask yesterday's comrade in arms to resign; they put no value on the leader's reputation, and betray him at the first convenient opportunity, subsequently flinging the vilest mud that they can lay their hands on for free.

One could venture to say that our democracy is as we ourselves are. It is our mirror, and its main problem is not, of course, as people often try to make out, the fact that in its work it is obliged to make use of an administrative apparatus inherited from the old system. Its main problem lies within itself, in the fact that the majority of those people of differing convictions, training, views, and ideas of good and evil who are united by the word "democrats" have never before had to bear such a heavy burden of responsibility as is now placed upon them. They are not used to weighing up their words and deeds, not only adopting but also fulfilling strategic decisions, advancing consistently and systematically toward the objective, and learning even from their own mistakes. It is easier for them to stand on the barricades than to create faultless documents, easier to descend from the skies on a peacemaking mission to a region of bloodshed

than to prepare the sides gradually and carefully for talks and rapprochement, easier to construct plans for determining Russia's share of ownership of the Lunokhod and other space devices than to privatize even a few enterprises. You could say that they sometimes seem willing to go to any lengths for a little bit of reflected glory.

It is not their fault that they are like this, it is their misfortune. But it is also the misfortune of all Russia, the whole country, because there is no time to wait for them to grow up, no time to teach them civilization—the choice must be made today. And there is no one to do it except these very people.

Now that the fate of the state is being decided, will they lack the wisdom and sense of responsibility to cast aside ambition and squabbles and take a worthy decision? Is "Russia's special fate," its historical mission, really to be expressed in its weighing so heavily on the other republics, which are trying by joint efforts to escape from the economic abyss and give their peoples the power to lead a normal life?

Rutskoy on Chechen-Ingush Events; Reviews Trip

*LD1010005591 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2120 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Interview with Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy by unidentified correspondent in Moscow on 9 October—live or recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] You have just returned from a sitting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. It appears that the Chechen-Ingush issue was examined. You have just returned from there; you know the situation better. What is taking place there, after all?

[Rutskoy] I would like to touch upon the background, in brief, so that everything is put in perspective, so that people and the broad public can understand what is taking place in Chechen-Ingush. If one looks at the way the events developed...[changes thought] Let us take the beginning of August. You know, views were voiced at the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet that Zavgayev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, should resign. The situation was becoming increasingly heated. Zavgayev should have, indeed, resigned and removed that tension so that the Supreme Soviet had the chance to elect a new leader and embark upon the path of democratic reforms, but this did not take place. You remember why such differences appeared at the Supreme Soviet. They were prompted by the referendum on introducing the presidency in the Russian Federation—and Chechen-Ingush is part of the Russian Federation—which was blocked by Zavgayev himself. And later the events that took place directly here, in Russia, on 19, 20, and 21 August, in the aspect of an attempted military coup, so to speak, entailed such consequences that a group of people's deputies and leaders of sociopolitical movements, having united, removed Zavgayev from power, although by force, to a degree. Consequently, the Supreme Soviet itself was removed from power. The Supreme Soviet

elected a group of 32 people, which was named a provisional Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, and it was given plenary powers to prepare new democratic elections of Chechen-Ingush people's deputies and, at a later stage, elections of leaders of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet.

If we look at the way the events of the 24th developed, even there there are indications, as it were, that a crime was committed because, although it is now being asserted that Comrade Kusenko, chairman of the city soviet, jumped out of a window by himself, I do not know of anyone who can jump through a pane of glass. I would think people first open the window and then jump out! So, there are still investigations to conduct on this. And it would seem that the goal was achieved. Comrade Zavgayev, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, was removed from office. The Supreme Soviet which failed to take up the cause of democratic reform was removed from power. And it had appeared that the new soviet, the provisional soviet, which was endowed with powers, was to prepare the election campaign, but a situation arose which went in the direction of a violation of the law. And starting from the first few days of August and then following the resignation of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, something like six or eight commissions went straight to Chechen-Ingush. I cannot remember exactly, but I know for a fact that Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov was there. State Counsellor Gennadiy Eduardovich Burbulis was there, too. And I flew out there myself. And the deputy chairman of the Russian Federation committee for legislation was there as part of the relevant commission, continuing to work there when I flew in. And this is how I got to be in Chechen-Ingush. There was a telephone call at 1800 on the Saturday evening to say the Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB buildings were being stormed in the city of Grozny. Lieutenant-Colonel Ayupov had been injured, and in that situation, guided by the thought that bloodshed in the republic had to be avoided, I called in Andrey Fedorovich Dunayev, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] minister of internal affairs, and Ivanenko, chairman of the Russian Federation's KGB, and we immediately flew out to Grozny.

And, the situation which has developed to date makes it clear that the legitimate body of authority that was elected as the republic's Supreme Soviet has been completely cut off from authority, completely cut off by Dudayev and his group. And the Dudayev group has taken up an incomprehensible stance, that is to say, they have started off on a criminal track. Why? Let us look at it like this. In Russia today, the democratic forces are in power—Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is the president of the Russian Federation. If we look at the situation as a whole in the Soviet Union, then Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has very clearly taken up the position of democratic reforms and democratic changes, and it would seem that the temporary council and the corresponding public-political movements, and the movement headed by Dzhakhor Moiseyevich Dudayev in

Chechen-Ingush should have also assumed a stance supporting democratic reforms and should have prepared for elections.

And so this is why what has happened recently, so to speak, is particularly incomprehensible. Why? Because, when I met Dudayev, he told me very clearly that the independent Islamic Chechen state is not a part of the Russian Federation nor of the USSR. Therefore, those laws which previously applied to the territory of the Chechen-Ingush republic no longer apply. Therefore, he does whatever he feels to be necessary.

When people armed to the teeth go around town rattling their weapons; when they seize the TV center, and the radio, and when they admit no one into either the TV or radio center apart from the representatives of the executive committee—the only legitimate body of authority as they call themselves—then forgive me, but that can no longer be called democracy, more an act of brigandage. Why? Because on what basis did they shoot Lt. Col. Ayupov, especially as they shot him in the back? Then in the evening, they came brandishing grenades and sub-machine guns to the doctor and surgeon and they took from them the bullet that had wounded Lt. Col. Ayupov. If they consider this to be democracy, then they are deeply mistaken, deeply mistaken.

And so, having arrived there and having made my evaluation of that situation, I took part in the congress of the Inguish people. At that congress their position was very clearly expressed—the Inguish people are in favor of a united Chechen-Ingush republic which would be a part of the Russian Federation. Dudayev took up a saber-rattling stance with the illegal seizure of state buildings. He opened fire, and besides this, I can say in all honesty that we did not find a single gun or a single piece of ammunition in the KGB. And now it has become clear that 12 assault rifles, two boxes of cartridges, and 10 F-1 grenades were stolen from the KGB. Further, this group is armed with 80 automatic weapons, 360 pistols, four grenade-launchers and Strela surface-to-air missiles. You know, if we and the republic's leadership view in this manner what is happening in that republic which forms part of the Federation and encourage what is continuing there, it will end, you know—and I state this with authority—it will end up with a Nagorno-Karabakh.

In order not to let this happen I invited and gathered together the provisional higher soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Republic and we had it out on this matter, because I managed in two days to meet and speak with the broad public and understand their opinion on this matter and to speak with Dudayev himself. Dudayev gave me his word of honor that there would be no more assaults and unconstitutional and unlawful actions.

At 0400 this morning a hotel was seized in an armed attack, and the republic's procurator, Comrade Aleksandr Vasilyevich Pushkin, was arrested. Why was

he arrested? He was arrested because he issued a statement ruling that the activities of the executive committee of the Chechen-Ingush republic are criminal actions.

The most terrible thing in this situation is the fact that a wedge is being driven between two peoples, between the Ingush and the Chechen peoples.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has ruled that the sole provisional state legislative body in the territory of the republic is the republic's Provisional Higher Soviet under the chairmanship of Comrade (?Bakhmadov). Further, a second point is that recommendations have been made to the Provisional Higher Soviet that all necessary measures be taken to stabilize the situation, because the republic has an Internal Affairs Ministry which is manned and there is an apparat and a procuracy. I, therefore, think that in this situation the Russian Federation should not intervene, because a body does exist that we have deemed to be, at present, prior to elections, the acting Supreme Soviet. We think this body has been recommended to take measures to achieve stabilization and accordingly we state here that these illegal military formations calling themselves guards and calling themselves, so to speak, people who have declared a holy war are to hand over their weapons immediately.

Against whom have they declared their holy war? I asked Dudayev himself to explain to me against whom they were taking up arms and against whom they intended to defend themselves. I did not get an answer.

I think that as a result of this decision the republic's provisional higher soviet has every right and chance to stabilize the situation and ensure legality and law and order. If this does not happen, I think the Russian president will then have to adopt specific measures with respect to detaining these criminals who are violating Article 218 of the Criminal Code on the possession and illegal bearing of arms and Articles 67 and 68 on terrorism against the lawful authorities. I think criminal proceedings should be instituted against these people in accordance with the Criminal Code.

Bessmertnykh Invited To Head Analysis Center

OW0910170491 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1500 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Another ex-foreign minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who resigned after the failed coup attempt in August, has been invited by Eduard Shevardnadze to lead the Political Analysis Center in the FPA [Foreign Political Association].

Mr. Bessmertnykh told the FPA meeting on Wednesday [9 October] that the center would make short and long-term political forecasts. Its staff should consist of about

a dozen analysts, "or else we would be sure to grow into another bureaucratic structure," Bessmertnykh says.

Russian Democratic Party Adopts Draft Program

LD1010033591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
 in Russian 1100 8 Oct 91

[Text] The board of the Democratic Party of Russia has held a two-day session in Moscow, the capital of our homeland. Reports were delivered by Nikolay Travkin on the political situation in the country and by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy on economic aspects of development. Resolutions were passed on the current situation, on relations among nationalities, and on social support for servicemen. Changes were made to the rules of this organization and a new draft of its program was adopted. The third Congress of the Democratic Party has been set for December.

Magazine Accused of Hampering Coup Case

LD0910221191 Moscow TASS International Service
 in Russian 2030 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] Moscow, 9 Oct (TASS)—Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Procurator General Valentin Stepankov assesses excerpts from the interrogation protocols of the main organizers of the attempted coup in the USSR in August, published in DER SPIEGEL magazine, as an attempt to hamper the investigation. It has been reported that a video record of interrogations was received by the editorial department of DER SPIEGEL through unknown channels. The information program of Soviet Central Television today showed shots of secret video protocols of the interrogations of the main participants in the August putsch, including former prime minister Valentin Pavlov, and former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov. In this connection the RSFSR procurator general said in his interview to Central Television today that DER SPIEGEL did not ask for any official information and did not receive consent to publish it. The fact that these documents were made public, in his opinion, "does not have any special consequences in this case." Stepankov said that an official investigation is now underway to find out the circumstances of DER SPIEGEL's acquisition of the video tape. "I think, Stepankov said, that this will not be the last attempt to hamper the investigation, to hinder it, and to erect artificial obstacles. Nevertheless, the investigation is continuing and making headway." According to him, the case presently amounts to approximately 20 volumes. Over 1000 people have been questioned.

KGB Official on Fight Against Crime

LD1010020591 Moscow Russian Television Network
 in Russian 2100 GMT 7 Oct 91

[Interview with KGB Colonel Sergey Nikolayevich by unidentified correspondent in Moscow; date not given; from the "Vesti" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] This is the first interview in his new post, specially for "Vesti." Sergey Nikolayevich, what will your administration deal with, how will it combat organized crime?

[Almazov] One of the main, fundamental areas of the new administration we are setting up will be combating corruption in the organs of administration and power.

[Correspondent] What level do you think the KGB fight against corruption could reach? Previously there were certain prohibitions.

[Almazov] Well, as we and you intend to build and live in a law-governed state, I think that there can be no levels here. Everyone has to be equal before the law. The second area that we are going to organize is the fight against organized crime in the field of the economy. The work here will extend to the state sector, to small and joint enterprises, and cooperatives. Traditionally, an area of our work is the fight against smuggling. In the near future we shall nevertheless come up against a considerable rise in drug trafficking, the so-called drugs business. These are the main areas that we will be focusing our attention.

Trade Ministry on Food Import Requirements

LD1010025591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
 in Russian 0100 GMT 8 Oct 91

[Text] Experts at the Russian Trade Ministry believe that in 1992 the republic will have to significantly increase food imports. According to their estimates, about 2 million tonnes of meat and meat products will have to be bought, plus 300,000 tonnes of butter, 3.8 million tonnes of raw sugar, 519,600 tonnes of flour, and 1.5 million tonnes of groats. This approximately corresponds to the amounts bought in 1990 by the USSR as a whole. The republic's possible meat imports are more than one-third up on the entire Soviet Union's purchases of it during 1990. According to Trade Ministry figures, during the first nine months of 1991 provision of the public in Russia with meat, compared to last year, fell by 20 percent, with milk and dairy products by 15 percent, fish products by 20 percent, vegetable oil by 27 percent, sugar also by 27 percent, and tea by 34 percent. Most oblasts in Russia are currently operating voucher systems [talony] for food sales; for meat products in 53 oblasts; for animal fats, groats, pasta, and vodka in over 60 oblasts; for tea in 24 oblasts; vegetable oils in 47; flour in 18 oblasts. That was a report from INTERFAX on how Trade Ministry experts assess Russia's needs for food imports and supplies for its people.

Declining Food Production Threatens 'Famine'

PM1010083391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
 8 Oct 91 Single Edition p 2

[Report by I. Totskiy: "Russian Food Market. They Do Not Promise Famine. But the Shelves Are Empty!"]

[Text] Our housewives probably dream about empty shelves in the stores. Going to or from work, they are beset by a single thought: What are they to buy to feed their family and where? People standing in long lines in food stores ask one another in perplexity: "Did they not promise to put something out?"

However, there is nothing to "put out," judging by an Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] State Committee for Statistics report. Because the stores are now altogether empty even in comparison with last year, when they were not noted for their abundance of produce.

Statistics confirm that food production in Russia has fallen again. In the first eight months 113 billion rubles [R] less food was produced than in the same period last year. Thus, production of meat, butter, cheese, and canned products dropped 13-15 percent and production of whole-milk and sausage products by 9 percent.

What are the stores to do when in that same eight-month period deliveries of meat, sausage products, canned meats, butter, cheese, and canned dairy products dropped by 25, 11, 22, 17, 26, and 20 percent, respectively. It turns out that every city resident can now only procure 800 grams of meat and 300 grams of butter per month.

People are trying to replace these foods with potatoes and vegetables. But the stores are no source of delight on that score either. What is more, at the very height of the vegetable season the population was not always able to buy vegetables, potatoes, and fruit in 37, 51, and 56 of Russia's republic, kray, and oblast centers, respectively. Why? One of the main reasons is the sharp fall in procurements of these products. RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture and Food procurement organizations alone reduced potato and vegetable procurements by a third and 25 percent respectively compared with last year's level.

The availability of fish to republic population has not improved but has, on the contrary, deteriorated. Market allocations of fish and canned fish products from state resources were cut by 262,000 tonnes and almost 183 million standard cans, respectively. However, fishery enterprises in Russia dispatch roughly 25,000 tonnes of fish every year to feed livestock.

Vegetable oil, margarine, and mayonnaise are in extremely short supply. Reports of holdups in the trade in bread and bakery products sound quite strange. In August, for instance, lines formed for these products in Perm, Novgorod, Ivanovo, Yaroslavl, Orenburg, and Irkutsk.

At one time the ironic Kozma Prutkov remarked that if you see the inscription "elephant" on a tiger's cage, do not believe your eyes. Something of the sort has happened to our confectionery stores. They remain that in name only, although there has long been no candy,

chocolate, fruit drops, or pastilles there. Add to that the sugar shortage and you will realize why we are forced to drink tea unsweetened.

Russia's food market has suffered not only because the republic has reduced agricultural production and procurements, but also because some sovereign republics have failed to carry out their intergovernment contracts and agreements. The Ukraine is in Russia's debt after failing to provide full supplies of sugar and salt for the first half-year. Belarus owes confectionery goods and vegetable oil; Kazakhstan owes dairy products and confectionery goods; and Georgia owes tea, margarine, vegetable oil, and confectionery.

Customers are alarmed: Will the population's food supply improve by the end of the year? No one dares answer in the affirmative. For God's sake let's avoid famine! People are pinning their hopes of this on the promises made by the kind transatlantic uncle. Only everyone knows that promises do not fill you up.

Local Affairs

Chechen-Ingush Situation 'Deteriorates Again'

Total Mobilization Declared

OW0910210091 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2000 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In his address on the republic's television Wednesday [9 October] night the executive chairman of the Chechen National Congress Dzhafar Dudayev described the statement by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet "On the Situation in Checheno-Ingushetia" as "a virtual war declaration on our republic." "Proceeding from that evaluation," he went on, "the presidium of the executive committee of the Chechen National Congress has declared a general mobilization in the republic of men from 15 to 55."

Dzhafar Dudayev has also announced setting up a defence committee for "armed resistance to any infringement by Russia's authorities." The ruling prescribes the units of the Soviet Army and Interior Troops, also the fire brigade "to refrain any movement from their usual deployment."

INTERFAX reports from Grozny that Dzhafar Dudayev opened a dialogue Wednesday night with the spokesman of the USSR Air Force Commander Major-General Petrenko. Dudayev has been called to Moscow, to the Air Force staff, concerning the continuation of his military service (Dudayev, aged 45, is a retired general, discharged early this year for unknown reasons).

Railway Building Seized

*OW0910194791 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1730 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Armed units of the Chechen National Congress have seized today, Wednesday afternoon, the administrative building of the Grozny railway.

INTERFAX reports that a meeting of the new line-up of provisional assembly of the Chechen-Ingush republic appointed for 16:00 has been speedily transferred to the district centre Shali from Grozny for safety.

Witnesses say that armed people are walking the streets in Grozny, and that a crowd has gathered by the Interior Ministry guarded by soldiers armed with sub-machine guns.

Media**Radio Rossii Official on Programming Changes**

LD1010013891

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 0005 GMT on 6 Oct 91 broadcasts an eight-minute studio program with Vladimir Churikov, deputy director of Radio Rossii news.

Churikov says that there are two directorates which prepare Radio Rossii programs. The Radio Rossii news program directorate would like to have its say on a certain piece of news. Churikov says that KOMSOMOL-SKAYA PRAVDA reported on 5 October that the Yunost radio station had not been on the air for nearly two weeks, citing Yunost Editor in Chief Yevgeniy Pavlov. Yet on the morning of 5 October, the All-Union Radio Second Program carried, as usual, a youth channel program prepared by the Yunost radio station. "I would like to take this opportunity to inform Radio Rossii listeners that not only do we check news items—especially if they are unexpected and contentious and thorny—against two or even three sources sometimes, but we without fail address the opposing side if the situation is a disputed one. We have a great deal of respect for our listeners, and I believe our listeners appreciate us for the accuracy and objectivity of our information, among other things. But let's go back to the Yunost radio station. Its editor in chief asserts that on 22 September the All-Russian Television and Radio Company switched the transmitters of the Second Radio Program on whose waves Yunost is carried. I shall reply straightaway: No switching whatsoever took place on 22 September. That I can reiterate from accurate sources. A number of transmitters were switched on 18 and 19 September; this did not affect the Second All-Union Radio program. On the contrary, some of the transmitters where Radio Rossii formerly operated were handed over for relaying the Second All-Union program. And we had an avalanche of telephone calls and letters from

listeners: It turned out that following the switching the overwhelming majority of the 25 million Russians outside Russia lost the opportunity to listen to Radio Rossii programs altogether. There is, I think, no need for any special explanation to the effect that the absence of information for Russians in other republics from their historic motherland and from the Russian channel in particular would very rapidly give rise to rumors and would serve to exacerbate interethnic conflicts which, as we already know, sometimes end in bloodshed. On 2 October the switching was reversed, at the initiative of the All-Russia Television and Radio Company. Worried listeners immediately stopped phoning us from outside Russia."

He continues: "Yevgeniy Pavlov, editor in chief of the Yunost radio station, threatens that the staff of his editorial office will go on a hunger strike unless Yunost programs are broadcast on all the previous waves. Incidentally, when Yevgeniy Pavlov's colleagues from Radio Rossii Radio were humiliated, when the All-Union Company would not give a single spare minute for Russia's radio programs, it did not occur to Yevgeniy Pavlov to go on a hunger strike so that justice might triumph and so that Russians might have the opportunity to listen to Radio Rossii."

"As for the Second All-Union Radio program, it now goes out on part of Russia's medium wave and UKW transmitters; it can be received both in Russia and outside it on short wave. In conjunction with other sovereign republics, options are being worked out for engaging new medium, long, and UKW transmitters to relay this program. On 8 October the Second Program is to be switched on in Belorussia; during this next week, the Second Program will return to other regions, too, though perhaps not in full."

In accordance with the Russian president's decree of 24 August, communications installations under all-Union jurisdiction located on Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic territory have been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Recalling that under Leonid Kravchenko, Radio Rossii had only five hours of airtime, Churikov points out that Russia still has only one radio channel, having agreed that the First and Second All-Union programs and Mayak and Orpheus should be carried on other channels. As for Yunost, Churikov adds that the heads of the All-Union Television and Radio Company could transfer Yunost to the First Channel, which is broadcast all over the country: "They could, if they valued young listeners. However, that is just my own personal opinion, because only All-Union Radio can decide what should be carried on the all-Union radio waves."

International Affairs**Official Discusses Border, Territorial Problems**

*LD1010024391 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 7 Oct 91*

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Territorial problems in Russia are becoming very urgent. The Baltic states are raising the issue of restoring the borders of the 1930's and 1940's. At the same time discussion of the problem of the northern territories, the areas adjacent to Japan, continue. Following Khasbulatov's recent trip to Tokyo, the sides have reached the conclusion that this matter should be dealt with as quickly as possible, no longer with the Union government but with that of Russia. What stance has been adopted by the Russian Supreme Soviet?

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] There has been concern recently at the fact that we are preparing to give away various territories belonging to Russia. This affects the northern territories, the Baltic republics.

[V. Lukin, chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet] We do, naturally, have a great desire to strengthen and improve relations with our great neighbor, Japan, and a great desire to conclude a peace treaty, but one that is, naturally, not based upon the sale of the islands. The question of altering the borders has arisen recently in a number of republics, Estonia, for example and, naturally, not in our favor. However, I believe it is wrong to raise old and contentious issues immediately after gaining, obtaining that is to say, sovereignty with Russian assistance. There is a law in Russia. That law was adopted in the form of a resolution by the First Congress of Russian People's Deputies. Under that law, all changes to the borders of Russia, whether by our republics which were formerly or still remain in the Union or by foreign states, can only be made after a Russian referendum by the whole population. Nothing, not one piece of land, will be handed over to anyone behind the back of the Russian people or without their agreement. Concern over this is completely unfounded.

[Correspondent] As far as I am aware, there are ethnic groups who live on the territory of other republics, including the Baltics.

[Lukin] Our attitude toward the Baltics is one of great respect but we will not permit the rights of our citizens to be infringed and we will be able to stand up for ourselves by legal means. [end recording]

Rally Protests Mainland Attitudes to Kurils

PM0910135591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
8 Oct 91 Single Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent N. Bratchikov under the "Situation" rubric: "Sakhalin Has No Spare Land"]

[Text] Vladivostok-Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk—A rally is being held on Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk's Victory Square in defense of the southern Kurils. An admirer of the Land of the Rising Sun daubed the following inscription in oil paint one night on the wall of a ruined building in the old

quarter of Vladivostok, popularly nicknamed "Milionka": "Kurils for Japan!"

During a recent visit to the islands G. Kunadze, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] deputy foreign minister, quite openly gathered people together on Shikotan in the fishermen's House of Culture and announced for all to hear: "The question of the Lesser Kurils is virtually settled."

"What happened then," I was told over the telephone by N. Pokidin, chairman of the Yuzhnokurilskiy Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee], "was that the people of the Kurils almost clobbered Kunadze."

There has just been a rally in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. A serviceman, who came home on leave from Nizhny Novgorod, took the floor.

"On my return, I will certainly speak on local television and tell millions of residents what is happening on Sakhalin. Let them condemn the commission in Moscow and those Russian deputies who are lusting to sell our islands to the Japanese."

He handed over to an old resident of the Kurils, Nina Vasilyevna Kaplina, who has lived on the island for 25 years:

"People often write in the newspapers: The Kurils are filthy and lacking in amenities, why mourn them. We are not to blame, but the problem is one facing all Russia. The resources to do the job will be found and we will clean things up. I only ask you all: Stand firm and don't hand over the islands under any circumstances in return for the promise of a better life somewhere on the mainland."

Nikolay Andreyevich Pokidin commented on events. A whole delegation of Kuril inhabitants—L. Sedykh, director of the "Ostrovnoy" fishing combine, and farmer V. Rymba—went to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. They expounded the economic aspects of the impending losses. The southern Kurils do, after all, not only constitute bare rocks, but 1.1 million tonnes of lost fish produce per year, equivalent to losses of 35 million rubles. An irreparable loss for people who have lived on the islands their whole lives. Some 13,500 people were born in Yuzhnokurilsk alone. The Japanese say that their relatives' graves are there on the islands. But who will mourn over the thousands and thousands of Russian graves and why should refugees leave their homes and wander this land at their rulers' whim?...

The rally in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk ended late that evening.

In the adopted resolution the residents of our furthest-flung islands gave the Russian president, who visited Kunashir a year ago, a reminder: "We urge Boris Yeltsin to be consistent on the Kuril question. We remember his promise to us: Territories will belong not to governments, but to the people who live there."

Belorussia**Resolution To Create Armed Forces Adopted**

PM0910153391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2

[Mikhail Shimanskiy report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "More Armed Forces"]

[Text] Minsk—The Belarus Supreme Soviet has adopted a resolution creating the republic's armed forces.

It is deemed necessary, the document states, to begin the creation of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus. The republic government and the Supreme Soviet Commission for Questions of National Security, Defense, and the Fight Against Crime, together with the command of the Belorussian Military District and other interested ministries and departments, are instructed to submit proposals on the structure and the principles for building such armed forces to the Belarus Supreme Soviet before 1 November this year.

Convertible Currency Introduction Delayed

OW0910192691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1730 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Deputy-chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers Mikhail Myasnikov has announced that by the end of the year the total on the current accounts in the republic's savings banks will exceed 200 bn roubles.

Myasnikov explained that the Centre and the republic aim at introducing internal convertibility of the rouble for the second half of 1992, but now Belarus is unable to introduce its own currency.

Ukraine**Kravchuk, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Meet**

LD1010044491 Kiev Radio Kiev in English 0100 GMT
8 Oct 91

[Text] Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, stated that there will be no food crisis in the republic. He said this during his meeting today with the U.S. secretary of agriculture, Edward Madigan, who has arrived in this country upon the order of the U.S. President in connection with the Soviet request for \$10 billion worth of food assistance on the part of the United States. In part, Edward Madigan said the following:

[Begin Madigan recording] President Bush enjoyed his meeting with you in Washington and he has asked me to follow up to see how we might be able to cooperate with you in agriculture. As you know, the President wants the United States to expand our economic relationship with Ukraine, and we are pleased that you enjoyed your visit to the United States. We hope that... and our visit here

encourage you to believe that we feel it is very important to help Ukraine and the other republics in the area of agriculture both during this winter and in terms of future modernization.

Both the President and the United States Congress are very concerned about the food situation throughout the Soviet Union this winter, and our first priority is to learn what we can about the food situation that will exist throughout the Union this winter. Our other priority is to learn what we might be able to do to be of assistance in terms of helping with future production and distribution problems. We feel that we can be most helpful by working with the Union and the individual republics, both. We feel that in that way we can assure that the assistance is best directed to the areas that need it. We want our assistance to be both effective and fair. We believe in order for it to be fair we must have the views of all of the republics, and to be effective we believe that during the winter our efforts must be coordinated through the inter-republic coordinating committee.

While the United States and our allies are committed to help avoid hardships this winter, we believe it is critical for all of the republics to be equally committed and for all of the republics to maintain open trade with each other throughout the winter. [end recording]

The U.S. secretary of agriculture, Edward Madigan, during his meeting with Leonid Kravchuk, the U.S. secretary of agriculture asked the latter to describe the situation with food products in Ukraine. Leonid Kravchuk said: This year we harvested 10 million tonnes of grain less than we had planned, but our main problem is fodder crops. That is why I can state that there will be no food crisis in Ukraine, stressed Leonid Kravchuk. He also expressed certainty that the republic will have enough of those basic food products which are produced in Ukraine. He also repeated the idea he had expressed during his meeting with President Bush that Ukraine does not ask for food assistance. Most important are other problems, the major one being assistance in raising food production and food processing. As a result we would be able to deliver more food products to other republics. So the United States would not need to render food assistance to Russia, for example. Instead, Russia would get food products from Ukraine in exchange for, say, gas, oil and so on. At present 30 percent of the agricultural produce in the Ukraine was lost. Leonid Kravchuk named three basic problems, the solution of which would make it possible to rapidly improve the state of affairs in Ukraine's agriculture. They are production of agricultural machinery, reconstruction of the processing technology, production of technological lines for processing agricultural produce, and, on a much higher qualitative level, for production of ecologically pure means of plant protection.

We do not intend to isolate Ukraine from the economy of other republics, said Leonid Kravchuk. We believe that the previous help, for instance on the part of the United States, was not efficient because the food is being eaten up and the debt is growing every year by 10 billion-15 billion rubles, and every year all this begins all

over again. Ukraine has the best black earth areas in Europe and can produce enough food and other agricultural produce to satisfy other republics as well. That is why Ukraine comes out for concentrating credits and potentials in order to reconstruct the entire agrarian complex, to give a big impetus to the increase of production for those republics which need that produce.

Leonid Kravchuk said that Moscow intends to purchase 20 million tonnes of grain and other food products to the tune of \$10 billion. If all that will again be delivered to the center, Ukraine will not know what its portion will be and will again become a debtor. We want Ukraine to know a concrete portion of the credit is allocated for modernization of the agrarian complex, that's our principled stand, said Leonid Kravchuk. He said Ukraine has huge reserves for construction of the agrarian complex and creates favorable conditions for joint agrarian ventures and foreign investors. We do not need purely food assistance because traditionally we produce and trade food products. We need assistance in modernizing the agricultural sector, which would open wide perspectives.

Cabinet Discusses Creation of National Army

*LD1010055691 Kiev Radio Kiev International Service
in Ukrainian 2300 GMT 7 Oct 91*

[Text] The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers met today. It reviewed a number of issues connected with the construction of the independent Ukrainian state. Among other matters, it adopted a decision on the division of Ukrainian state property into two categories: republican and municipal.

It also approved a package of draft bills regarding the creation of a National Guard and Ukrainian armed forces. It is planned to create the latter in the next two to three years. They will be subordinate to the republic's president, drawing strength entirely from the defense doctrine.

Military construction in the Ukraine foresees the turning later of its territory into a nuclear-free zone and the republic itself into a conductor of active neutrality. The strength of the Ukrainian national army will not exceed 450,000, that is, its personnel will equal the norms maintained by leading states of Western Europe that are members of NATO.

Supreme Soviet Assesses Economic Issues

*LD1010034591 Kiev Radio Kiev in English
0100 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Excerpts] The fourth session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet continued its work in Kiev today [8 October]. The plenary meeting started with heated discussions of the agenda. [passage omitted]

Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin briefly addressed the problems facing the Cabinet of Ministers: At present we are working very hard on the new program, the more so that a real struggle is being waged for

concluding economic treaties primarily with such republics as Russia, Kazakhstan, Belorussia. Without this we will not have a needed balance and will not be able to form a budget so as to organize a social protection of the population. That is why I call on you to be very attentive to this issue, Fokin stated.

After a lengthy discussion the following issues were included in the agenda: information of the Cabinet of Ministers on the program of social protection of the population, on the use of nuclear energy, an appeal to Ukraine's people, changes in the criminal code, issues on the declaration of human rights, formation of the constitutional court, nationalization of the Ukraine's Communist Party property, creation of the Ukraine's foreign economic bank, a report of the commission on the actions of the officials regarding the coup d'etat.

A bill was considered in the first reading on the taxes from the owners of cars and other vehicles. According to the draft law 350 million rubles will come to the national budget from the taxes. World War II veterans, participants of the elimination of the Chernobyl tragedy consequences, and some other categories of people will be freed from taxation.

In the course of the discussion some people's deputies suggested to privatize the roads. A heated debate took place about the resolution of the parliament on the position of the press, television and radio of Ukraine during the coup d'etat and the measures proceeding from this. As a result, this document was not adopted by the deputies by the third time.

The People's Council held a meeting in between the sittings. The Council proposed for discussion a draft resolution on relationships between Ukraine and the USSR in solving the problems of common interest. To preserve economic ties between Ukraine and the new formation of the USSR it was proposed to form a delegation of the Supreme Soviet for solving economic, military, ecological and other issues which are of common interest.

The draft resolution caused a discussion among representatives of various factions of the People's Council. People's deputy Stepan Khmara in part said the following: It is a great danger to have an economic union at the time when we haven't yet become the state. If we want to become the state we have to separate our economy from the union's one: forget the word union either in economic, political, or legal sense of the word. We should not revive the centralized structures, said Stepan Khmara.

Today, the deputies of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet also discussed a bill on citizenship in Ukraine and again there were sharp debates, especially about dual citizenship. Finally the constitutional majority adopted the following proposal: on the basis of bilateral inter-state treaties a double citizenship will be admitted in Ukraine. [passage omitted]

That was a report about the work of the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine which resumed its work in Kiev today.

Citizenship Law Adopted, Reviewed

PM1010092391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 91 p 1

[By correspondent O. Musafirova: "New Citizenship, Old Passports"]

[Text] The Ukraine did not celebrate USSR Constitution Day 7 October. On the other hand the following day, when the parliament session resumed work after an intermission, was if not festive then at any rate notable. The keynote speaker, Deputy Vladimir Smetanin, leaving the rostrum to applause, said: "I am happy to have mounted the rostrum as a USSR citizen but to come back a citizen of the Ukraine!"

And so less than two months before the referendum on independence and the election of the president, the republic's inhabitants have acquired their own unified citizenship. The amendments with proposals for preserving citizenship of a Union of sovereign states, if it is suddenly formed, were resolutely rejected. And dual citizenship, including that retaining citizenship of former republics of the former Union, is possible only with the presence of the relevant international treaties. So far the Ukraine does not have agreements of this kind.

The law does not stipulate a duration of residence qualification. People who at the moment the law went into force were living in the Ukraine have been declared citizens of the Ukraine, irrespective of social and property status, nationality, language, political views, and so forth, as long as they do not object to acquiring Ukrainian citizenship and, of course, are not citizens of other states.

A notable detail: The entry "Ukrainian" on his birth certificate or passport does not give its possessor any special advantages or privileges. On the other hand, you can become a citizen of the Ukraine even if you are an elderly negro... You only have to prove that at least your grandfather or grandmother had the honor of being born on that territory. It is categorically forbidden to grant citizenship to those who have committed crimes against humanity or have been convicted of serious crimes.

But it is still too early to hand in the "hammer and sickle" passports in the Ukraine. The elaboration of the new-style documents by the republic's Supreme Soviet and most of all their series production is an expensive and long business. Perhaps one page of the passport (it is not known which one) will be decorated with a special stamp or perhaps we will do without formalities all together.

Communists Plan Presidential Election Strategy

LD1010033191 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 8 Oct 91

[Text] An underground plenum of the Zaporozhye Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party

has been held in a forest on the border of Zaporozhye and Donetsk Oblasts. This is reported by the newspaper ZAPOROZHSKAYA PRAVDA. At the plenum the former party apparatchiks discussed strategy and tactics. Particular criticism was directed at Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Kravchuk. Those taking part in the session adopted a decision to work on not allowing him to be elected president of the republic. It was suggested that the former communists support the well-known writer Boris Oleynik in the presidential elections. Following publication of this, the editorial office received several phone calls in which the fact that the meeting had been held in a Kuybyshev forest was not denied, although it apparently discussed something else.

Chornovil Receives Presidential Support

LD1010043491 Kiev Radio Kiev Network in Ukrainian
2000 GMT 7 Oct 91

[By Correspondent Dmytro Ponomarchuk]

[Excerpts] Vyacheslav Chornovil, a presidential candidate, has enthralled a huge audience in Zhitomir. He was kept by them in the hall for over one and half hours. [passage omitted]

Vyacheslav Chornovil is supported in Zhitomir by top officials. Suffice it to say that Ukrainian people's deputies from Zhitomir Oblast, such as Yakiv Zayko, Oleksander Suhanyako, Vitaliy Melnychuk, who is chairman of the Zhitomir city soviet, and popular journalist Alla Yaroshynska, deputy of the former USSR, have joined the All-Ukrainian committee in support of Chornovil in his campaign to become president.

According to Vitaliy Melnychuk, Vyacheslav Chornovil is well known in Zhitomir. [passage omitted] He believes that the majority of Zhitomir residents will vote for Ukrainian independence in the referendum and for Vyacheslav Chornovil for the post of president.

Moldova**Snegur Seen as Presidential Front-Runner**

OW0910170691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1500 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The nomination of candidates for Moldova's presidency began on Wednesday. The Central Electoral Commission began its work, and a special commission of doctors was set up to check the health of the future candidates.

Local observers say the current president Mircea Snegur has the best victory chances regardless of the possible disposition of political forces.

Georgia

Gamsakhurdia Links Resignation, State Existence

LD0910201791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] The Georgian Supreme Council today adopted a resolution in which the events of September and October in Tbilisi are assessed as a coup attempt. Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia said the putsch was headed by Tengiz Sigua, the ex-prime minister of the republic, and Tengiz Kitovani, commander of the guards of the rebellious guards, who were preparing the coup back in the spring and took action in August. Gamsakhurdia stressed that he is not afraid of losing the premier's chair, but if he resigns Georgia, as such, will cease to exist.

Events Termed 'Attempted Coup'

OW0910192891 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1730 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The session of the Georgian parliament has passed a resolution today, Oct 9, qualifying the events in Tbilisi in September-October as "an attempted coup-d'etat".

Georgia's President Zviad Gamsakhurdia named as the leaders of the putsch the former Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua and the commander of the rebel guards Tengiz Kitovani "who were preparing the coup even last spring, but started acting in August".

Z. Gamsakhurdia stressed he was not clutching at the presidency, but warned that with his resignation "the country would sink into chaos, and Georgia as such would cease to exist".

The parliament suspended the powers of deputies from the Communist Party. The opposition parliamentary parties—the Democratic Centre, and Charter-91, did not take part in the voting.

Supreme Council Vote

AU0910113891 Paris AFP in English 1122 GMT
9 Oct 91

[Excerpt] Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia, Oct 9 (AFP)—The Georgian parliament approved a resolution Wednesday describing opposition efforts to unseat President Zviad Gamsakhurdia as a "putsch," deputies said.

The resolution was approved by 179 of the parliament's 256 deputies but it was unclear how many had voted against or abstained.

The vote came in the early hours of Wednesday after the parliament decided to expel 60 Communist Party deputies from the legislature on the grounds that the party was "illegal" in Georgia.

A vote in September on the fate of the 60 had ended in a tie, with opposition deputies voting to reinstate the communists and pro-Gamsakhurdia elements calling for their ouster.

The parliament, which was due to continue its emergency debate on the political crisis in Georgia later Wednesday, did not call for the arrest of opposition leaders as some deputies had earlier predicted. [passage omitted]

Gugushvili Renews Accusations Against Moscow

AU0910164991 Paris AFP in English 1619 GMT
9 Oct 91

[By Christopher Boian]

[Text] Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia, Oct 9 (AFP)—Georgian Prime Minister Vissarion Gugushvili on Wednesday accused the Soviet leadership of responsibility for the republic's political crisis and said the KGB was undermining government efforts to reconcile with the Georgian opposition.

"This is not just a question of two sides against each other," Gugushvili said. "There are external forces who do not want a reconciliation to take place—this force is well-known to the West," he added, referring to the KGB secret police. "The West has forgotten that the bear is still alive" in Georgia, he said, alluding to the symbol of the Soviet Union.

Gugushvili, speaking to a small group of reporters in the heavily-guarded cabinet office building, declined however to give any concrete evidence of KGB involvement in the Georgian crisis, saying to do so would compromise his sources of intelligence on Moscow's activities in Georgia.

"What evidence do you have that the KGB operates in your country?" he said in response to a question on whether he had proof to support his allegations against Moscow. Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and other officials here levelled similar charges against Moscow in September.

The Soviet Government has denied the accusations and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev dismissed them last month as "not serious."

Gugushvili, speaking as the parliament prepared to conclude an emergency debate on the crisis in the republic, called for talks with opposition leaders and said he believed that some issues of contention—notably opposition demands for access to the television—"can be settled quickly."

He side-stepped a question on whether the government planned to arrest any more opposition leaders, noting only that the parliament decided Tuesday that opposition protesters who renounced their actions would not be "persecuted." "Any person who hasn't broken the law is beyond suspicion," Gugushvili stated, adding that the

government might also "forgive" some opposition protesters who had. "As our country is young and government structures are weak ... the balance of freedom and responsibility is not settled in the minds of the people," he said.

Meanwhile a planned opposition march to the prison on the outskirts of Tbilisi where two opposition leaders were being held was called off due to a funeral ceremony held for a man killed in political violence on September 5, local journalists said.

Opposition protesters however were gathering later in the evening at the university building, the site of nightly rallies against Gamsakhurdia to await word on the outcome of the parliamentary debate. Opposition protesters told AFP they now planned to stage the march to the prison on Thursday.

Barricades blocking access to the parliament along the city's main avenue were lifted Wednesday and traffic was moving normally. However the atmosphere inside and outside the parliament remained tense with scores of armed soldiers and civilians patrolling the area and surveying movements around the building.

IZVESTIYA on Clashes, Prison Revolt

*PM0910132591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Oct 91 Union Edition p 1*

[B. Urigashvili report: "Tbilisi: Victims of the Tragic Night"]

[Text] During the night of 5 October there were clashes between supporters and opponents of President Gamsakhurdia outside the parliament building in Tbilisi. As a result of the clashes one person died and several dozen were injured. Many of the injured have gunshot wounds.

According to the official version, the initiators of the clashes were opposition representatives who tried to seize parliament and used firearms.

However, as numerous witnesses testify, including foreign journalists, shots were fired mainly from the direction of parliament. Witnesses do not deny the possibility that there was some answering fire from the opposition.

The clashes continued all night and shooting could be heard even in the morning. According to numerous testimonies from inhabitants of Rustaveli Avenue, the presidential guard searched apartment blocks in the morning, looking for opposition supporters, rounded up people who had gathered in groups in the streets adjoining the avenue, and detained many people on the spot.

Tension decreased only toward noon. On the same day Georgian President Gamsakhurdia and Supreme Soviet Chairman Asatiani gave an address on television. Gamsakhurdia called on everyone to engage in reconciliation and stated that the decisions adopted by the extraordinary session, which has now started its work, will be

acceptable to many of his opponents, including the diehards. In his address Asatiani explained that the beginning of the session was brought forward from 8 October to 5 October as a result of the tragic events of the night.

The sitting of the session continued late into the night. It was held in camera. According to reports from certain opposition deputies, certain paths toward dialogue were outlined, but no concrete decisions were adopted.

On the morning of 5 October there was a revolt among the prisoners in Tbilisi's Detention Center No. 1. This event, according to many journalists, was closely linked with the severe political crisis. The prisoners seized one of the prison buildings, opened all the cells, including the condemned men's cells, climbed onto the roof, and were able to get out onto the territory of the prison. National-Democratic Party leader Chanturia and National Congress member cameraman Khaindrava, who were arrested in September and are well known to everyone, were also in the detention center. In collaboration with several prisoners, they managed to assess the situation and take control. After virtually preventing a mass escape of prisoners, Chanturia and Khaindrava demanded that the detention center administration immediately call a press conference for Georgian and foreign journalists. At the news conference Chanturia stated that the revolt was incited to deal with him and Khaindrava, and also 37 members of the "Mkhedrioni" organization, which is sharply opposed to the government, who were also in this detention center.

"If a mass escape had begun, we would all have been shot," Chanturia stated.

Representatives of the administration in turn maintained that the riot was instigated by the prisoners in cell 105, former militia workers who tried to take advantage of the resultant situation to escape.

Representatives of the detention center administration stated that they have no complaints against Chanturia and Khaindrava and gave a high assessment of their contribution to stabilizing the situation in the detention center.

Demonstrators Use Supreme Council Session

*LD1010011791 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 9 Oct 91*

[Correspondent B. Baryshnikov video report from Tbilisi; from the "TV Inform" newscast]

[Excerpts] On the streets of the Georgian capital, which is still divided into two camps, one zealously backing President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the other striving by force to get him to resign, emotions are once again ready to overflow. Some formations are taking advantage of the Supreme Council session being at work to demonstrate their political demands, for instance, these few hundred people here representing the as yet unregistered

National Democratic Party of Georgia and, although they had weighty reasons to get through to Government House, Rustaveli Avenue nevertheless remained closed. [video shows demonstrators behind barrier] [passage omitted]

Meanwhile the session has continued its work and adopted a number of fairly substantive decisions, one of which was a sensation. It concerns the fate of deputies from the Communist Party of Georgia. There are 60 of them with deputies' mandates and they have now been suspended ahead of term. After all, the party has been outlawed in the republic.

As for the demands for the president's resignation, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who gave an assessment at the session of the political situation, stated that although the presidency is a heavy burden he is against changing the state system, because if he were to depart Georgia would be threatened with unprecedented anarchy and armed confrontation—in effect civil war. [video shows street scenes]

Artillery Fire Continues in South Ossetia

LD0910205891 Moscow TASS in English 1849 GMT
9 Oct 91

[By correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz October 9—Artillery cannonade goes on in the suburbs of Tskhinvali. Southern and northern populated areas of the city have been under fire of large-caliber machine-guns, grenade-launchers and rocket shells and air defence guns.

One person was killed, seven wounded in the shelling.

The city was shelled from the outskirts of the settlements of Nikozi and Mevrikisi of the Gory Region and the settlement of Eredvi of the Tskhinvali Region, the press centre of the Southern Ossetian Information Committee reports.

All these settlements are not included in the emergency zone.

Militants continue punitive actions against the Ossetian population in remote Ossetian settlements of the Tskhinvali and Znaurskiy Regions. They cease hostages and take away private cars, cattle and agricultural products. Seventeen Ossetians have been driven away in an unknown direction over the past three days.

Groups of refugees are coming to the capital of Northern Ossetia and other populated areas of the republic, from the Southern Ossetia and Georgia. According to unofficial information, their number has reached 85,000.

Call For 'Military Approach'

LD0910232491 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 9 Oct 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The deputy chairman of the North Ossetian parliament says that territorial changes can only be examined in accordance with the constitutions of the country, Russia, and North Ossetia. Anxiety was caused by the decision of the congress of the Ingush people to strive for the return of the territory inhabited by the Ingush before 1944. Meanwhile, it is reported from Tskhinvali that, via the media, the Georgian Government is openly calling for a military approach in South Ossetia. The Russian Information Agency is in possession of information which states that last night there was shelling from the Georgian village of Tamarasheni.

Armenia

Coming Presidential Election Race Analyzed

LD0910185291 Moscow TASS in English 1426 GMT
9 Oct 91

[By correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan October 9 TASS—The first presidential elections campaign is about to end in Armenia. The elections will be held on October 16. There are six contenders. They are now outlining their programmes on Armenian TV.

46-year-old chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Levon Ter-Petrosyan is believed to have the best chances to win the elections. A philologist by profession, he advocates Armenia's full-fledged participation in all structures of state power and administration in the USSR, explaining his stand by the belief that "no disintegration of the country is permissible, since millions of people will be hit by the debris if this happens". According to Ter-Petrosyan, the disintegration processes now under way in the country must be directed towards the creation of a community of independent states, in which Armenia must take its place as a subject of international law and member of the United Nations.

Ter-Petrosyan takes practically no personal part in the elections campaign. He plans to devote his one and only TV statement to the preparation of the Republic for winter in light of the growing shortage of fuel and food.

The referendum of September 21 has shown that Armenia wants to secede from the USSR. October 16, when the elections of the first Armenian president will be held, was declared a non-working day in the Republic.

Fears of Bread Shortage Discounted

NC0810085391 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network
in Armenian 1600 GMT 7 Oct 91

[Interview with Armenian Grain Products Minister Rafayel Shakhbazyan by Julietta Apovyan; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Mr. Shakhbazyan, lately the situation surrounding (?the availability) of bread has somewhat stabilized. In your view, can people be confident about the future?

[Shakhbazyan] I would say that the citizens have no reason to feel concerned. There should be no concern at all. The reason for panic is that during power cuts the bakeries are unable to bake bread on time, the scarcity of bread in the shops causes panic, and people buy more than they should.

I want to again assure our people, my compatriots: Do not panic. Buy only as much as you need. [Words indistinct] we have enough provisions. Eighteen days a month I tour the various republics of our Union; we visit Moscow. We obtain provisions through a centralized arrangement. We are getting them for example from Sochi, Batumi, and (?Navrashinskiy), where the ships anchor and deliver to us. The ministry is doing everything possible not to lose even one gram of the provisions. It is doing everything to bring in the amount it receives each month and provide our people with bread and [word indistinct]. There is no cause for panic.

Our republic receives 1.1 million tons from the Union annually and we supply 60,000 tons. Of this our republic has so far provided 45,000 tons. I think the people of our republic must give more than 60,000, since our annual (?output) is around 250,000-300,000 tons [words indistinct].

[Apovyan] You have in mind the privatized lands on which grain is cultivated?

[Shakhbazyan] Yes, both the privatized lands and those on which collective and state farms have remained. People should feel obligated to sell the produce, particularly given the fact that two or three times more is paid for the grain and machines will be given in return. Therefore, our farmers should hand in their produce so we can make use of that grain.

[Apovyan] Armenia is also receiving bread from abroad. Have agreements been signed?

[Shakhbazyan] Despite the fact that all our republics, such as Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and others have become independent states, the bread and grain issue is such that during my speech at a Moscow meeting I said that as far as the small republics are concerned the grain provisions should be made in a centralized manner for 1991 and 1992 until each republic can sign its own agreement. We could even adopt the practice with European countries. There is an association that buys centrally [words indistinct]. This will not adversely affect

our independence [words indistinct]. The association would act centrally for all. Or, we do not have to act through it and could instead establish direct ties. We have proposals from Finland, Canada, and other sources. The only problem here is foreign currency. We have to have foreign currency.

[Apovyan] What would you say about other grain products, meaning groat products?

[Shakhbazyan] Regarding groat products, our ministry worked well this year and we can provide 1 kilogram of groat products per person from October to April. Half of that will be rice and half groat. Therefore, people should remain confident. Everyone will receive up to 1 kilogram through April.

Defense Officials Assess NKAO Issue

NC0910184491 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network
in Armenian 1600 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Interview with Samvel Khachatryan, assistant to the Defense Committee chairman; and Manvel Mahtesyan, the Defense Committee's deputy chief of the general staff of the border guards, by Gevorg Nazaryan at the Defense Committee of the republic's Council of Ministers; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Nazaryan] In preparing the newscasts each day, we receive reports from Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and the border region. They do not always give a clear picture and people are concerned about the situation. I request that you clarify the situation. How is it today?

[Khachatryan] The situation is (?quite) tense in Nagorno-Karabakh. There is a massing of Azerbaijani forces. The Azerbaijanis are massing forces mainly in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon. Judging from yesterday's report, it appears that there also is a massing of forces on the borders of Idzhevskiy, Tavushskiy and Noyemberyanskiy Rayons. (?Every) measure is being taken to put up resistance.

[Nazaryan] People also are amazed that despite a cease-fire agreement at Zheleznovodsk, the fighting is continuing. What, in your view, is the reason for this?

[Khachatryan] Apparently the Azerbaijanis have ulterior motives. That commission [words indistinct] has not yet started work. The Azerbaijanis [words indistinct] from this unstable situation. I think that their aim is to do to Shaumyanov what they did to Getashen. But they will not be able to achieve that. I can assure you that they will not be able to achieve that.

[Nazaryan] Previously, Azerbaijan destroyed Getashen and Martunashen with the assistance of the center. Today, however, Russia comes forward as a democratic republic, and together with Kazakhstan plays the mediator's role to prevent the spread of fighting. Today I am rather concerned with the following: Why the observers

are not coming, and have you, as the representative of the Defense Committee, asked Russia why they are not sending the observers to prevent such attacks?

[Khachatryan] These efforts are going on at a high level. The Internal Affairs Ministry and the relevant organs of the Supreme Soviet are (?dealing with) this matter. Defense Committee Chairman Vaan Shirkhanyan is now in Moscow for this purpose. We will see what will come out of it.

[Mahtesyan] On my part, I would add that our people should remain calm. Everything is being done to put up resistance to the enemy. This is being done on state level. Everything is placed on a state level. There is no cause for panic. People should feel no concern for our borders, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Shaumyanovskiy Rayon. [end recording]

Azerbaijan

Supreme Soviet Views Draft Constitutional Law

NC1010105791 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri
1800 GMT 8 Oct 91

[Text] The extraordinary session of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet convened in the republic's parliament building on 8 October. As expected earlier, the session began with an intensive debate on the agenda. Matters related to the Azerbaijan Republic's independence; the drafts of the appeals to the United Nations and the union republics; the national defense forces; the question of stabilizing the republic's economic, social, and political situation; the constitutional changes; and other matters were included on the agenda.

The representatives who support an independent Azerbaijan proposed that the question of the draft constitutional law on the establishment of a national council and the question of the declaration of a transition period until the next parliamentary elections be included on the agenda. An intensive debate was held on this matter.

For the first half of the day, the deputies discussed giving the republic's president additional powers in connection with the measures aimed at stabilizing the republic's economic, social, and political situation. Later they debated the draft constitutional law submitted by the democratic deputies block for the establishment of a temporary national council in Azerbaijan. The draft law calls for the declaration of a transition period until elections are held to the state organs. The national council will be charged with legislative powers during the transition period. Deputies Tovfik Kasumov, Mamed Kuliyeu, Sabir Rustamkhanly, Tovfik Bagirov, [name indistinct], Atif Kalenterov, Ismail Shikhly, Iskandar Khamidov, Bakhtiyar Vahabzade, and others addressed the debate and put forward various views and suggestions.

A commission was established at the conclusion of the debate, which continued until the evening, to work on

the question of establishing a temporary national council within the supreme soviet. It will submit its proposals on the establishment of the structure of the temporary council on 9 October.

Popular Front Assembly Meeting Reported

NC0910091291 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri
1800 GMT 7 OCT 91

[Text] The Azerbaijan Popular Front Assembly has examined the tasks of the popular front in light of the republic's social and political circumstances. The participants responded positively to the talks recently held between the popular front leaders and President Mutalibov. [Baku Radio Baku in Azeri at 2045 GMT on 7 October carries this same report, the only difference being that the 2045 GMT cast says that the participants "did not" respond positively to the Mutalibov meeting] They also examined issues the popular front will raise during the extraordinary session of the republic's supreme soviet.

The participants believe that emphasis must be given to the question of dissolving the parliament and replacing it with a national council. Those who discussed the plan said that they believe the national council should be established by opposition representatives and other deputies. All legislative power must be transferred to this council. The peoples deputies, who will not be included in the national council, will retain their status as deputies but will have no authority to make legislative initiatives. It was also noted that the national council must be temporary; in other words, it must continue only until the republic's new parliament is elected. The new parliament can be elected only after the enactment of laws related to the elections and political parties in Azerbaijan.

The representatives of Shafag and [name indistinct] towns in Geranboyskiy Rayon also participated in the meeting, explaining the serious situation created in the two villages by armed Armenian attacks. A decision was made to bring the situation in Geranboyskiy Rayon and in the other parts of the republic to the urgent attention of the supreme soviet.

Nakhichevan Decries Armenian Presence at Talks

OW0910140791 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1200 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Supreme Majlis (parliament) of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan maintains that Armenia's participation in the Zheleznovodsk talks on Nagorno-Karabakh [Autonomous Oblast, NKAO] was an instance of outside interference in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan and a violation of Azerbaijani sovereignty. A statement issued by the Majlis in the wake of the September 23 talks that had also involved mediators from the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist

Republic] and Kazakhstan, said that it was exclusively within Azerbaijan's authority to decide Nagorno-Karabakh's future. The authors expressed doubts as to the final document's capability "to ensure the attainment of desired goals."

Aliyev Calls for Food, Fuel From Iran

LD1010054791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1300 GMT 8 Oct 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Aliyev, the speaker of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic parliament, is calling upon Iran to provide fuel and food aid to the republic. According to a report from IRNA, Aliyev explains this by citing the problems caused by the blockade of roads leading to Azerbaijan.

Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast

Thwarting of Agreement Seen as 'Sabotage'

PM0910134991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Oct 91 Single Edition p 1

[Vasily Andreyev report under the "Trouble Spots" rubric: "Nagorno-Karabakh: Having Said 'But'..."]

[Text] The top-level meeting was awaited with great hope in Nagorno-Karabakh. And the meeting did take place. The documents signed by the top leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan through the mediation of the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan did appear to have loosened the grip of the undeclared war: No one expected a quick solution. But 10 days have now passed, and the situation has not improved.

Moreover, the latest TASS reports from Stepanakert increasingly resemble dispatches from a theater of military operations: Since the signing of the communique in Zheleznovodsk 20 (!) people have died. The blockade has not been lifted, but, on the contrary, has been stepped up: No freight has come into Stepanakert by rail for almost two weeks, and there is just one day's supply of flour left in this city of more than 50,000. There is no gasoline even for ambulances and fire engines. Children in Stepanakert have forgotten the taste of sugar, let alone candy.

And yet the two-week deadline for lifting the blockade was one of the main points of the signed communique. As people in Stepanakert observed, freight was stopped on the very day the 14-page document was signed.

What is one to call this phenomenon? Sabotage? Perhaps. People say they advocate peace and mutual understanding. But in fact we have a fresh escalation of combat operations and economic actions. However, the position of the warring sides does not surprise me: Both in Azerbaijan and Armenia there are forces which benefit for various reasons from thwarting the Zheleznovodsk agreement. But that is precisely why I am surprised by the conduct of the mediators. It was very likely clear to everyone that the signing of the document was only a small step on the way to a truce. Other steps, albeit small ones, had to follow; but step by step they would lead to a truce. However, as is our wont, it was signed and that was it. I appreciate that the presidents of two huge republics do have more important work, but where are their teams? The observers who from 1 October on were to have started work in Nagorno-Karabakh, but who have failed to appear there to date?

I am sure that political pressure by the presidents of the two republics, who shouldered the difficult burden of mediation in this interminable bloody conflict, could and would bring a peaceful outcome to the "Soviet Ulster." But consistency and fulfillment of commitments are essential. Ordinary people in Nagorno-Karabakh, who suffer from politicians' actions or inactions, expect this.

New Clashes Near Stepanakert Reported 9 Oct

NC0910173691 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 1600 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Report by ARMENPRES correspondent Aleksandr Grigoryan from Nagorno-Karabakh; date not given]

[Text] A new day of combat in Nagorno-Karabakh commenced with an exchange of fire in the Kirkidzhan settlement near Stepanakert. The Azerbaijani Special Purpose Militia opened fire on Stepanakert with automatic weapons. One of the bullets hit Aram Elyazyan, a sixth grader at School No. 9. He was taken to the local hospital. USSR Internal Affairs Ministry troops responded and detained six armed brigands. One Azerbaijani militia man also was injured.

Khurgan, a USSR Internal Affairs Ministry serviceman, was injured in Martuninskiy Rayon on 8 October. He was defending a passenger bus carrying Armenians which was fired upon. Fortunately, there were no other casualties.

The brigands' attacks have not ceased in Martuninskiy Rayon for the last few days. Edik Agabekyan and Vachik Arushanyan, residents of Martuni, sustained injuries from such attacks.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Comments on USSR Succession

PM0810104591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 Oct 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report from roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, RIA, and INTERFAX reports: "Nursultan Nazarbayev: All Republics Will Be Against One of Them Becoming the Successor to a State Like the USSR"]

[Text] Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated the above when he spoke at a conference of a number of public organizations and movements to create the "People's Congress of Kazakhstan" Party. What has been created by the entire people is the possession of all and so it should be, he added.

The conference adopted a statement which notes that the statements by Gennadiy Burbulis and Sergey Stankevich could "wreck the conclusion of an economic union of sovereign states."

Activist on Trial for Insulting President

OW0910210191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2000 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Alma-Ata's city court has started a trial today, Oct 9, of Bahythan Abirov [spelling as received], an activist of the Kazakh People's Front, charged with "publicly insulting the president of the Kazakh Republic".

Conviction entails a prison term up to 3 years or a fine up to 3,000 roubles.

The accused flatly denies his guilt. He admits repeatedly criticizing the president, but not insulting or disparaging him.

INTERFAX correspondent reports that after his critical remarks Abirov was forcibly subjected to an examination at a psychiatric clinic from June 10 to July 2, 1991.

Bahythan Abirov maintains that "the true aim of this political trial is to intimidate other activists of the democratic movement in Kazakhstan".

'Alash' Demands Leaders' Release From Prison

OW0910194491 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1730 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Over 100 activists of the Kazakh National Independence Party "Alash" have held a rally today, Wednesday, near the Alma-Ata council building demanding a release for their leaders arrested on Tuesday.

After the city council's chairman Zamanbek Nukadinov [spelling as received] refused to receive spokesmen of the party the rally started calling for the council executive's resignation.

Militia units have arrived at the site of the rally. At the founding conference of the Kazakh People's Congress Party held Oct 5 members of "Alash" accused the republic's President Nursultan Nazarbayev of slander and threats that "such a party as "Alash" should be banned for fanning ethnic strife".

Rashid Nutushev, Bolatbek Ahmet Ali, Muratbek Sengazin, Galia Abylhatina, [spelling of names as received] and some other members of "Alash" were arrested on Tuesday, as witnesses say, by "people in civilian clothes" without any charge.

The Alma-Ata prosecutor's office objects that "those people are charged with a grave crime". The deputy-prosecutor Serik Jakupov [spelling as received] refused to comment on the facts and motives of arrests "in the interests of the investigation".

The law department of the Alma-Ata city council explain that the arrested members of "Alash" are charged with insulting the honour and dignity of the Kazakh President.

Earlier Alma-Ata's persecutor gave the "Alash" members an official warning for taking part in an unsanctioned rally.

'Azat' Movement Holds First Congress

OW0810011691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1630 GMT 7 Oct 91

[Text] On Saturday and Sunday, Kazakhstan's public movement "Azat" held its first congress at the Alma-Ata House of Writers. The congress discussed and adopted the draft declaration of the movement's principles which says that its goal is to unite the national-patriotic forces for creating a democratic and multi-party society and an independent state-the Republic of Kazakhstan. Guided by the generally-accepted values and Islam, the society will work for the revival of the Kazakh nation and for full-fledged development of all ethnic groups, and aspire for "justice and spiritual, political and economic freedom." The congress elected Mikhail Isinaliyev chairman of the movement.

The congress also set up the group "Irtysh", which will campaign to change the name of the city of Yermak, located in the Pavlodar region, and to remove the monument to Yermak in its centre. The group's active members believe that this monument offends the national feelings of the Kazakhs.

Regional Group To View Economic Questions*LD1010021991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1730 GMT 7 Oct 91*

[Text] A number of inter-republican bodies will be set up in Central Asia and Kazakhstan to decide economic questions. The POSTFAKTUM agency reports this. The decision was made at a conference of representatives of the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviets of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan on questions of economic reform. The final document of the meeting was published in the newspaper SOVETY KAZAKHSTAN. In accordance with this document, it is intended that Central Asia and Kazakhstan set up an inter-republican committee to coordinate law-making activity, a special monitoring body under the parliament of the republic. It is also intended to study the possibilities for introducing a unified currency for reciprocal payments between the republics, the unification of the taxation system, customs regulations, decentralization, and privatization.

Kyrgyzstan**Preparations Under Way To Issue Currency***OW0810031591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2215 GMT 7 Oct 91*

[From "Soviet Business Report"; Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan has begun preparations for issuing its own money. The plan for the transition must be ready by 1992. One of the managers of Kyrgyzstan's central bank has told IF [INTERFAX] that an independent monetary system will be essential to Kyrgyzstan's economic prosperity.

Tajikistan**Calm Prevails as Presidential Contest Begins***PM1010091691 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Aleksandr Karpov report from Dushanbe under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Rallies Fall Silent. But for How Long?"]

[Text] On Tuesday morning Ozodi Square in the city center, after two weeks of turbulence, greeted the people of Dushanbe with an unaccustomed silence. But everyone realizes that the present lull could be deceptive.

The stubborn political confrontation between the official authorities and supporters of opposition forces resulted in a Tajikistan Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution on measures aimed at democratizing sociopolitical life in the republic. Ordinary opposition supporters have perceived it as the first significant victory for democracy.

The leaders of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the "Rastokhez" ("Revival") People's Front, and the Islamic Revival Party are more cautious in their assessments of this document. For them—sober-minded people, it must be admitted—what is more important is how the principles enshrined in the document will be implemented.

Outside observers are today worried about something different: whether it will in fact be possible to achieve the consensus for which the resolution—in both substance and spirit—undoubtedly paves the way. In the past two weeks the opposing sides have reached agreement several times. But then parliament met and... the efforts of the participants in the talks proved to be in vain, and an angry rally once again broke out in the square in front of the Supreme Soviet building. What will the deputies say this time?

"We must all learn to hear and listen to each other," A. Sobchak, member of the USSR president's Political Consultative Council, said at a news conference. "Unfortunately, this does not always happen. I have no intention of lecturing anyone. This deafness affects politicians both here in Tajikistan and in my own St. Petersburg, and indeed throughout the country. But the ability and desire to understand your opponent are the source of well-considered decisions and ultimately of concern for the people's well-being."

The first day of silence in Dushanbe was the first day of a calm, businesslike atmosphere for the 10 candidates for the republic presidency. The contenders' teams have begun work. I do not want to offend any of them, but many observers assume that the main contest for the post of president will most likely develop between USSR People's Deputy D. Khudonazarov, chairman of the USSR Cinematographers' Union Board, and republic People's Deputy R. Nabiyev.

Labor Collectives Form Strike Committees*PM1010154191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Oct 91 First Edition p 1*

[Report under the "Direct Line" rubric by TADZHIKTA Correspondent V. Zhukov specially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Agreement Signed"]

[Text] Dushanbe—The republic's labor collectives are making their presence felt with increasing determination. Their influence on the political situation in Dushanbe and Khudzhant is particularly noticeable. Strike committees have been created at enterprises in both cities. In Khudzhant, workers have demanded that the republic's legislative organ adopt no more hasty decisions which destabilize the situation in the republic. Strike committees and the board of directors of Dushanbe's largest enterprises are monitoring the supply of food and necessities in the republic's capital. They have taken part in talks between the Tajik official leadership and the opposition. Observers note that the workers' opinion and their determination to strike if the unstable

situation which is worsening the lives of the entire population goes on is noticeably cooling the passions of the conflicting sides.

Although Ozodi Square is still full of people holding rallies the conviction is dawning, even among opposition circles, that the time has come to end the marathon rally which has lasted many days now and give the republic's population an opportunity to tackle the harvesting and winter preparations in earnest.

As a result of the talks in which the leadership of the Tajik Republic and opposition representatives took part together with A. Sobchak and Ye. Velykahov, who were visiting Dushanbe, an agreement has been reached which has become the basis for adopting the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution "On some measures aimed at democratizing public life in the Republic of Tajikistan."

The main provisions of this document relate to lifting the bans on the activity of parties of a religious character, postponing the date of the republic's presidential elections to 24 November this year, settling the fate of Communist Party property, holding a nationwide vote of confidence in the republic's Supreme Soviet, and other questions.

According to a statement by representatives of the democratic party of Tajikistan, a number of foreign countries have imposed an embargo on trade with the republic. In particular, it has not proved possible to accelerate the delivery of wheat because of the unstable situation.

St. Petersburg Mayor A. Sobchak and the Dushanbe city leadership have signed an agreement to declare the Tajik Republic capital and St. Petersburg twin cities.

Winter Bread Shortage Unlikely

LD0910175191 Moscow TASS in English 1133 GMT
9 Oct 91

[By TADZHIKTA-TASS correspondent Vitaliy Zhukov]

[Text] Dushanbe October 9 TASS—"Tajikistan is not threatened by a hungry winter. The Republic has enough wheat to meet the population's requirements in bakery products and flour". TADZHIKTA was told by Tajik Minister for Bakery Production Abdulmalik Abdullodzhonov.

He blamed definite circles in the Republic for spreading vile rumors about "empty elevators", which produced a rush for bread. People are queueing up at Dushanbe bread stores from early morning. They buy scores of loaves each. According to the minister, "statements by opposition leaders, demanding an embargo on trade with

Tajikistan from several foreign states in light of the unsound socio-political situation in the Republic are exaggerated, to put it mildly".

The minister admitted that "after the appeal addressed by several radically-minded democrats to the United Nations and leaders of some sovereign states, urging them to impose an "economic blockade on Tajikistan", some foreign partners in Switzerland and several Arab countries began to display cautiousness during negotiations. Some of them were even deadlocked. Abdullodzhonov noted that now the situation was improving. Several large Swiss private firms have urged their parliament to adopt a positive decision on the granting of easy credits to Tajikistan for food purchases. Some Arab sheikhs have agreed to grant a credit of 110 million U.S. dollars to Tajikistan for the purchase of one million tonnes of grain. The minister did not name the "creditors" not to disclose the commercial secret. However, it is known that the agreement was reached with the mediation of Canada, which agreed to guarantee the credit.

Abdullodzhonov's statement sounds reassuring, but people are not gullible enough to trust this cabinet member's words. And they have reasons for this. After all, vegetable oil, sugar, cereals and tea have disappeared from Tajik shops, let alone meat and sausages.

Turkmenia

Niyazov Discusses Security With Grachev

PM0810214591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Oct 91 First Edition p 1

[N. Chunakova report under the "Around the Country" rubric: "In Favor of a Unified Army"]

[Text] Ashkhabad—The stance espoused by Turkmenia, which favors retaining a unified army capable of ensuring the security of the sovereign republics remains unchanged. Turkmen SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] President Saparmurad Niyazov said this during a conversation with Colonel General Pavel Grachev, USSR first deputy defense minister and chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] State Committee for Defense Questions, who is visiting here.

During the conversation they discussed a broad range of problems concerning relations between sovereign Turkmenia and the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces. In particular, they raised the questions of the need to create a military district on the republic's territory and the procedure for drafting young men into the Soviet Army.